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

Beyond Borders: Notes on the Colonial and Post Colonial Dynamics in The Americas, Europe and Indonesia

by Baskara Tulus Wardaya

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Beyond Borders:

Notes on the Colonial and Post-Colonial Dynamics
in The Americas, Europe and Indonesia

Baskara T. Wardaya SJ

In memory of my beloved Father,
who taught me to explore the world
beyond our traditional borders.

Beyond The Usual Borders
An Introduction

WHAT DID the Romans, Genghis Khan, Christopher Columbus and the CIA have in common? They were all "border crossers". They were not content with their respective traditional borders and they went pass these borders. The Romans were not pleased withtheir traditional territory in the Italian regionand they went to the four directions of the windin search of new territories. Settled in the cold area of Northern Asia, Genghis Khan often led his armies to cross their traditional borders andattack foreign lands, as far as Europe. Christopher Columbus and his companies did not seem to be happy with just living within the traditional borders in the Iberian Peninsula and went beyond the geographical limits, before eventually they founda new continent. Meanwhile the CIA, a post-colonial U.S. agency, oftenbusied itself with interfering the business of other countries, sometimes countries which werefar away from U.S. borders.

It appears that since the ancient times there has been strong tendencies among people and nations to go beyond their own borders, in the broadest sense of the word, in search of something different— different territories, different peoples, different opportunities, different spheres of influence, etc. Not surprisingly, the historical border-crossing-agents mentioned above were not alone. There were many others. To them we can add a list of other people who were also crossing the borders in search of something different, something new: the American Indians, the Vikings, the Germans, the Arabs, the Chinese, and many more…. In some cases these people crossed their borders to go to other placesfor good reasons; in some other cases they did it based on less-than-noble intentions.

The colonial and post-colonial periodsof world history were marked by the same tendencies. Throughout these periods there were efforts among different peoples to expand their knowledge and understanding beyond their conventional borders. Due to the ability to build bigger seafaring ships and better system of navigation during the colonial period people in Europe

continuously managed to cover great distances and found new territories hidden from them for centuries.

This book tries to humbly offer notes on the dynamics related to such a tendency, especially during the colonial and post-colonial periods. It wants to show how during the two periods people began to globally move around and influence (often dominate) each other, directly and indirectly. It happened not only in one place but in many: not only in England but also in South America; not only in Continental Europe, but also in Indonesia. As result, there were colonization, imperialism, birth of new ideas, global politics, cultural exchange, capital punishment, formation of trans-national communities, regional rebellion, war, et cetera.

As we will see in chapter one, for instance, a Creole by the name ofJose Xavier Leandro Baquijano y Carrilo tried almost all means available to him to pursue the highest position possible in the colonial government of Peru. Unsatisfied with the educational system in his country he crossed his country's borders and went to Madrid to study. Once he finished his studies he returned back to his homeland and shrewdly climbed the ladder of government position before eventually in 1812 he was appointed as *alcadel de crimen* (head of crime division) and later as *oidor* on Lima's *Audiencia*, a position that up to that time was allowed only for people from Spain. An Oidor, a judge of the Royal *Audiencias* and *Chancillerías*, was the highest organ of justice within the Spanish Empire.

The individual case of Baquijano certainly reminds us of the larger dynamics of the period in which many people in Spain (and Portugal) were not content with their own boundaries in Southern Europe and began to explore a wider world, crossing the Atlantic, before eventually they found a new vast land they called the "New World". In the early 1500s they began to settle the areas which today comprised mainly of the Caribbean islands, South and Central America. Similarly, in the early 1600s many people from England began to emigrate to and built colonies in the eastern coast of North America. The settlement was later followed by westward expansion at the expense of the native population.

In chapter two we will see how the cultural practice of doing witchcraft in the Caribbean could bring deadly consequences among the Puritan community in the colonial east coast of the United States. The chapter will offer an example on how external factors mixed with local politics could bring devastating and long-lasting consequences to the society. In chapter threewe will take a closer look at the colonial-period American newspaper called the *New York Evening Post*. As reflected in this newspaper up to the mid-18th

century many Americans were still very much European-oriented. It was well-represented in the *Post*. Instead reporting news about America, the news in the newspaper were mostly about events outside the American borders, namely Europe, and more specifically England.

In chapter four we will address an irony in the literatures pertaining to the role of religious groups in shaping U.S. foreign policy. On the one hand, religious groups have been very influential in the shaping of U.S. policies toward other countries. On the other, there were not enough publication discussing the issue. As this chapter will show, there are two schools of thought regarding literatures on U.S. foreign policy. One is the so-called negative-ecclesiastical school of thought. The other is the so-called affirmative-ecclesiastical school of thought. While the former emphasizes the limited nature of the role played by religious groups in shaping US foreign policy, the latter gives more emphasis on significant role that religious groups play in shaping the policy.

Chapter five talks about tension that existed between the Catholic Church in the US and the U.S. government at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, especially with regard to American occupation of the Philippines. The occupation raised at least two concerns for the U.S. Catholic Church. One, any occupation of a foreign country was considered against the anti-colonial principle of the US. Two, the people of the Philippines were mostly Catholic which in the US Catholic Church's view should not be subjugated under Protestant-dominated U.S. government.

In chapter six we will see the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 through a book called *The Brink: Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962* written by David William Detzer. This book is very interesting because it was written by someone who were actually "there" when the crisis took place, In addition, asthe sourcesfor the book he interviewed who were also "there" when the crisis unfolded. Other than giving the context of the crisis Detzer also gave the reactions and comments of the eyewitnesses of the crisis from President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev to ordinary American citizens. As we know it, the Cuban Missile Crisis was actually a cross-border crisis, since it involved at least three countries, namely the U.S., Cuba and the Soviet Union. Within the context of the Cold War one can imagine that any mishandling of the crisis could result in another devastating global war.

Chapter seven will take us to factors that led U.S. President Woodrow Wilson to come up with the idea of forming The League of Nations in the wake of World War I. As we will see, the factors were personal and national as well as international. As an advocate of international peace and collaboration,

Wilson was successful in selling the idea abroad, but he ironically failed to persuade his own country to ratify the membership to the League. Needless to say, Wilson's idea to form an international league in which the US was one of its members faile[76] Following the end of World War II, however, similar idea emerged and it eventually led to the establishment of the United Nations.

Chapter eight is still about President Wilson, albeit on a slightly different topic. Wilson might have failed in his foreign policies, but domestically he had a lasting impact on the American economy. Along with President Theodore Roosevelt, he was also considered a "progressive" president. Although originally a conservative, Wilson gradually became open to the idea that came from the Progressives, th[12]dea of fightingagainst monopolistic system of economy in America at the early years of the 20th century. Wilsonadopted and supported the Progressives by giving the government more authority and power to break up monopolistic practices done by big U.S. corporations. Wilson's policies would later be adopted by his su[120]sors.

In chapter nine we will see that President Wilson's failure in forming the League of Nations does not mean the death of the idea of collaborations among nations across borders. As mentioned above following the end of World War II initiatives to push for international collaboration for the sake of global peace re-emerged and it brought to the establishment of the United Nations which is still in existence today. In this chapter we will focus more on how the UN addresses issues on human rights.

One of the many ways nationspursued in going beyond their borders was conquering other nations. Imperialism was one of the forms of the conquering. There are several theories about imperialism. Lenin, for instance, believed that imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism. Schumpeter, however, proposed a different theory of imperialism. He believed that imperialism did not stem from capitalism, but from a different source. In chapter ten we will see what was actually the source behind imperialism according to Schumpeter.

Regardless of the many theories on imperialism, the practice of imperialism was not the only way for a nation to engage another nation. In the wake of World War II, for instance, nations in Europe wanted to engage with each other, but in a different way. They wanted to integrate nations of Western European through trans-national collaboration. Spearheaded by France, they began with limited economic collaboration. These nations then worked together beyond economic issues. The United Kingdom was invited to join the collaboration but the island-nation was not always sure how to respond. In chapter eleven we will look at how the British saw their role in the European

integration process, and how the membership in the European Union would or would not affect British social, economic and political life.

The last two chapters of this book are a bit different. While chapters one to eleven talk about other places, especially the Americas and Europe, chapter 12 and 13 will focus on Indonesia. The two chapters will remind us that even after Indonesia declared its independence on August 17, 1945, the former colonial powers still wanted to re-occupy the newly-independent nation-state. Chapter 12 will look at how World War II affected the struggle for independence in Indonesia amidst of the complex war-time relations in which the Netherlands wanted to recolonize Indonesia. Chapter 13 will bring us to look at how—through its intelligence agency—the United States involved itself in the domestic affairs of Indonesia, as a part to control the political and economic Indonesia in the post-colonial period. These two chapters will remind us that even after colonialism ended, more powerful nations were still in 340 ted in controlling weaker nations—albeit in a different way. Unfortunately it was not only the case of the Netherlands and the United States wanting to "recolonize" Indonesia, but also with the case of Indonesia which in 1975 invaded East Timor and occupied the territory for the next two and a half decades.

It is hoped that in this increasingly interconnected modern worldthis book will remind us that today's global interconnectedness is not something that suddenly happens. It was instead a result of a long and gradual process, in our case since the colonial and post-colonial periods of history. Of course, there are laudable and not-so-laudable examples of border crossings. Promoting collaboration among nations is certainly laudable but covertly intervening in the domestic affairs of another country is far from being praiseworthy. We want to learn the lessons only from the ones that are respectful of the interests and well-being of others. In any case, we hope that the chapters in this book will provide us with a broader context for the current phenomenon of globalization with all its impact on our individual as well as collective life.

On a technical level, if while reading this book you feel that each of the chapters are not smoothly connected, you are totally right. The chapters of this book were not from the beginningintentionallyproduced to be a single book. They were originally papers written as parts of class requirements while the author was studying for a master's and PhD degrees at Marquette University, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, USA. Only later were these papers collected and edited so that they can be published as a single book. If you still find it inconvenient to read it as a book, the author would like to sincerely apologize.

All said, the author hopes that you will enjoy reading this book (read: these notes) and the topics being covered. It is hoped that the book will help you continue to broaden your horizons; to seek new possibilities; to explore new territories beyond the usual borders. *Bon voyage!*

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Borders? I have never seen one. But I have heard they exist in the minds of some people.

Thor Heyerdahl

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Ambition of a Creole

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We cannot seek achievement for ourselves and forget about progress and prosperity for our community... Our ambitions must be broad enough to include the aspirations and needs of others, for their sakes and for our own.

-Cesar Chavez

JOSE XAVIER Leandro Baquijano y Carrilo was a very interesting *creole*. His life signified Spanish imperialism in Peru between late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. His ambition and struggle to receive Lima's Audiencia appointment reflected both his personal characters as well as those of Lima's colonial environment, where he lived.

He was a man with a good family background and strong personal characters. His family was wealthy and very respectable. His educational background and his academic appointments suggested that he w[133]an intelligent person. However, as Mark A. Burkholder shows in the book *Politics of a Colonial Career, Jose Baquijano and the Audiencia of Lima* (1990), Baquijano's aggressive ambition for an honorable *audiencia* appointment made him dissatisfied with what he already had in the family and misused his talents. For the sake of this appointment he also misused and was unfair to other people.

He eventually was appointed to the position he had been longing for, but most probably the appointment was not only based on his personal qualities. The basis for it

was also a mixture of shrewd unfairness and some external lucky favors. Despite his personal abilities and success, his unfairness in pursuing his career made it hard to admire him.

Unfair

Born on March 13, 1751, Baquijano belonged to an ideal family situation. Juan Bautista Baquijano de Beascoa, his father, was a successful businessman. Bautista was both wealthy and respectable. Maria Ignacia Carrilo de Cordobay Garces, his mother, descended from early Spanish settlers in Peru and Chile. She was related to titled families of Lima. In short, Baquijano was born in a socially and economically well-off family. Economic reasons, therefore, were not the reasons for Baquijano's quest for Audiencia appointment.

Baquijano was an intelligent person. He began his formal education by entering Lima's Seminary of Santo Toribio in April 1762, when he was only eleven years old. Three years later, at the age of fourteen, Burkholder writes, he already received his licentiate and doctorate degrees from University of San Marcos in Lima.

His writings in the Lima's *Amantes del Pais'* bulletin *Mercurio peruano* in 1790s also showed his intelligence. He was able to write well-thought-of articles covering diverse subjects. He wrote about the development of mining center in Potosi, about the Chilean grain trade and about different aspects of Peruvian social and political affairs. He grounded his writings in careful examination of written materials. His election as the first president of Lima's *Amantes del Pais* also suggested that he had special intellectual ability.

Baquijano seemed to be a hardworking person. In no part of the book Burkholder mentions or gives impression that this third Conde de Vistaflorida was lazy. The amount of writings he wrote and the numbers of responsibilities he had to handle suggested that he devoted most of his time and energy to work. In the book there was no mention about his laziness prior to his second visit to Spain, in which he began to be fond of gambling.

He was not a person who gave up easily. He seemed to be optimistic. Following his rejection to the audiencia appointment in the mid-1770s he did not just give up his goal. Instead, he learned from his failure and optimistically improved his career before he eventually resumed his pursuit.

During his second solicitation in Madrid between 1793 and 1797 he was rejected for several times. The rejections sometimes made him tempted to give up and returned home. However, his optimism kept him to be patient and modified his strategy. In 1797 at last he was appointed as a *numero alcade del crimen.* Had he been pessimistic and returned home after the first rejection, he would probably never achieve his goal.

Baquijano's optimism was probably based on his self-confidence. He was always sure of his own intellectual ability. His *Eulogy* for the newly appointed

Viceroy Agustin de Jauregui in August 1781 was full of self-proclamation of his own knowledge and intellectual ability. This way he wanted to assure the Viceroy and other colonial officials (especially Visitor General for Peru Jose Antonio de Areche) that he was intellectually sound and therefore deserved high *audiencia* appointment.

Being member of a good family, being intelligent, hardworking, optimistic and self-confident, however, were only "one of the two sides" of Baquijano's life. On "the other side" of his life he was a person who liked to misuse his family's well-being and his own good personal abilities to pursue his strong ambition. This ambition, in turn, made him selfish, manipulative and unfair.

Jose Baquijano
http://www.deperu.com/abc/biografias/88/jose-baquijano-y-carrillo

Manipulative Moves

As Burkholder shows many times in the book, Baquijano was a very selfish person. He did well in his services in Lima, but it was not for the betterment of the people he served, nor for the Crown. It was, instead, only for his own selfish interest.

When Baquijano was serving as an interim protector of the Indians, he seemed to do the service seriously and responsibly. He, for example, studied Spanish legal codes he needed to protect the natives under his responsibility. However, he did this not out of his concerns about the conquered. It was out of his concerns about his own bureaucratic career in the Audiencia. He wanted to serve well in order to have a possible stepping-stone to a regular Audiencia appointment.

He wrote numerous articles in *Mercurio peruano*. His main purpose in the writing, however, was not to enhance the knowledge of the readers or to find the best ways in dealing with the topics he proposed in his articles. His main purpose was to give written impression of his intellectual ability to the intellectual and bureaucratic communities both in Peru and in Spain. This way he hoped he would be considered for a high governmental position.

His academic service in the University of San Marcos, therefore, was not dedicated to the education of the students. His service in the University was dedicated to himself in pursuing his own interests. That was the main reason for his demand for retirement, as soon as he thought that his academic service was enough as the fulfillment of a requirement for an audiencia appointment.

In pursuing his selfish interests Jose Baquijano became manipulative. In several occasion he mastered and manipulated situations for the sake of his own benefits. Burkholder provides us with enough evidence to show this.

During his pursuit for the rectorship of San Marcos in 1783, for instance, he manipulated his good relationship with Viceroy Jaurequi. He proposed him a petition signed by forty-five people to demand consideration for the election of a new rector despite the fact that the University already had a current legal rector, Jose Ignacio de Alvarado.

When he challenged Alvarado in an acrimonious discussion on July 11, 1783, Baquijano manipulated the session. He had filled the cloister with his supporters, to ensure an election of a new rector. Supported by Viceroy Jauregui, an election took place. Baquijano run for the election, but he was defeated.

As Burkholder indicates, Baquijano used similar manipulative tactics throughout his next bids for rectorship. Unfortunately, he was always defeated.

In his letter to Charles IV Baquijano wrote the summary of his career. Here he manipulated his own career story. To the Monarch he only wrote about positive features in his service to the Crown. He omitted certain features that would not benefit him. Thus he did not write anything about his notorious *Eulogy*, which had been blamed by Spanish colonial government, both in Peru and in Spain. Nor did he mention about his manipulative moves in his

campaigns for rectorship in the University of San Marcos. In his letter he did not tell the whole story. He manipulated it in order to gain what he wanted: retirement of his position as *prima* professor at San Marcos, and at the same time an appointment as supernumerary *oidor* of Lima's Audiencia.

High Imperial Position

In his pursuit for his ambition Baquijano was also unfair. He involved some improper tactics such as bribery, family pressure and illegal use of influence. His campaigns for rectorship at San Marcos showed his unfairness clearly. In order to call an election and to oust Alvarado he misused Viceroy Jauregui's official influence. In order to win Jauregui's support he had shrewdly praised him in his *Eulogy* in 1781. The next rectors of San Marcos, Villalta and Dr. Domingo Larrion, became victims of Baquijano's unfairness. He would exploit his family's influence and wealth in his campaigns. Every time he was defeated in an election he would ask for the annulment, despite his prior agreement to abide the results.

In February 1797 Baquijano was eventually appointed as *alcadel de crimen*. Five years later, on April 2, 1807, he assumed his position as *oidor* on Lima's Audiencia. He, at last, reached the honorable position he had been struggling for.

Perhaps the appointment was based on his personal qualities as well as his service to the monarchy. However, other factors probably played more important roles in his success. Those factors were probably lucky favors and some degree of unfairness.

Viceroy Francisco Gil de Fabadoa and University of San Marcos Rector Tomas Jose de Orrantia were very favorable to the rise of his fortune in the 1790s. Their support played important parts in his second journey to Madrid in 1793. Viceroy Gil, whose nephew married Baquijano's sister, helped him and his ambition more acceptable in San Marcos and in Lima's politics. Meanwhile Orrantia supported him by writing the letter of endorsement to King Charles IV in 1793.

Baquijano was also lucky that his family had good reputation in Peru and Spain. The title of his father and the history of service for the Crown by his mother's family provided him solid family background for his appointment. His mother's death and the wealth he inherited from her strongly supported him in his financial affairs he needed in his second visit to Madrid. Without this money it was almost impossible for him to resume his ambitious pursuit.

Another factor that probably was no less important in the appointment was unfairness, namely bribery. As Burkholder mentions, it was possible that Baquijano had bribed some highly influential persons, including Manuel Godoy, in his bid for the appointment. This possibility is reminiscent of Baquijano's unfairness during his competition for San Marcos rectorship. According to Larrion, Baquijano and his family "employed other very irregular means" in securing his nomination, in addition to their efforts in lobbying and cajoleries.

It is very interesting to know that a *creole* was appointed as a high official in the New World colonial government. It showed part of the reforms in Spanish imperialism, which occurred in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In our case, it was a reform in regard to the (Iberian) peninsular monopoly over the appointments of colonial officials. Therefore, it is very interesting to see Baquijano's appointment as *alcadel de crimen* and later as *oidor* on Lima's Audiencia. The joy and celebration in late June 1812 following his appointment to serve in the Council of State showed the pride of the Peruvians that one of them had been appointed a high imperial position.

However, Baquijano's unfair tactics along his years of pursuing his aggressive ambition, as Burkholder points out, were far from being praiseworthy. It hardly makes him admirable.

≈ Chapter 2 ≈

The Invisible World and Puritan Justice

Looking at the Salem Witch Trials in Colonial America

The three hundredth anniversary of the Salem witch trials of 1692 comes at a time when witchcraft commands a scholarly attention that would have been puzzling in 1892 or even in 1792.

-Edmund Morgan

ON FEBRUARY 29, 1692, John Harthorne and Jonathan Corwin, the Magistrates of Salem Village, Essex County, Massachusetts, in New England (now part of the USA), were summoned. Tituba, a Caribbean Indian slave woman, was brought before them, accused of bewitching four girls, all under eighteen years of age. Probably because she was exposed to psychological and physical pressure, Tituba "confessed" that she had practiced a witchcraft upon those girls. At the same occasion, however, she "revealed" that there were two other women who also practiced witchcraft. As the trial continued and developed, Tituba's "confession" and "revelation" not only brought the two women into the court as "witches," but many others as well. Thus began the infamous New England witch-hunt of the late seventeenth century in North America.

The witch-hunt and the witch trial not only occurred in Salem Village. It spread to neighboring towns such as Andover, in which Martha Carrier was one of those accused of being a witch and was tried. Despite her denials, she was later executed.[1] Between June 19 and September 22, in the wake of Tituba's trial, more than one hundred people were imprisoned. Twenty would be executed, and a few more would die in prison.[2] Although the number of

human victims of the Salem "witchcraft" outbreak of 1692 was very small compared to that of European witch-hunts, this event remains one of the most intriguing historical moments in American colonial history.[3] It reflects how a Puritan community in New England dealt with a social tension in a way that was very much influenced by their socio-religious world-view.

Tituba's "confession" and "revelation" also demonstrates an example of how a modified non-White culture could fit the Puritans' belief in the "invisible world" and bring far-reaching consequences. In other words, the Salem witch trials signify the influence of an external culture on that of a white, Puritan community. Focusing on the witch trials of Tituba and Martha Carrier, this chapter attempts to demonstrate the significance of Tituba's role—along with several other social, economic, and religious factors—in the outbreak of the Salem witchcraft tragedy during the colonial period of North America.

Salem Witchcraft trial
http://womenshistory.about.com/od/salempeople/tp/Victims-Of-The-Salem-Witch-Trials.htm

Remained Slave

On February 29, 1692 a warrant for Tituba's arrest was issued. The next day, March 1, this "Indian Woman servant, of [M]r [Samuel] Parris,"[4] was brought to court for examination. She was charged with "Suspicion of Witchcraft" she allegedly did to Samuel Parris' daughter Elizabeth and her three friends Abigail William, Ann Putnam, and Elisabeth Hubbard, all of Salem Village, "afflicting" them with certain magical acts which resulted in a bizarre hysteria.

In the examination Tituba initially denied all the charges. But she later gave in. She did not only "acknowledge the fact" that she was a witch, but did also "accuse the other two" of being witches, namely Sarah Osborne and Sarah Good.[5] Tituba's "confession" continued with details of how she had met and followed the instruction of the devil: "The devil came to me and bid me serve him," she told the court.[6] She also admitted that the devil then ordered her to hurt the girls; that she had met the devil in the form of a black dog; that the dog had threatened her if she would not serve him; and that when she refused, she was enticed with "pretty things" as rewards.[7] She admitted to having pinched Elizabeth Hubbard the morning before the trial.[8] Tituba also admitted to have ridden a pole, with Sarah Osborne and Sarah Good behind her as fellow witches.[9]

On May 9, when in the trial took place, the 17-year old Elizabeth Hubbard accused Tituba of having been tormenting her by "pricking [,] pinching and almost chocking me" up to the day when she was brought to court.[10] Ann Putnam said that on February 25, 1692, Tituba had tormented her by pinching her dreadfully.[11] Samuel Parris—Tituba's master, 39—gave a very short testimony, saying that Tituba had participated in tormenting the "afflicted" girls. He also said that Tituba had caused the girls grievous distress until the day when she was brought to court.[12] His testimony was supported by a short testimony of Thomas Putnam.[13]

On the same day, the court indicted Tituba of having made a covenant with the Devil by signing "the Devills Booke" at the end of 1691. She was also indicted of having become "A detestable Witch" against the peace of Salem Village.[14] Tituba was found "guilty," and was liable to the death penalty. However, because of her "confession," she managed to avoid execution, although she remained slave.

Was Hanged

Martha Carrier was one of the six children of Andrew and Faith Allen, two of the original settlers of Andover, Massachusetts. Her birth date was unknown, but it was probably between the late 1650s and early 1660s.[15] Her family was not very wealthy, but neither was it poor. Her family members were considered "middling" folk.[16] Martha married Thomas Carrier, a young Welsh servant with financial troubles, in 1674.[17] They lived in Billerica in the early years of their marriage, but moved to Andover with their four children in the late 1680s. There a fifth child was born.[18]

On May 28, 1692, a warrant for Martha Carrier's arrest was issued. She was charged with "having Sundry [acts] of Witchcraft on the Bodys of Mary Walcot[t] and [Abigail] [W]illiams of Salem Village to theire great hurt & [injury]."[19] On May 31 was brought to trial. In the examination, Abigail Williams, Mary Walcott, Susan Sheldon, Elizabeth Hubbard and Ann Putnam all testified against her.

One of the witnesses, Susan Sheldon, testified that "She bites me, pinches me, & tells me she would cut my throat, if I did not signe her book."[20] Mary Walcott said that "the same that there lay. 13. Ghosts" of the people Carrier had murdered.[21] Elizabeth Hubbard and Ann Putnam supported this testimony, saying that Martha Carrier "had killed 13. At Andover."[22]

In the course of another trial on August 3, Benjamin Abbott, 31, testified that after having had a land dispute Martha Carrier had "putt me to very great missery, so that it brough[t] me almost to Deaths doore, & Continued, untill goodwiffe Carrier was Taken & Carried away by the Constable & that very day I begun to grow better."[23] Sarah Abbott, 32, Benjamin's wife, gave further testimony that ever since her husband was granted a parcel of land Martha Carrier had afflicted their cows, so that "some of the Cattle would Come out of the woods w'th their tounges hanging out of their mouths in a strange & affrighting manner."[24] John Roger, a 50-year-old former neighbor in Billerica, testified that Carrier had disturbed his cows, also he believed that "Martha Carrier was the occasion of those Ill accidents. By Meanes of Witchcraft she being a very Malicious Woman & further Saith Not."[25]

Phoebe Chandler, 12, testified that once he heard Martha's voice threatening him that he would be poisoned, as he indeed was.[26] Allen Toothaker, Martha's nephew, 22, complained that some of his cattle died without any clear reason. With regard to the deaths he said: "I knowe not of any naturall Causes of the death of the abov'd Creatures, but have always feared it hath been the effect of my Aunt Martha Carrier her malice."[27] Samuel Preston, 41, said that "about 2 yeares since I had some differences w'th Martha Carries w'ch also had happened sever'll times before and soon after I lost a Cow in a strange manner."[28]

Elizabeth Hubbard testified about Martha Carrier "almost chocking me to death: which I bel[i]eve she could not doe if she ware not a witch."[29] Mary Walcott testified that she "bel[i]eve in my heart that Martha Carrier is a most dreadful witch and that she hath tormented me and the parsons affore named by hir act of witchcraf[t]."[30] Thomas Putnam and John Putnam believed that "Martha Carrier the prizsoner att the barr has most dreadfully tormented and most grievously afflected the affore mentioned parsons by acts of witchcraft."[31]

The court then officially indicted Martha Carrier with "certaine Detestable Arts called Witchcrafts: and Sorceries, Wickedly and felloniously hath used practiced and exercised at and within the Towneship of Salem in the County of Essex afores'd in and upon and ag't one Elizabeth Hubbard of Salem in the County of Essex..."[32]

Throughout the trial Martha Carrier maintained her innocence. Occasionally she would deny the charges with short but strong responses, such as: "I saw no black man but your own presence," or "It is false[.] [T]he Devil is liar," or "You lye, I am wronged."[33] Despite her strong and persistent denials, the charges against her were maintained and on August 19, 1692, she was hanged.

Being a Witch

Tituba was an American-Indian from Barbados who was brought to Salem by a merchant-turned-minister, Samuel Parris. She served in the Parris household along with her husband, John Indian.[34] While living in the Parris family, Tituba apparently liked to practice a certain kind of fortune telling among some young girls of Salem Village, particularly those who were either members of or closely related to the family. The girls enjoyed such activities, being naturally curious about their future, particularly with regard to their future husbands.[35] During the winter of 1691-92, about that same period of time, interest in books on prophecy and fortune telling ran high in Salem and the surrounding communities, particularly among the young.[36] Throughout Essex County, small informal circles of adolescents, mostly girls, were preoccupied with divination and—as the Rev. Cotton Mather put it—"little sorceries" based on occult experiments with "sieves and keys, and peas, and nail, and horseshoes."[37]

On one occasion without Samuel Parris' knowledge, Tituba did some fortune telling for his nine-year-old daughter Elizabeth, her niece Abigail Williams, and two of their friends, Ann Putnam and Elizabeth Hubbard, matters began to get out control. The girls became frightened and upset. They experienced bizarre and unsettling physical phenomenon—some form of hysteria.[38] The failure of both Samuel Parris and the village physician, William Griggs to identify the girls' illness eventually led to the suspicion of the witchcraft and the accusation of Tituba of being a witch. This would result in the Salem witchcraft trials of 1692.

Indictment

Just as Tituba was a new member in Salem Village, Martha Carrier was a recent arrival in Andover. Although her parents were among the first to settle in that village, Martha had lived Billerica before she and her husband Thomas Carrier resettled in Andover. After their arrival there, however, they occasioned some uneasiness among the residents of the Andover community. To help ease their poverty, the town selectmen granted them a piece of land to start farming. The decision disappointed many in the community. A number of people became hostile toward the Carriers. Amid the hostility, however, Martha Carrier maintained her independent spirit and lack of deference for her more prosperous neighbors.[39] Martha's attitudes, in turn, only intensified the tension between her and her neighbors.

The tension increased when several of Martha's children suffered from small pox in 1690. Some people began to think that Martha purposely spread a small pox epidemic to the community. The selectmen then notified Martha's brothers and brothers-in-law that unless she stopped the epidemic the town would abnegate responsibility for her and her family.[40] Despite the warning, the epidemic spread in the community. A number of people in the Allen family, Martha's extended family, died. Martha's father and her two brothers died, as well as brother Andrew's youngest son, some of her in-laws, and another nephew. The striking number of deaths became a fertile ground for a rumor that Martha Carrier was a witch.[41]

That rumor became the basis for Martha's being accused of witchcraft when the witch-hunt in nearby Salem Village broke out after Tituba's trial. She was arrested soon after, and brought before the magistrates to be examined.[42] The testimonies of the witnesses all led to the court's indictment of Martha as a witch. The indictment led her into the hands of her executioners.

Less Significant

Tituba's role in the Salem outbreak was very significant. In her study on the Salem witchcraft trials Elaine G. Breslaw, for instance, demonstrates that Tituba played a central role in the early part of the Salem witch-hunt.[43] At the same time, however, she realizes that there have been few serious studies on Tituba:

> Tituba, ... in spite of her central and early role in that witch-hunt, has attracted little serious attention. The Salem records provide very

> sparse detail about her background and few scholars have turned to alternate sources for information on her life. She has no descendants who can speak for her or spark new interest in her guilt or innocence. Surprisingly, there has been minimal interest in her ethnicity or the relationship of her racial background to the accusations. Most important, the multicultural dimensions of Tituba's confession, the most significant evidence of a diabolical conspiracy in Salem, have been either misunderstood or ignored.[44]

Breslaw then suggests that Tituba's roles in the Salem tragedy, both as a victim and a willing participant, as well as a scapegoat and a manipulator of Puritan fears should be re-examined.[45] She disagrees with the common allegations that Tituba was practicing voodoo on the Salem girls. She argues that, her confession notwithstanding, there was no evidence that Tituba ever performed occult activities. "But those allegations and the sensationalist nature of the trials," she writes, "have overwhelmed the importance of Tituba's background and her status as a symbol of Puritan fears."[46]

The main reason for the very limited number of studies that might provide fresh interpretations is explained by Breslaw:

> There is a good reason for Tituba's low profile in the history books. It stems from the dearth of useful, direct information about her. Historians need reliable written, artifactual, or statistical evidence with which they can detail events or on which to base their conclusions. The absence of reliable sources often means that a particular potentially significant element has to be omitted from a study. Such has been the case for most of the underclass in history, particularly women, Africans, and American Indians, who leave few useful trails for others to follow and are, therefore, easy to ignore in the historical record.[47]

Breslaw also refutes previous notions that Tituba was an African slave. "It is clearly evident from all references in [the available] written records," she writes, "that Tituba was an American Indian and *not* African as later writers have assumed..." [48]

Literature on Tituba is limited. Even more so is that on Martha Carrier. There were some short biographical notes on Martha, such in Carol F. Karlsen's book *The Devil in the Shape of a Woman*,[49] but in general specific study on her is almost non-existent. The reason for this lack of literature is

probably because Martha is considered a less significant accused witch and because there is not much available documentation on her life and trial.

Cleverly Manipulated

When the outbreak was still at its early stage, apparently the Salem residents did not think that witchcraft was at the heart of the problem. Even Samuel Parris himself initially did not assume that the girls' illness had anything to do with witchcraft. That was probably the reason why he consulted the village physician, William Griggs. Surprisingly, it was the physician who, after failing to find the physical causes of girls' illness, suggested that the illness was caused by the "Evil Hand"—a term used to refer to the practice of witchcraft.

Tituba's involvement in Mary Sibley's "witch cake" undertaking to find the causes of the illness, which later was followed by the accusation of Sarah Good and Sarah Osborne, helped the "afflicted" girls turn the case into a different stage. On February 28, 1692, a warrant was issued to arrest and examine Tituba and Sarah Osborne. In the examination Tituba "confessed" that she was a witch who afflicted the girls, and told the court that Sarah Osborne and Sarah Good were also witches.

Tituba's confession, however, was doubtful for at least two reasons. One, although initially she denied the accusation, she later yielded to pressure from the Parris household as well as from the court to confess.[50] Another, Tituba chose to confess with the hope that her confession would release her from the punishment. As it is clear from the record of Tituba's trial, she stated that she was a witch, but she also said that it was because she was forced by the devil and even offered with "pretty things" by the devil.[51]

During the investigation Tituba apparently understood some of what her examiners and audience wanted to hear. Having lived in Salem for several years, she knew what the Puritan beliefs and fears were. In her testimony she mixed some aspects from what she understood about Puritan religious concepts regarding the "invisible world" with her own recollection of the Caribbean culture and beliefs. Therefore, her testimony before the magistrate was not merely that of a simple and honest slave, but a cleverly made utterance that manipulated Puritan beliefs and fears.[52] From the court record it is evident that Tituba's questioners provided her with clues as to what her answers should be. It was not surprising, therefore, that "a good part of Tituba's testimony was a direct response to those questions."[53] In the hope of saving her life, Tituba gave them what they wanted.

However doubtful Tituba's confession was, apparently her testimony brought far-reaching consequences in this New England Puritan community. It "verified" the Puritans of the Salem Village believed that the power of the Devil was indeed present and destructively operational among them. As Breslaw writes,

> Tituba's subsequent testimony confirmed the worst fear of a diabolical presence and gave the Salem worthy reason to launch a witch-hunt. She supplied the essential legal evidence required to begin the process of communal exorcism, to purge the community of its collective sin. Without her testimony the trials could not have taken place. Thus it was only after Tituba began to confess that the witch-hunt began in earnest. In her fantasies of an evil power, the Indian woman confirmed that the Devil was now among them.[54]

The impact of Tituba's confession, in turn, became a starting point of "the witch hunt that defied all past experience with witch hunting in New England."[55] At the same time it also became the basis for a great assault on gender roles, social-economic status, the Puritan justice system, and the clergy's authority. The "afflicted" girls and other accusers demonstrated how relentless they were in pursuing the assault.[56]

Many people would be accused of being witches and were jailed following the confession, and twenty people would meet their deaths in the outbreak. But Tituba got what she wanted: thanks to her cleverly manipulated "confession" as a practicing witch as well as her "revelation" of other people as witches, she managed to escape an execution and save her own life.

They Refuted

Martha Carrier was less fortunate. As we have seen, ever since her arrival in Andover with her husband Thomas Carrier and their children, she was not fully welcome in the community. Martha's independent attitudes and the selectmen's granting of the land to her family turned the community's disappointment into hostility. The small pox disease her children suffered along with many deaths in her extended family became a stronger reason for the Andover community to remove her from the town. What was now needed was an excuse for such removal.

The Salem Village witchcraft outbreak in 1692 provided the perfect excuse. Martha was accused of being a witch and was investigated and tried

accordingly. Validity of the testimonies in the trial, however, was doubtful at best. Many of them based their testimony on "spectral" evidence. A spectral evidence was almost impossible to prove or disprove, since this evidence was based on someone's personal and supernatural vision of a witch's activities, which were only visible to the person himself or herself.[57] Other testimonies were presented by witnesses under great physical and psychological pressures.

In the Allen family it was not only Martha who was accused of being a witch, but also her sister and brother-in-law, Mary and Roger Toothaker, their daughter, and four of Martha's children. Roger Toothaker died in prison before he could be tried. The others preferred to "confess" in order to avoid further physical torture. John Proctor, one of the men executed in the Salem tragedy, said that Martha's sons Richard and Andrew decided to confess after being "tyed ... Nec and Heels till the Blood was ready to come out of their Noses."[58] Soon after they realized that their lives were no longer in danger, they refuted their previous confession.[59]

Center Stage

The Salem witchcraft outbreak was not merely an event that came out of the blue. It was the product of a certain situation. Boyer and Nissenbaum, for instance, argue that the Salem outbreak of 1692 was partly the result of a socio-economic tension in the Puritan community of Salem Village.[60] Originally Salem Village was part of Salem Town. In 1672 the settlement was granted a limited and partial legal independence as "Salem Village." However, even after its independence it remained in many ways a mere appendage of its larger and more prosperous neighbor.[61]

In 1689, Rev. Samuel Parris, a former merchant who had been to Barbados and brought along with him Tituba and John Indian as slaves, attempted to build a separate church—the central pillar of any Puritan community—in Salem Village, but was challenged by those who opposed the Village's independence from the Town. In the annual Village election in October 1691 all Parris' supporters were removed from the Village Committee. The new committee members refused to pay for Parris' 1692 salary, which eventually caused a great economic difficulties for the Parris household during the winter or 1691-92.[62]

Underneath the Parris case was an enduring tension between the agrarian and less developed Salem Village and the "secular" life of the more prosperous Salem Town. Whereas the village was agrarian and closely tied to medieval and communitarian values, the town was modern and commercial. Many

villagers felt that their values were threatened by the town residents who had their own values and lifestyles. Such division probably helps explain why twelve of the fourteen initially accused came from the eastern part of the village, which was closer to the town, whereas almost all of the accusers were from the western side, which was further from the town.[63]

In such a situation, the "afflicted" girls—and later several other accusers—were able to carry the day. A number of men and women from prosperous families were tried and executed. The reason for this was partly because those convicted had in some way affirmed the prevailing beliefs in the existence of witchcraft, but also because of the deep and long-festering division within the Salem Village community.[64] These facts suggest that the outbreak of the Salem witch-hunt and witchcraft trials may have been the result of personal grudges as well as socio-economic tensions.[65] In 1692 the tensions eventually culminated in the infamous extralegal outbreak, which at the same time had some religious aspects.

The use of a combination between extralegal procedures and religious belief, such as a witch-hunt, was not unusual in the New England Puritan community. David Thomas Konig who studies the legal system in the Puritan community of Essex County argues that "the justification for extralegal activity was a traditional Puritan argument; indeed, some of the protests had an explicitly religious—often chiliastic—tone."[66] He gives an example of Jeremiah Watts, a Salem Village potter, who disagreed with the idea of separating Salem Village from Salem Town. To his minister he wrote that the idea of separating the Village from the Town could not be "accomplisht in A way of god when brother is against brother and neighbors against neighbors all quarreling and smitting one another."[67]

Konig also suggests that the Salem witchcraft incident was not unique. Similar incidents, but in a smaller scale, were common among Puritan communities, particularly in the Essex County. He writes,

> it was a sentiment shared by many in Essex who feared the clandestine violence of recalcitrant neighbors who would call their enemies 'damned toads' and threatened 'that the devil would have them.' Although the outburst of 1692 that made Salem synonymous with witchcraft in American culture was spectacular in its magnitude and tragedy, it was not the first instance in which people in Essex either used themselves or suspected their neighbors of using magical, satanic forces in their daily lives. Suspicions were common in that

society, but very few practitioners—real or reputed—were prosecuted for such activity until 1692.[68]

In this sense, the Salem witchcraft outbreak was merely one of many similar incidents in the community. What made the 1692 incident special was probably the role of Tituba in the beginning of the outbreak. Tituba's acculturation into the white culture helped her manipulate her testimony to the court and making it believable to her curious listeners.[69] Breslaw believes that Tituba's confession had a long-term impact on the New England's Puritan society. She argues that the Indian slave "participated in a process of cultural exchange that merged the world of print culture with that of the folk, activating change from the bottom up." Such a transformation, she suggests, "was as much the result of the details of Tituba's fantasy as it was of the Puritan need to believe her story and accommodate the unfamiliar Indian ideas to their own notions of evil."[70] The transformation further signifies the role of non-English influence in the shaping of the colonial, Puritan life of the seventeenth-century New England.

Such influence and its impact was certainly ironical given that from the beginning the Puritans of New England had been obsessed about preserving the purity of their commonwealth. For two decades, as Middleton suggests, Puritan ministers had been threatening the people that they would suffer for their sins. The surprise was that there had not been a significant number of people charged with practicing witchcraft. The hysteria that the Salem girls suffered and Tituba's confession of being a witch then became a perfect, long-awaited justification for their jeremiads.[71]

This leads us to conclude that any explanation of the Salem witchcraft trials should include several factors. There was a Puritan obsession with sin; the belief in the existence and active presence of the devil in the community; the belief in the active and destructive power of witchcraft; the social and economic turmoil in the two Salems and neighboring towns; personal vendettas; and influence of a non-English culture and belief into the Puritan culture and belief. All these factors obviously contributed to the infamous witchcraft outbreak and its horrible excesses.[72]

In 1693 the Salem witch trials continued with the same judges presiding. But by this time the atmosphere had changed. The horror had subsided, and almost all of the accused had already been freed. Some of the "afflicted" girls admitted that they had lied. Samuel Sewall, one of the judges, confessed his errors publicly. Rev. John Hale, the chief witness against Brigit Bishop--the first to die in the Salem trial-- allowed his confession to be published in 1697

as *A Modest Inquiry into the Nature of Witchcraft*. Cotton Mather kept silent in public but privately he had doubt "for my not appearing with *vigor* to stop the proceedings of the judges when the inexplicable storm from the invisible world assaulted the country."[73] In some respects, the Salem tragedy signified a passing era in the American colonial period. As the forces of old orthodoxy diminish, the new, more secular forces increased. By 1700 there were no more witch trials conducted by the justice system in New England.[74] And as the centuries went by, people's memories about the horrible witch-hunt began to fade--until the mid -twentieth century, when McCarthyism came into the center stage of American politics.

Remains Unclear

In the early 1950 a social outbreak similar to the Salem witch-hunt of 1692 took place in the United States. The outbreak began when on Thursday, February 9, 1950, Joseph Raymond McCarthy, a Republican Senator from Wisconsin, announced his allegation that the highest level of U.S. government had been infiltrated by a large-scale communist plot. In a speech given to the Ohio County Women's Republican Club in Wheeling, West Virginia, he declared,

> While I cannot take time to name all of the men in the State Department who have been named as members of the Communist Party and members of a spy ring, I have here in my hand a list of 205 that were known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping the policies of the State Department.[75]

Thus began a campaign that brought the United States into "that period of hysteria and frantic search for domestic Communists and traitors"[76] widely known as "McCarthyism."

Although the Senate investigating committee under Milliard Tydings which was assigned to investigate the case concluded that McCarthy's charges were false, the Senator continued his anti-Communist campaign. With his popular demagogic methods of anti-intellectualism and social envy he attacked officials in the administration as well as in the military. He also attacked many American public figures on communist charges. The senator's campaign caused broad social disturbances and destroyed many of his victims' reputation. The impact of the campaign was so threatening, people equated McCarthyism with "witch hunting"—a term which is closely associated with

the Salem witchcraft outbreak of 1692. The Salem witchcraft tragedy may have long gone, but its legacies still influence the twentieth-century America.[77]

It is probably also interesting to compare the Salem trials with today's American trials. With regard to how the justice system applied, the Salem witchcraft trials have similarities as well as dissimilarities with the trials in the United States of the 1990s. The trial of O.J. Simpson in 1994-95 was probably the most significant example. In terms of similarities, both series of trials involved minority-majority issues. As Carol Karlsen—who discusses the Salem trial from a feminist point of view—argues in her book mentioned above, the Salem trial involves the fact that in the Salem Puritan community women were considered a minority and a weaker gender. The fact that most of those who were tried and executed in the Salem trial were women, she believes, it was partly because they were considered minority and weak in the male-dominated Puritan society. In the Simpson trials, the defendant came from an ethnic minority (African-American), and was tried in a justice system which originally came from the white, majority society.

At the same time, however, the two trials have dissimilarities. Whereas in the Salem trial the minority lost the case, in the O.J. Simpson case the minority won—or probably had to win. In the Salem trials, the fact that many women lost their case (and lives) did not cause open social, violent conflicts. In the O.J. Simpson case, however, there was a possibility that a conviction of Simpson's guilt in the brutal murder case of his former wife Nicole Simpson and her friend Roland Goldman would trigger an open racial conflict between white and black communities such as the one which occurred in the 1990s Rodney King case in Los Angeles, California. A fear of such possibility affected how the Los Angeles justice community elected the presiding judge, lawyers, or the jury selection, which was obviously less favorable to the victims' families and the white community in general. A Simpson victory or defeat in the trial could be interpreted as a victory or defeat of African-American community in the 1990s United States. O.J. Simpson was found "not guilty," and therefore an open racial conflict was avoided. Whether in the O.J. Simpson case justice was served or not remains unclear, as it does in the Salem witch trial.

Notes:

1 Paul Boyer and Stephen Nissenbaum, *The Salem Witchcraft Papers: Verbatim Transcripts of the Legal Documents of the Salem Witchcraft Outbreak of 1692*. Volume I. (New York: Da Capo Press, 1977), 30.

2 Elanie G. Breslaw, *Tituba, Reluctant Witch of Salem: Devillish Indians and Puritan Fantasies* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1996).

3 Boyer and Nissenbaum, 1977: 3.
4 "[W]arrant vs. Tituba and Sarah Osborne." Boyer and Nissenbaum, 745.
5 "Summary of Examination of Tituba, Sarah Good and Sarah Osborne." Boyer and Nissenbaum, 746-747.
6 "Examination of Tituba." Boyer and Nissenbaum, 747.
7 Boyer and Nissenbaum, 748.
8 Boyer and Nissenbaum, 748.
9 "Examination of Tituba—A Second Version." Boyer and Nissenbaum, 751.
10 "Elizabeth Hubbard v. Tituba." Boyer and Nissenbaum, 756.
11 "Ann Putnam, Jr. V. Tituba." Boyer and Nissenbaum, 756.
12 "Samuel Parris v. Tituba." Boyer and Nissenbaum, 756-57.
13 Boyer and Nissenbaum, 757.
14 "[I]ndictment v. Tituba." Boyer and Nissenbaum, 755.
15 Carol F. Karlsen, *The Devil in the Shape of a Woman: Witchcraft in Colonial New England.* (New York: Vintage Book, 1987), 98.
16 Karlsen, 98.
17 Karlsen, 99.
18 [K]arlsen, 99.
19 "Complaint v. Martha Carrier, Elizabeth Fosdick, Wilmott Reed, Sarah Rice, Elizabeth How, John Alden, William Proctor, John Flood, Mary Toothaker and daughter, and Arthur Abbott." Boyer and Nissenbaum, 1977: 183.
20 "Examination of Martha Carrier." Boyer and Nissenbaum, 184-85.
21 Boyer and Nissenbaum, 185.
22 Boyer and Nissenbaum, 185.
23 "Benjamin Abbot v. Martha Carrier." Boyer and Nissenbaum, 189.
24 "Sarah Abbot v. Martha Carrier." Boyer and Nissenbaum., 190.
25 "John Roger v. Martha Carrier." Boyer and Nissenbaum, 190-91.
26 "Phoebe v. Martha Carrier." Boyer and Nissenbaum, 191-192.
27 Boyer and Nissenbaum, 193
28 "Samuel Preston v. Martha Carrier." Boyer and Nissenbaum, 193.
29 "Elizabeth Hubbard v. Martha Carrier." Boyer and Nissenbaum, 194.
30 "[M]ary Walcott v. Martha Carrier." Boyer and Nissenbaum, 195.
31 "Thomas Putnam and John Putnam, Jr v. Martha Carrier." Boyer and Nissenbaum, 196.
32 "Indictment v. Martha Carrier, No. 2." Boyer and Nissenbaum, 187.
33 "Examination of Martha Carrier." Boyer and Nissenbaum, 184-85.
34 Karlsen, 263.
35 Richard Middleton, *Colonial America: A History, 1607-1760* (Cambrige, MA: Blackwell, 1992), 162.
36 See for instance, Boyer and Nissenbaum, 228.
37 See Cotton Mather as quoted in Boyer and Nissenbaum, 4.
38 Boyer and Nissenbaum, 4.
39 Karlsen, 99.
40 Karlsen, 99-100.
41 Karlsen, 100.
42 Karlsen, 100.
43 See Breslaw (1996)
44 Breslaw, xix.
45 Breslaw, xix.
46 Breslaw, xx.

47 Breslaw, xx.
48 See for instance, Maryse Conde, *I Tituba, Black Witch of Salem* (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 1992). This book was a translation from the original French edition *Moi, Tituba, Sorciere... Noire de Salem* (Editions Mercure de France, 1986).
49 See Karlsen, 98-101.
50 The court summary of Tituba's examination states that "Tituba upon Examination and *after some denyall* acknowledged the matter ...." See "Summary of Examination of Tituba, Sarah Good and Sarah Osborne." Boyer and Nissenbaum, 1977: 746. Italics added. Karlsen argues that the girls' "possesion" was probably not without external interference. She contends that when the witchcraft was at its early stage, the "afflicted" girls were unable to tell who had tormented them. "Probably with some outside encouragement," Karlsen writes, "they eventually came up with the names of three people--Tituba, Sarah Good, Sarah Osborne--all of whom fit closely enough their community's belief about witches..." Karlsen, 245.
51 Boyer and Nissenbaum, 1977: 747-755, Karlsen, 37.
52 Breslaw, 117-118.
53 Breslaw, 117.
54 Breslaw, 107-108.
55 Breslaw, 117.
56 Breslaw, 117.
57 For a brief but sufficient explanation regarding "spectral evidence" see Boyer and Nissenbaum, 19-20.
58 John Proctor, as quoted in Karlsen, 101.
59 Karlsen, 101. Doubtful legal proceedings in the Salem witchcraft trials did not only occur in the trials of Tituba and Martha Carrier. They also occurred in the trials of other accused witches. Rebecca Nurse was an example of how the normal judicial processes were completely overturned. Nurse was initially acquitted. However, her accusers strongly urged the magistrates to order the jury to reconsider their verdict. She was retried, indicted, and later executed. According to Middleton, "Given the prevailing mood, many of those accused preferred to confess, since a confession normally entitled a person to leniency. Unfortunately, those who took this course had to name their accomplices in order to be convincing, so that even children denounced their parents in the general hue and cry." Middleton, 163. Many of the accused had to "confess" of practicing witchcraft, because defending one's innocence could be understood as not giving up the devil. Middleton, 163.
60 Boyer and Nissenbaum, 1977: 5.
61 Boyer and Nissenbaum, 5-6.
62 Boyer and Nissenbaum, 6-7.
63 For the thesis concerning the location of the accusers and accused, see Paul Boyer and Stephen Nissenbaum, *Salem Possessed: The Social Origins of Witchcraft* (Cambridge, Mass, 1974). See also Middleton, 167.
64 Karlsen, 245.
65 Middleton, 167.
66 David Thomas Konig, *Law And Society in Puritan Massachusetts: Essex County 1629-1692* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Caroline Press, 1979), 141.
67 Jeremiah Watts, as quoted in Konig, 141.
68 Konig, 145. Konig also argues that it was very likely that "many persons in seventeenth-century Essex did attempt to use supernatural power to effect specific goals." *Ibid.*, 146.
69 Breslaw, xxiv.
70 Breslaw, xxiv.
71 Middleton, 168.

72 Middleton, 168.
73 David Hawke, *The Colonial Experience* (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1966), 305.
74 Middleton, 168.
75 Sen. Joseph R. MacCarthy as quoted in David Halberstam, *The Fifties* (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1993), 49-50.
76 Melvyn Dubofsky, Athan Theoharis, Daniel M. Smith, *The United States in the Twentieth Century.* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.: 1978), 344-345.
77 Peter Teed, *A Dictionary of Twentieth Century History, 1914-1990* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 283.

≈ Chapter 3 ≈

Colonial Times Reflected

A Study in an Eighteenth-Century American Newspaper

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In America the President reigns for four years, and Journalism governs forever and ever.

-Oscar Wilde

THE NEW York Evening Post, published in New York between 1744 and 1752, was one of the first papers published in the British North American colonies. The type of news it reported, the apportionment of space to foreign and domestic news, as well as for advertisement and other features reflected various aspects of life in the colonies.

This chapter will show how to a certain degree the news and journalistic style of *The Post* were a reflection the 18th-century life in America. The fact that most of the news published in the paper were several months old and were reprints from European newspapers suggests the simplicity of the period's means of mass communication. It also suggests that Europe was still very central to the life of many people in the colonies. This chapter is based on a study of 26 weekly issues of the paper from Monday, October 2, 1749, to May 7, 1750, inclusive. The November 6 and 13 issues and the four December, 1749, issues were unavailable for this study.[1]

Only Occassionally

The New York Evening Post was published by Henry De Foreest, a printer who lived and worked on Wall Street, in New York. Sources on De Foreest's personal background, however, are very limited. Documentation on his life is very rare, while the available descriptions about him are usually very short and

obscure, suggesting that he was probably not a very prominent publisher in his time. Isaiah Thomas LL.D., author of *The History of Printing in America* (1970), for instance, only gave a very brief description on De Foreest's background. He wrote,

> Henry De Foreest was born in New York, and served his apprenticeship with either [William] Bradford or [John] Zenger, probably with the latter. I can learn but little respecting him. In 1746, he published a newspaper, *The New York Evening Post.* I cannot ascertain how long before or after 1746, this paper was published. But De Foreest was not many years in business. He printed several pamphlets, which I have seen advertised for sale by him in Zenger's *Journal*; also, *The Whole Book of Forms*, and *the Liturgy of the Dutch Reformed Church*, etc., an octavo volume of 216 pages.[2]

Charles R. Hildeburn, who wrote *Printers and Printing in New York*, gave a better description on De Foreest's background. Hildeburn described that De Foreest, who was

> New York's first native printer, was born in 1712, and baptized at the Dutch Church November 2 of that year. His father, Barent De Foreest, was a son of Hendrick de Foreest, who was a son of Isaac De Foreest, a native of Leyden who settled in New York about 1637. He was apprenticed to Bradford at an early age, served his time, and was admitted a freeman of New York City November 12, 1734. On the 24th of the following month he married Susannah, daughter of Benjamin Bill and widow of William Golding.[3]

> With regard to De Foreest's career as a printer, Hildeburn reported that [De Foreest] remained with Bradford for some years after the expiration of his time, and about 1742 became a partner in the "New York Gazette." Towards the end of 1744 he acquired Bradford's interest in this paper, and on October 26 of that year changed its name and time of issue to the "New York Evening Post"...[4]

De Foreest, who died sometime before August 1766,[5] was one of the first newspaper publishers in the British North American colony. According to Thomas (1970), *The New York Evening Post* which he published was the second evening paper in America, the first being *The Boston Evening Post* and the third

being *The Pennsylvania Evening Post*.[6] In New York, Thomas contended, the paper was the fourth newspaper being published in the city. In Hildeburn's opinion, however, De Foreest's paper was "the first afternoon paper published in America."[7] Hildeburn believed that "the paper was unusually well-printed and fairly edited," although it "was not a success."[8]

Despite the different opinions on the paper's place in relations with other papers in the colonies, it was clear that *The Post* was published every Monday. Each issue comprised of four pages. The paper's first issue was published on Monday, November 1744, and came out at least until December 18, 1752.[9]

In his paper, De Foreest put great emphasis on foreign news. In a typical issue, foreign news was given about 60% of the paper's space, while advertisement and domestic news were given 30% and 10%, respectively. The emphasis on foreign news, mostly from Europe, was very obvious almost in every issue. The January 15, 1750, issue, for instance, reported foreign news without a single domestic item of news, except for the names of incoming and outgoing ships in the New York harbor. Despite the fact that the paper was published in New York, most of the domestic news came from other colonies, such as Boston, in Massachusetts, and Philadelphia, in Pennsylvania. There was very little news about New York itself.

Occasionally the paper published business news. This news, however, was often very limited in quantity, and mostly from Europe. Domestic business news was usually only about incoming and outgoing ships in the colonies' harbors, along with the cargo that each ship carried with it.

As previously noted, advertisement occupied almost 30% of each issue's space. There were various items being offered, such as books, farmlands, window glass, and wooden boats. Occasionally, slaves were advertised, indicating the legality of slave trade in this period. An advertisement on April 2, 1750, for instance, announced: "To be sold a likely Negro Wench, who can do most Sorts of Household Work, and is a very good Cook; any Person inclining to purchase the said Wench may apply to the printer for further Information."[10]

Advertisements did not change with every issue. Sometimes one set was republished in several issues. One that appeared in the October 2, 1749, issue, for instance, was identically republished in the October 9, October 16, October 23, and October 30 issues.[11] A set of advertisements which appeared in the January 1, 1750, issue reappeared in issues of subsequent weeks until March 5, 1750. Some advertisements were even continued until April 9, 1750.[12]

The news reported covered a variety of topics, such as politics, economy, religion, crime, and others. The report on each set of news, however, was

usually very short. A typical news item often took only one or two paragraphs of a column. In addition, most of the news were again reprints from other papers. Only rarely did The *Post* publish original news. Throughout the issues under study, only one had a letter originally intended for publication in *The Post.* This was a letter addressed to De Foreest regarding the writer's objection to the existence of the Free Mason secret society in America, and published on the paper's February 5, 1750, issue.[13]

Difference of opinion was not very evident in *The Post*. Most of the issues were dominated by news and advertisements which did not reflect difference of opinion. Only occasionally were there letters to the editor which contained a person's position on a certain issue, such as the one against the Free Mason society noted above.[14]


NEW-YORK EVENING

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1802.

***New York Evening Post* newspaper**
http://www.rarenewspapers.com/view/592650

Thrown into the Sea

News on Europe's social, economic, and political issues dominated the paper. As previously noted, there was more news about Europe than about the colonies. Among European countries, England was obviously the main source of news. The paper often published matters concerning British internal affairs. The March 19, 1750, issue, for instance, published the letter of November 18, 1749, from the House of Commons to the King, and the King's response to the letter, both republished in full.[15] The same issue also published an address

which was presented to the King on November 17, 1749, and the King's response to the address.[16] News about the death of Princess Christiana who was born Duchess of Mecklenbourg was reported on the October 30, 1749, issue.[17]

The paper also published news items on European economic issues. The April 2, 1750, issue, for instance, republished an excerpt of a letter from Dean Swift's third volumes of *Miscellanies*, containing "*An infallible SCHEME to pay the publick Debt of* Ireland *in Six Months*." In the article the writer (whose name was not revealed) suggested that the British government should increase national revenue by "arising from the Tax on our *Vices*," such as taxes on perjury, fornication, drunkenness, swearing and slander.[18] The letter took almost 70% of the issue's space. In October 16, 1749, it published news on compromising taxes in The Hague, Netherlands.[19]

A plan to start a fishery project in Scotland, which cost 5,000 Pound Sterling was reported in the October 16, 1749, issue.[20] The October 30, 1759, issue published news on the arrival of a Spanish ship from Algiers.[21] The same issue reported news about a plan to find the remaining Moors in Spain and to transport them to work in America.[22] An item from Vienna (August 26, 1749) reported the failure to drive away a great number of locusts which destroyed crops in Germany.[23]

The October 2, 1749, issue reported an item from Madrid, Spain, dated July 9, 1749, that "His Catholick Majesty [of Spain] being determined to put an End to the illicit Trade carried on in America has sent the strictest Orders for that purpose to his Governors..."[24] The March 19, 1750, edition published "RULES proper to be observed in TRADE" in which one of the rules was "the golden rule of doing *as you would be done unto*."[25]

News and articles on public morality were given a fair amount of prominence in *The Post*. On Monday, November 27, 1749, for instance the paper republished a story on such a topic from *The London Magazine* of August 1749. Using a character by the name of Volpone, the story was intended to discourage people from deceiving others: "Of all evils that disturb and interrupt the peace of civil society, there is scarce any one comparable to a publick cheat and impostor."[26]

An article published on October 2, 1749, issue discussed the importance of honor and virtue in life. It stated that

> true Honour is the Applause of right reason, which always attends virtue, As the Shade attends the Substance, and is inseparable from it. True honour, like the Sun's Light, is Virtue's Examination, which

> though not always seen, yet always shines. Virtue is the Child of right reason, as Vice is that of Folly; and, tho' any nation should be so far plunged in Sensuality and Corruption, as to dispise Virtue, and pay all outward Honours to Vice, yet such nation would thereby only dishonor itself; for Virtue will always have its intrinsick Honour, nor does the Swine's not esteeming the Pearl, diminish at all its real Value; from hence it appears that Darkness may sooner proceed form the Sun, than true Honour from any vicious Action.[27]

On January 8, 1750, the paper republished a letter to the editor which was taken from *The London Gazette*, of September 2, 1749. The writer, who used a pseudonym "Britannicus," emphasized the role of vice and virtue in the rise and fall of a nation. His letter occupied almost the entire first page of the issue, or almost a quarter of the whole paper. In the same issue the paper republished an extensive composition criticizing the practice of gambling in society, "An Essay on Gaming." The essay, which did not include the name of the writer, declared that

> a gaming table is the school of iniquity, where all the vices of the age are taught and practiced, the temple of Lucifer, in which immortality and profaneness (*sic*), drunkenness and debauchery, cheating and lying, rabine and murder, have their place of residence; nor can any man enter, without great danger of infection: But, what is still worse, the distemper is of such a malignant nature, that whoever has the misfortune to catch it, remains incurable; for there is not one in a thousand that ever recover. Age and experience, Time and reflection, have in some cases reformed numbers, and turn'd them aside from their favorite vices.[28]

The October 16, 1749, issue republished an article from a British magazine, *The Gentleman's Magazine,* about the lack of morality in society. It declared that "the scandalous connivance at brothel houses, and the methods used to furnish them with fresh supplies of women is too shocking to be mentioned! It is high time for reformation."[29]

The Post often reported news on European social issues. On October 16, 1749, for instance, it published news from Hamburg about a riot in the town of Altena, which was caused by a conflict between "a Jew and a Journeyman Taylor."[30] The same issue reported a flood in Rome caused by heavy rain.[31] On August 11, 1749, came the news that four alleged "conspirators" were

executed in public rather sadistically in Malta. The four had been "carried through the principal Streets of the Town, where they were pinched with red hot Pincers, and had boiled Pitch poured into the Wounds, they were afterwards strangled, and their Bodies burnt."[32] On August 18, 1749, it was reported that a Jew and a Grecian were executed in Malta for involving in a "conspiracy" and for "seducing slaves." The two died shortly after being "put into sacks and thrown into the sea."[33]

Border Settlement

Religious news often appeared in *The Post*. The October 30, 1749, issue, for instance, reported the persecution of the Christians in the Empire of China.[34] It also published news from Rome about the Pope prohibiting activities which he thought might profane the Holy year, such as "opera, comedy, or other theatrical piece."[35] The issue reported that "as these are some of the principle entertainment of the noblesse, several cities have made representation upon this subject, entreating the pope at least to permit the exhibiting of spiritual piece; but his holiness persists in an absolute prohibition."[36] Occasionally there were remarks which reflected an anti-Catholic sentiment, such as speaking of the "Popish clergy."[37]

Despite the fact that the paper frequently published articles on public morality, including a criticism on gambling, it often published news and advertisement on lottery. The January 1, 1750 issue, for instance, published an advertisement on "The Scheme of a Lottery in Woodbridge, in the county of Middlesex" which appeared in every single issue, until March 5, 1750.[38]

In terms of quantity, news about North American colonies were few. The Monday, November 20, 1749, issue, for instance, contained only about 6% of its news from the colonies. The rest came from Europe. The only American news was an item from Boston about a number of people who met at the Town House to improve their town's economy, and one from New York about a boy who had been found dead in a dock near the Old-Slip.[39] The January 1, 1750, issue published only one paragraph of news from New York. Even so, it was not "news" in the strict sense, since it was a public notice regarding the selling of liquor in the city. The rest of the paper only published news from Europe, and advertisements.[40]

News from the colonies were usually less political, such as the sinking of the ship *Diamond* from Virginia on its way to London, and an accident in a saw mill in Worcester, near Boston, in which a 60-year-old man was killed.[41] The paper also published news on social events in the colonies, such as a public

Thanksgiving celebration in Boston, on October 23, 1749.[42] The March 19, 1750, issue reported that a fire had consumed the house of Rev. Whipple of Hampton Falls, New Hampshire, and another fire had destroyed the dwelling house of Capt. John Dwight of Thompson, Connecticut. In the latter, it was reported, "a Negro Man was burnt to Death, but through divine Goodness the rest of the Family just made shift to escape the Flames."[43] News on crime in the colonies was reported in the October 30, 1749, issue, reporting that two convicted robbers, James Johnson and Thomas Fielding, was executed in Philadelphia on October 26, 1749.[44]

With regard to the British-Indian-French relations, *The Post* often reported that the French helped the Indians in attacking North American British colonies. The February 5, 1750, issue, reported that

> a Number of the French Inhabitants had Join'd the Indians in the Attack of the Fort at Minas, sent a party of Men to seize them, who had the good Fortune to take three of 'em, and bro't them to Halifax on the 1st Instant. By these fellows they learn'd that there were about a dozen more of their Countrymen who had join'd the Indians in the abovementioned Attack, and a Number of Penobscot Indian. The Frenchmen pleaded in Execute of their Conduct, that they were obliged by the Indians to join them, on pain of Death.[45]

The March 19, 1750, issue published an "Extract from the Journal of the Honourable House of Representatives" of Saturday, January 13, 1749, in which it was discussed border settlement between British and French territories.[46]

Advertisers

From reading the type of news printed during the period under study, several notions become apparent. First, *The Post* put a great emphasis on foreign, i.e. European, news. As noted in the beginning of this chapter it probably suggests that in America during this period Europe was still central for the life of many people. The idea of American independence from Europe, i.e. from the British Empire, was not yet very significant.[47] Orientation toward England as a "model" of social and political entity was still very strong. The closeness with England is also indicated by the amount of the news which came from that country. In the October 2, 1749, issue, for instance, almost 30% of the news came from London, and in almost every issue there was news from London.

The paper also often published news which were exclusively concerned with British internal affairs. As previously noted, the November 18, 1749, issue republished both a letter from the House of Commons to the King and the King's response.[48] The same issue also published the Lord's address which was presented to the King on November 17, 1749, and the King's response to the address.[49] The fact that the paper's logo was very similar to the British royal coat of arms also suggests a closeness to England.

Second, *The Post* indicates the simplicity of mass communication technologies in the colonies during the period. The transfer of information still greatly depended on the ships which connected the two sides of the Atlantic, delaying the publication of news from Europe took several months until it reached *The Post*'s readers in America. At the same time the lack of technology also made it difficult to gather news from the colonies themselves, except from big cities such as New York, Boston and Philadelphia. No wonder that among the news printed only 10% was domestic, compared to the 60% of foreign news.

Third, with regard to the source of news, it was not clear whether De Foreest had his own journalists. Since most of the news were reprints from other papers one is inclined to refer that De Foreest did not have his own journalists. Besides, except De Foreest's own name, there was no mention of other staff members' names in *The Post*. This probably indicates that De Foreest was probably more a printer than a newspaper editor. He reprinted in his paper whatever material available from other papers. His main concern must have been to attract advertisers in his paper, rather than to offer fresh news to his readers.

Complexity

In comparison to *The Post*, modern newspapers are very different. The two and a half centuries since its publication have brought great changes in the newspaper publication in America. The mid-Eighteenth-century paper was much simpler compared to today's papers, such as *The New York Times.* While *The Post* was dominated by foreign news, *The Times* is full of domestic news. *The Times* issue of November 28, 1996, for instance, only had less than 20% of its space which was dedicated for foreign news.[50] Europe is no longer the only source of foreign news. The same issue of *The Times* present source of news such as Zaire, Indonesia, Mexico, and Korea.

Clearly today's newspapers use superior mass communication technologies. Most of the news today reach the readers by the following day.

The news about the result of the American presidential election on November 8, 2016, for isntance reached the readers of The *Times* on the following morning.[51] In addition to the paper's edition, which is published daily—not weekly as in the case of The *Post*—*The Times* also provides a computerized on-line service on the internet, which is updated several time each day.

Unlike *The Post*, *The Times* has its own numerous journalists who are assigned to gather news from different parts of the world. On the editorial page there is a list of names, not only of the publisher, but also of the other principal staff members of the paper. This of course does not include the names of numerous journalists and many other people who work for the paper. Further, each issue of The *Post* comprised only of four pages. *The Times* has over fifty. An average issue of *The Times* today, for instance, there could be 20 pages of the main section, 16 pages of "The Living Arts" section, and 16 pages of the "Business Today" section. *The Times* also publishes many more news topics than *The Post* ever did. *The Times* publishes not only social and political news, but also news on arts, mink farms, fashion, sports events, weather, entertainment information, and others. In *The Times* much of the news and advertisement are accompanied by pictures—something that *The Post* did not have. Needless to say, just as the simplicity of *The Post* reflected certain aspects of life in the mid-eighteen-century America, the complexity of *The Times*' publication reflects the complexity of life in the twenty first-century America.

Notes:

1 Issues under study for this chapter are issues published in October 2, 9, 16, 23, 30, 1749; November 20, 27, 1749; January 1, 8, 15, 22, 29, 1750; February 5, 12, 19, 26, 1750; March 5, 12, 19, 26, 1750; April 2, 9, 16, 23, 30, 1750; May 7, 1750.

2 Isaiah Thomas LL.D., *The History of Printing in America* (New York: Wheathervane Books, [illegible] from the Second Edition by Marcus A. McCorison, 1970), 471.

3 Charles R. Hildeburn, *Sketches of Printers and Printing in Colonial New York* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1895), 55-57.

4 Hildeburn, 57.

5 Hildeburn, 58.

6 Thomas, 440.

7 Hildeburn, 57.

8 Hildeburn, 57. After 1752 De Foreest's *New York Evening Post* was discontinued for unknown reasons. In 1800 a paper with similar name, *Evening Post*, was published in New York by William Coleman (1766-1829). With regard to De Foreest's quality as a publisher, Thomas argued that "if we may judge of the editorial abilities, and the correctness of the printer, by the following extract from the *Evening Post* of October 13, 1746, we shall not be led to rank him with the editor of the present *New York Evening Post,* who is one of the most able and celebrated conductors of a public journal in the United States." Thomas, 495.

9 In the microfilm of *The Post* produced by Readex Film Products, the earliest recorded issue was the December 17, 1744, issue. This issue, however, was number four edition. See *New York Evening Post*, December 17, 1744. The Marquette University Library on-line catalog, where this study was conducted, states that the paper's first issue was published on November 26, 1744.
10 April 2, 1750, p. 4.
11 See *The New York Evening Post* October 2, 1749, p. 4; October 9, 1749, p. 4; October 16, 1749, p. 4; October 23, 1749, p. 4; October 30, 1749, p. 4.
12 See *New York Evening Post*, January 1, 1750, p. 4; January 8, 1750, p. 4; January 15, 1750, p. 4; January 22, 1750, p. 4; January 29, 1750, p. 4; February 5, 1750, p. 4; February 12, 1750, p. 4; February 19, 1750, p. 4; February 26, 1750, p. 4; March 5, 1750, p. 4.
13 February 5, 1750, p. 1.
14 February 5, 1750, p. 1.
15 March 19, 1750, p. 1.
16 March 19, 1750, pp. 1-2.
17 October 30, 1749, p. 2.
18 April 2, 1750, pp. 1-2.
19 October 16, 1749, p.1.
20 October 16, 1749, p. 2.
21 October 30, 1749, p. 1.
22 October 30. 1749, p.1.
23 November 20, 1749, p.1.
24 October 2, 1749, p. 1.
25 March 9, 1750, p. 2.
26 November 27, 1749, p. 1.
27 October 2, 1749, p. 1.
28 January 8, 1750, p. 2.
29 October 16, 1749, p. 2.
30 October 16, 1749, p. 2.
31 October 16, 1749, p. 1.
32 November 20, 1749, p. 1.
33 November 27, 1749, p. 2.
34 October 30, 1749, p. 2.
35 May 7, 1750, p. 2.
36 May 7, 1750, p. 2.
37 April 2, 1750, p. 1.
38 See the paper's editions of January 1, 8, 15, 22, 29, 1750; February 5, 12, 19, 26, 1750; March 5, 1750.
39 November 20, 1749, p. 3.
40 January 1, 1750, p. 3.
41 April 2, 1750, p. 3.
42 October 30, 1749, p. 2.
43 March 19, 1750, p. 3.
44 October 30,1749, p. 3.
45 February 5, 1750, p. 3.
46 March 19, 1750, pp. 2-3.
47 Even as late as 1773 the would-be American revolutionists such as Benjamin Franklin were still in favor of maintaining the British North American colonies as part of the British Empire. See Esmond Wright, *Franklin of Philadelphia* (Cambridge, MA and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press) 1986, 224-232.

48 *New York Evening Post*, March 19, 1750, p. 1.
49 *New York Evening Post*, March 19, 1750, pp. 1-2.
50 *The New York Times*, November 28, 1996.
51 *The New York Times*, November 9, 2016. See: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/us/politics/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-president.html Accessed February 13, 2017

≈ Chapter 4 ≈

Religious Groups and the Shaping U.S. Foreign Policy: *A Historiography*

Human rights is the soul of our foreign policy, because human rights is the very soul of our sense of nationhood.

-Jimmy Carter

WRITING A historiography on the role of religious groups in the shaping of U.S. foreign policy is both interesting and challenging. It is interesting to see how non-political factors such as religious affiliation influence political affairs, in this case in the making of foreign policy.

At the same time it is challenging, because literatures on this topic is far from abundant. As Ted G. Jelen, who has written numerous books on the relationship between religious belief and political attitude, states, "with few exceptions... there have been relatively few studies of the effects of religion as a source of foreign policy attitudes toward international affairs."[1] This neglect of religion as source of foreign policy is somewhat surprising, because religious organizations, as this historiography will show, are important sources of political attitudes. This chapter will discuss the historiography on the topic with the focus on the period up to the mid-1990s.

From the available literature up to the period, there were at least two schools of thought regarding the historiography on the role of religious groups in the shaping of American foreign policy. One was what we might call the negative-ecclesiastical school of thought that emphasizes the limited nature of the role played by religious groups in it. The other was what we perhaps would call the affirmative-ecclesiastical school of thought, which emphasized the significant role of religious groups in shaping United States foreign policy.

Among the areas of American foreign policy most discussed in relations with religious groups were the Arab-Israeli conflict, humanitarian works abroad such as refugee service, U.S.-Vatican diplomatic relation, human rights policy, and American involvement in foreign wars.

Misunderstood

Douglas Johnston is one of the writers who emphasize the limitedness of role played by religious groups in shaping American foreign policy. In the introduction of the book *Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft*[2] he suggests that there is a growing number of ordinary religious personalities who play important roles at different levels in international relations: people who seek to promote peaceful change "from the middle." According to him, sometimes in the realm of official mediation and in the anonymous, behind-the-scenes realm of non-official diplomacy, these people make their mark in the world of negotiation and conflict resolution.[3] However, despite the significance of their roles, Johnston argues, individuals operating on a religious or spiritual basis have been particularly neglected in the study of international relations.[4]

Moreover, many Americans, according to Johnston, the executive vice president and chief operating officer of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, also inadequately appreciate the transformational possibilities that exist when the parties involved in an international conflict can be appealed to on the basis of shared spiritual convictions or values.[5] Many American foreign policy practitioners are also often inadequately equipped to deal with situation involving other countries in which the imperatives of religious doctrines blend intimately with those of economics, culture, and politics. Because of the degree of which the Americans separate their spiritual lives from their public ones, he further argues, they face a certain difficulties in comprehending the depths to which religious and political considerations interact in shaping the perceptions and motivations of individuals from other societies.[6]

In line with Johnston, Edward Luttwark, in his essay "The Missing Dimension"[7] is concerned about the inadequateness of the religious dimension in American foreign policy. He is particularly concerned about what he calls the "Enlightenment prejudice" which underestimates the role of religion in international relations. He states that many people such as policy makers, diplomats, journalists, and scholars who usually over interpret economic causality and minutely categorize political affiliations, often disregard the role of religion, religious institutions, and religious motivations

in explaining politics and conflicts. "Equally," he writes, "the role of religious leader, religious institution, and religiously motivated lay figures in conflict resolution has also been disregarded—or treated as a marginal phenomenon hardly worth noting."[8] He further argues that while the divisive character of religion is widely recognized, its observe contributions to resolving conflict are all but totally *unknown*.[9]

Luttwark, director of the Geoeconomics Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and writer of *The Endangered American Dream* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), shows some examples which indicate the failure to regard the role of religion in international conflicts which resulted in the disastrous American foreign policies: Lebanon, the *Intifadah* in Palestine, Vietnam, Sudan, and Iran.[10] The failure of the CIA to support a single proposal for following the religious dimension of the Iranian politics, for instance, was an example which followed a pattern of distortion caused by official America's "secularizing reductivism," defining the struggle by way of conventional Western political and economic categories. [11]

Vietnam was another example. In the fall of 1971, the United States urged the Vietnamese Catholics and Buddhists to put up an electoral candidate against President Thiu. The CIA had especially good contacts with both groups. But American talks with the Buddhists were enigmatic at best. The Catholics were seemed easier: they were perceived as the "hard-liners." Meanwhile, the use of the term "hard liners" itself is an example of how officials in the United States viewed the whole situation exclusively in political terms[12], which of course is inadequate. As in these examples show, "the missing or diminishing of the religious element in diplomatic reporting... led naturally to failures in action and policy."[13]

Luttwark in his concluding remarks suggests that *blindness to spiritual elements* has frequently led U.S. diplomacy to hope and action when despair and inaction would have been more appropriate.[14] American diplomats, raised in the Enlightenment secularism of the Realist school, in his view, are often unprepared to see spiritual aspects of problems and possible solutions or to cope with the whole cultural richness, including the intellectual life and structure of belief of the people (not just institutions) with whom they deal abroad.[15]

Reassessing the tradition and intellectual habit of dogmatic secularism described by Edward Luttwark, in his article "Implications for the Foreign Policy Community."[16] Stanton Burnett highlights the notion of religion as the "missing dimension" in U.S. foreign policy. [17] Inadequate recognition of the defining character of spiritual element in U.S. foreign policy, according

to him, is more likely to occur in the Third World. Weak and ineffective governments are often transformed in diplomatic reporting into communities whose binding fabric is weak. "Yet the real warp and woof of the social fabric," he writes, "sometimes almost invisible to modern Western eyes."[18] This occurs, according to Burnett, because foreign policy makers in the West hardly realize that the core of the problem is often hidden in the religious institutions and spiritual phenomena woven deep into the culture. "When this thread is missed," he continues, "diplomacy based on the assumption that a weak government equals a weak community is flawed from the outset."[19]

According to Burnett, writer of *Investing in Security: Economic Aid for Noneconomic Purposes* (1992), one reason why spiritual factors have usually been ignored in U.S. diplomacy is the sense of the movement of history held by modern policy makers and diplomats. They are often concerned more about the future leaders of a country rather than about the actual power holders. Consequently, they often missed the current dynamics of a country, which in many cases are in the hands of their religious leaders. Thus the character of an effective foreign policy is misunderstood when religion is not accurately taken into account.

Active Minority

Studying the effects of religious memberships and beliefs on general foreign policy orientations and on attitudes toward aspects of the Gulf War, Ted G. Jelen found some patterns. In the article he writes, "Religion and Foreign Policy Attitudes: Exploring the Effects of Denomination and Doctrine",[20] he finds that Roman Catholics tend to support peace-oriented foreign policies. He writes, "Catholics are significantly less likely to endorse the 'traditional' foreign policy priorities of using force to solve international problems, of protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression, and of promoting democracy abroad."[21] Skeptical attitudes toward the necessity of bombing civilians were found among Catholics who hold Evangelical theological beliefs. With regard to the bombings done by the United States military in the Gulf War, for instance, "Evangelical Catholics are distinctively likely to believe that such bombing is immoral."[22]

Meanwhile, among the Protestants, Jelen, who teaches political science at Illinois Benedictine College, found that the effects of membership in an Evangelical denomination are extremely limited. However, among those who hold the Evangelical beliefs he found that there is a tendency to support military actions. "Protestants who endorse a literal Bible and report born-

again experiences," according to him, "are more supportive of traditional foreign policy goals and are more likely to regard the bombing of civilians as a necessary consequence of modern warfare." [23]

As a general conclusion, however, Jelen states that the role of religion in explaining attitudes toward issues of international relations is quite limited. Aspects of Christianity have but modest effect, and yet it was limited to isolated attitudes involving foreign policy. "Although religious affiliations and beliefs effect certain highly specific foreign policy," he concludes, "there is a little evidence that religion affects such issues in any systematic manner." [24]

A similar concern is expressed by Barry Rubin in his article "Religion and International Affairs."[25] He believes that American policy makers have often *misread* the importance of religion as a factor in the national politics and international behavior of some countries and regions. This fact, in his view, has sometimes led to incorrect analysis and erroneous policy responses that have proven quite costly.[26] The underlying causes of this problem, according to him, is the generally accepted reading of European history that American political leaders, policy makers, and intellectuals have applied to the Third World realities, often uncritically. In this context, religion has been perceived as a declining factor in world politics.

Rubin, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East policy and a fellow at the John Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, sees three significant errors in this perception. First, the increasing view in the West that in modern times on religion as a set of theological issues rather than as profoundly political influence in public life.[27] Religion as the prime communal identity has, until recently, been too often neglected. Secondly, the expectation that religion would inevitably decline in the process of Third World modernization. This perception, according to Rubin, is incorrect. Third, the Marxist concept of religion as the opiate of the masses which caused many people in the West perceived religion as a distraction from the important things of life and that the chance to improve one's existence in this world would obviate the need for a system that could only promise rewards in the after-life.[28]

Many politicians in the West hardly realize the fact that not having experienced a long period of communal fusion into a nation, numerous Third World societies continue to see religion –along with clan, ethnicity, and others—as makers of community identity. The anti-Americanism of radical Islamic fundamentalism, for instance, does not result from some mistaken U.S. foreign policy or from a resolvable misunderstanding. It occurs, according to him, because many Islamic fundamentalists seek to take over Muslim countries in order to revolutionize their societies. "If the United States opposes such

objectives—and U.S. national interests make this inevitable—then," he warns the reader, "the two forces are going to be adversaries." [29]

For several decades, Rubin contends, the prevailing school of thought underlying U.S. foreign policy has assumed that religion would be a declining factor in the life of states and in international affairs. However, experience has shown and projections indicate that the exact opposite is increasingly true. In many Third World countries, for instance, disappointment with the post-independence course of events and the discrediting of radical and Marxist philosophies may result in religiously based or influenced political viewpoints filling the vacuum. A number of possible outcomes may affect U.S. interests. The triumph of radical Islamic fundamentalism could destroy alliances and create new crises. Such a scenario would result not from the strength of existing fundamentalist movements, but from a breakdown of current structures, socioeconomic deterioration, and despair about lack of progress. Similar dynamics of the role of a religious group occur among the Christians. The political manifestations of Christianity, and of Catholicism in particular, according to Rubin, have changed from a major force against change into a factor favoring the attainment of democracy and social justice through reformist or revolutionary means. Moreover, the Catholic Church has proved to be the one organized institution that has survived years of communist rule, having an almost instantaneous mass appeal.[30]

Therefore, the negligence and misreading of the role of religion in international affairs, according to Rubin, can no longer be retained. To neglect religious institutions and thinking would be to render incomprehensible some of the key issues and crises in the world today. *American Religious Groups View Foreign Policy: Trends in Rank-and-File Opinion, 1937-1969* by Alfred O. Hero[31] is an interesting comparative study on the attitudes of the chief American religious groups—Roman Catholics, Protestants and Jews—toward foreign policy issues. Based on national surveys which have posed questions about both religion and world affairs, he examines empirically a number of differences between the religious groups in their thinking on international questions. Hero, Director of the World Peace Foundation and author of numerous books and articles on the roles of public opinion in foreign policy, suggests that the composition of the Catholic Church are generally more cosmopolitan than that of particular Protestant denominations. The more diverse cultural and political experience of its hierarchy around the world results in greater emotional and rational sensitivity to international development among its adherents. In the Protestant Churches, according to him, there is much resemblance between the pronouncements of bodies that represent many Protestant denominations—

e.g. The National Council of Churches (N.C.C.)—and pronouncements of the heads of affiliated denominations. These pronouncements have been typically liberal, internationalist, and multilateralist. The divergent historical experience of Jews, both abroad and in the U.S., their wider transnational dispersion, and their more intimate associations with non-Americans as contrasted with most American Christians, in Hero's view, have undoubtedly been major sources of Jewish cosmopolitanism and liberalism.[32]

According to Hero, by the mid-1960s many pre-war differences between the Protestants and the Catholics had become inverted. Both Catholics and Jews in 1963-1969 were significantly more favorable than Protestants to a number of types of international cooperation and negotiation—such as the U.N., relaxation of tensions with the communist world, admission of Mainland China to the U.N., and policies regarding foreign aid.[33] He believes that Catholics had also become somewhat more optimistic than Protestants about most public issues, including the possibilities of avoiding another major war, America's future role in the world, and the general course of international relations."[34]

In most other issues, he further argues, the two Christian groups differed in no consistent respects—international trade, military aid to "friendly" governments, national defense, collective security, and most aspects of the war in Vietnam. Up to 1965, according to Hero, Catholics as well as Protestants inclined to maintain a strong defense establishment and effective collective security arrangements with American allies and to resist any communist attack by military force, even at the risk of world nuclear war. However, by the end of the 1960s Catholic Americans had become distinctly less supportive than their Protestant compatriots on large defense budgets, the prevailing magnitude of U.S. military forces, and military means as central instrument in U.S. relations with its communist allies.[35] On the whole, however, Hero believes that Christian churches in the United States seem to have little direct impact on the thinking of their parishioners on world affairs, even in such ethical issues as foreign aid."[36]

Hero's findings about the idea of diplomatic relation between the United States with the Vatican are very interesting though predictable. In 1951 three out of four Catholics, contrasted with but slightly more than one out of four Protestants thought that the U.S. should appoint an Ambassador to the Vatican, as proposed by President Truman. In the Protestant Churches, Hero found in his survey, the black Protestants had been consistently less antagonistic to diplomatic relations with the papacy than their white coreligionists.[37] Many white Protestant leaders feared that diplomatic relations would upset the

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separation of church and state, and result in undue influence of the Catholic Church in the United States.[38]

Hero concludes his book by contending that the churches are likely to continue to exert but very limited influence on foreign-policy making, especially in Congress. This situation will remain the same unless the churches are able to develop real interest and vitality in this field among at least an articulate, active minority of churchmen in congressional districts, and demonstrate some capacity to arouse and sustain considerably greater concern and involvement over extended periods at the local level than are now apparent.[39] In his conclusion he writes,

> Thus the churches could over the coming generation become more effectively relevant to ethical reflection in respect to American foreign policy and international phenomena generally and exert significant impacts on the thinking of their own members, on the body politic generally, and on the policy-making process generally. However, they would be obliged to shift considerably their current priorities. As of the early 1970s the prognosis for their doing so unfortunately does not seem optimistic.[40]

Religions and foreign policy
http://www.pfaw.org/report/who-is-weaponizing-religious-liberty/

The Berrigan Brothers

There is another group of writers who, instead of being negative and pessimistic, are very affirmative and optimistic about the role of religious

groups in shaping United States foreign policy. J. Bruce Nichols is one of them.

Focusing on U.S.-sponsored overseas relief operations and the problem of church-state conflict, Nichols in his book *The Uneasy Alliance: Religion, Refugee Work, and U.S. Foreign Policy* (1998)[41] suggests that the U.S. government and religious institutions have historically been partners in achieving humanitarian goals. Using examples of refugee works in Honduras, Thailand and Sudan, he contends that national security and foreign policy concerns have overshadowed humanitarian ones.

According to Nichols, director of Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, there is a majority view that religion has taken a "back seat" to more powerful political, economic, and military interests that today mold America's relations with the rest of the world. In a world of power politics and vast economic struggles, casting the American church/state issue in an international framework seems to be a merely academic. In this book he attempts to challenge such notion. He wants to demonstrate that "institutions representing explicitly religious goals and communities play an active and expanding role in determining America's ties with the rest of their world." [42]

Intending to place the post-World War II history of this cooperative humanitarianism in the context of American church/state tradition and to understand the impact of the post-war political climate on religious participation in government-sanctioned humanitarianism, Nichols finds that in the field of refugee work since the war, "the institutions of church and state have been found in both intimate affairs and unrequited loves."[43] Much of the concern and care for refugees that has been marshaled by governments in the modern era, he believes, has its roots in religious traditions that embody commitment to the stranger and the oppressed.[44] In the American case, Nichols contends, refugee work overseas has been "a need that has drawn modern American institutions of religion and government together beyond the borders of the nation."[45]

Finally Nichols argues that care of the world's refugees has been one of the great postwar tests of American's moral stature; it has also been a great testing ground for the cooperation of church and states abroad. Out of this cooperation have emerged millions of success stories. "The larger story," he writes optimistically, "[the story] of the slowly fraying bonds between religious institutions and the government in foreign policy, is still being told."[46]

In line with J. Bruce Nichols, Ernest Lefever belongs to the school of thought which emphasizes the significant role of religious groups in shaping U.S. foreign policy. Focusing on American foreign policy since the end of

World War II, in his book *Ethics and United States Foreign Policy*[47] he attempts "to relate the insights and affirmations of Judeo-Christian ethics to the problems and direction of United States foreign policy."[48] In doing so, he relates the descriptive facts and analytical insights of political science to the normative judgments of religious ethics.

Based on his analysis, Lefever—a research analyst in foreign affairs with the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress and an ordained Protestant clergyman—contends that the American public have been actively involved in shaping U.S. foreign policy. Not by offering day-by-day advice, but, he believes, by offering a set of values for which the nation stands, and by creating a climate in which these values can be effectively pursued in practical foreign policies.

On this active public participation, according to Lefever, the churches and synagogues play a central role. Along with homes and schools, the churches have been the custodian and interpreters of America's deepest values. He writes,

> Generations of our citizens have been brought up under the social teachings of Judaism and Christianity. Our preachers, priests, and rabbis have talked about peace, justice, good will, and the sovereignty of a God that knows no favorites among the nations.[49]

In Lefever's view, many American foreign policy makers have been motivated by values and insights of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Thanks to the churches and synagogues, he views, the policy makers were always able "to relate the wisdom of the Judeo-Christian heritage to the tragic realm of politics."[50]

Writing in the first half of 1950s, Lefever was of course unable to include in his work morally questionable foreign policies such as the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Vietnam War. His attempt to relate foreign policy with moral justifications appears to be inadequate.

In seeking to develop in the American context a theory of religious groups' involvement and influence in politics, Robert Booth Fowler comes up with some hypothetical findings. In his book, *Religion and Politics in America* (1985)[51] he reveals his findings. First, he finds that in the United States religion is extremely involved in American politics. Secondly, he also finds that ironically, however, the involvement has only a little influence in American politics. The reasons for this very limited influence, in his view, are religions' uneasiness with politics, their un-organized-ness for politics, and religious

pluralism in theology, tradition, attitudes toward politics and governments, and policy objectives.[52]

Compared to Evangelical and Fundamentalist Protestantism, according to Fowler, a professor of political theory and American politics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the Roman Catholic Church has been politically more active both in domestic as well as foreign policies. "The Roman Catholic Church," he writes, "has been active in political and social affairs all over the world for almost two millennia."[53] It is not surprising to him, therefore, to see that many Catholics were involved in the burst of radical activity in the United States in the era of the New Left and the revolt against racism and Vietnam War. As Fowler shows,[54] the Berrigan Brothers and their pacifist movement against the Vietnam War in the late 1960s was an example of Catholic involvement in shaping American foreign policy.

Slowly but Definitely

An Associate Professor of Biblical Exegesis in the Jewish Theological Seminary of America and Rabbi of Temple Beth-El in New York, Dr. Robert Gordis also emphasizes the relevance of the Judeo-Christian heritage in international affairs. In his work, *Religion and International Responsibility* (1967)[55] he strongly challenges a common notion that there is no connection between religious ideals and international affairs.[56]

To him there is no aspect of life, including the areas of national and international affairs, which is isolated from the "Government of God" or exempt from the judgment of moral conscience.[57] He suggests that relating international responsibilities to Judeo-Christian religious tradition means efforts to use Biblical insights for meeting world crisis. These efforts, according to him, should include attempt to use the Biblical considerations in practical international policies such as foreign aid, international negotiation, the promotion of civil liberties and integration, and in support to the United Nations as an instrument for expressing the opinions and interests of the various governments of the world.[58]

Emphasizing the responsibility of Christian and Jewish communities in international affairs Rabbi Gordis writes,

> as heirs of the Judeo-Christian tradition, whether in religious or in secularized form, we have no need to compartmentalize our minds and insulate the ethical ideals we espouse form the foreign policy we practice. If we keep before us the full dimensions of Biblical thought

> and recognize that a vital ethics includes intelligence as well as justice, truth as well as righteousness, we can find in our religious heritage a vital and relevant instrument for grappling with our international responsibilities.[59]

Classifying American foreign policy writers from a Catholic perspective into two categories, Sister Dorothy Jane Van Hoogstrate, Dean of Webster College, Webster Groves, Missouri, suggests an interesting notion. She classifies some writers as Realists, and o[illegible] Idealists. Each of the groups, as Van Hoogstrate explains in her book *American Foreign Po[illegible] Realists and Idealist: A Catholic Interpretation* (1960),[60] has its own view on the role of religious groups on U.S. foreign policy.

Referring to [illegible]nhold Niebuhr, by the Realists she means those who hold the position to take into account "all the factors in a social and political situation, which offer resistance to established norms ... particularly the factors of self-interest and power."[61] Among the Realists Van Hoogstrade includes Reinhold Niebuhr, George F. Kennan, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Emery Reeves.

The Realists, according to Van Hoogstrade, advocate power politics and balance of power. They view man as in a sad state from which he cannot extricate himself. According to the Realists man "has no law to live by, no morality to support him—he has nothing except balance of power..."[62]

In the other spectrum, she shows writers whom she considers as Idealists. By the Idealists she means those who believe that,

> in affairs of state, conscience and reason must place ethical restraints upon egoism so that truthfulness, freedom, fidelity to obligations, justice, and charity may prevail for the benefit of all mankind.... They recognize that realization of state of peace requires some subordination of individual to group interests; in this process, politics becomes the art of accommodation rather than the unmitigated struggle of power.[63]

Among the Idealists, Van Hoogstrade includes Robert O. Osgood, Dorothy Fosdick, Walter Lippmann, Frank Tannebaum, Thomas E. Cook, and Thomas E. Murray. The Idealists generally "endorse the pursuit of national interest which is consistent with the objective moral order of the universe, but at the same time they acknowledge that national power entails

responsibility for a wider commitment. Ethical appeal and shared purpose are singled out as source of power which the Realists have not reckoned with."[64]

Catholic thought, according to Van Hoogstrade, transcends both the Idealists and the Realists. It challenges the pessimism of the Realists about the role of human conscience in political society. At the same time, Catholic interpretation "does not run parallel" with the disposition held by the Idealists.[65] Catholic interpretation "differs from the stand of the humanitarians who believe that an earthly millennium is the goal of history, and that man's reason has the unlimited ability to attain the true and the good by its own powers." It also differs from the Idealists who "reduce peace solely to a technological and economic operation."[66]

As conclusion, Van Hoogstrade states, "Catholic thought acknowledges the validity of national interest, but it insists that this be related to the whole international fabric of which it is a part, and to which it must be made compatible." She believes that "consciousness of international social obligation, in themselves antecedents to any law, is developing slowly but definitely..."[67]

Only Vaguely

American foreign policies in the Arab-Israeli conflict appear to be one of the most discussed topics regarding the role of religious groups in shaping the U.S. foreign policy. An article, "Mainline Churches and United States Middle East Policy,"[68] by Peter Johnson is one of them. Johnson initially observes that religion and politics are intimately related in the United States, despite the constitutional concept of separation of church and state. He states "religion also intervenes through the activity of the churches in missions and in international relief and aid programs."[69] In the case of American policy towards the Middle East, he then argues, the religious overlay "is particularly important."[70]

Johnson, a Protestant Minister and member of the Middle East Research & Information Project (MERIP) in Washington D.C., finds that "the National Council of Churches has been consistently several years ahead of both the United States government and the American public in understanding Israel and the Palestinian and in advocating new approaches to the Arab-Israel conflict, the Palestinians and Israel."[71] He also argues that the ties of the American Protestant churches to the Middle Eastern churches and their participation with Palestinians in the refugee program have led to a significant a new responsibility for the churches, to act in a more progressive manner,

both as they act in world affairs and as they inform the ideology and public ethos in the United States.[72]

In discussing the role of the Catholic Church in the Middle East policy, Jesuit priest Joseph L. Ryan, S.J. focuses on official documents on the Middle East issued by U.S. Catholic Bishops from 1973 to 1978. According to Ryan, in his article "Religion and United States Foreign Policy toward the Middle East: A Catholic Perspective,"[73] there is a consistent support for Israel expressed in the documents. He points out that with regards to policies towards the Middle East, churches are not only major structures, but major media as well.[74] Regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, he believes, too often statements of official leaders have not dealt with the inherent merits of issues because of an overriding concern for the ecumenical problems, such as supporting Israel for the sake of improved relations with American Jewish groups.[75]

But, Ryan also believes, it now has changed. According to him the trends now is towards addressing issues involving justice, and among these is the disinheriting of Palestinians whose inclusion as independent participants in any negotiations in the Middle East problem is considered both politically sound and morally necessary.[76]

Hassan S. Haddad in his article "Christian Zionism in America: The Religious Factor in American Middle East Policy,"[77] proposes a major thesis when he states that the pro-Israel anti-Arab sentiment of the American public is primarily the product of a religious conviction and is not based on reasoned economic or political considerations of on knowledge of international politics. Support for Israel in 1948, Haddad believes, was also tied to an obsession with anti-communism and a fear of Soviet involvement in the Middle East.

Haddad, professor of history at St. Xavier College, Chicago, Illinois, observes that the 1970s witnessed an increase in grassroots support for Israel, a support that was and continues to be politically active. Among American politicians, Haddad observes, there has been an insistence that the United States has a "moral commitment to the State of Israel." Such insistence, along with the Biblical reference and Judeo-Christian tradition, have been very influential in shaping American policy towards Arab-Israeli conflict, to the benefit of Israel.

In her attempt to examine the nature and strength of the organized church in the United States and to evaluate existing such policies on the Middle East in America, Beth E. Heisey, a staff on United Methodist Office for the United Nations and U.N. Representative for the Mennonite Central Committee, suggests that there is no unified position maintained by American Christians on the Middle East.[78] In 1980, the National Council of Churches of Christ/

USA (N.C.C.) issued a statement that called for the "right of Palestinian to self-determination."[79] It also encouraged PLO's recognition of Israel as a state and its right to continue as a Jewish state. On this, the U.S. Catholic Bishops issued a different statement. Praising the Camp David accords as a courageous step toward peace, the Bishops' statement was careful to define its limits, such as a satisfactory resolution regarding the status of Jerusalem and the fate of the Palestinians.

However, in her article "Impacting United States Church Policies on the Middle East,"[80] Heisey acknowledges that Christianity's Jewish roots are especially significant in connection with Middle Eastern issues. "Stances of American church-goers," she writes, "have generally evolved without benefit of access to the Arab point of view; they are based on false assumption, bias, misinformation, or plain ignorance."[81]

Focusing on the role of Christian and Jewish religious groups, Steven Spiegel, in his article "Religious Components of U.S. Middle East Policy,"[82] discusses the influence of the two in shaping U.S. foreign policy concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict. Challenging the common belief that religious attitudes and philosophies have been important in the public debate in the U.S. about the Middle East, Spiegel, Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Los Angeles and author of numerous books on international politics, argues that the influence of religiously-identified groups in the foreign policy process has been very limited.

Using some examples from the Johnson, Carter and Reagan administrations, Spiegel suggests that while basic religious attitudes may affect sympathies and fundamental philosophies, they do not determine policy. Contrary to the notion that pro-Israeli supporters, and especially Jewish groups, directly determine U.S. policy towards the Middle East, Spiegel's study "raises serious doubts."

Moreover, his study shows the anomalousness of the role played by religious groups in U.S. Arab-Israeli policy. On the one hand, religious ideals have always been closely linked to American ideas about the Arab-Israeli dispute. On the other hand, when the decisions were actually made in the Executive Branch these groups were remote and largely irrelevant. As a final conclusion of his study, Spiegel states, "both religious ideals and groups are important in affecting public discussions of the Arab-Israeli dispute in the United States, but they are at best only vaguely related to decision-making itself."[83]

Concrete Actions

As we have seen in Alfred O. Hero's survey, U.S.-Vatican diplomatic relations also appears to be one of the most discussed issues concerning religious groups and American foreign policy. Writing about a year after the official announcement of the establishment of the diplomatic relation between the United States and the Vatican on January 10, 1984, Michael W. Galligan, for instance, emphasizes the importance of the event. As he shows in his article "United States-Vatican Relations: Present Benefits and Future Precautions,"[84] in the past a good number of Americans rejected the idea of the establishment of U.S. diplomatic relations with the Holy See. They feared that the establishment would bestow a seal of approval on the governing authority of the Catholic Church or expresses a "preference" for that authority in violation of the no-establishment clause of the United States Constitution.[85] This has become a block that prevented the diplomatic relations between the two sovereignties. Another block, Galligan also shows, was a speculation that the Catholic Church would gain a special channel of communication to the U.S. government which, in turn, would violate the principle of the church-state separation.

However, despite such fear and speculation, Galligan, an editor of the law review and a teaching assistant in international law in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University, believes that the establishment of diplomatic relation between the two governments serves American national interest in two ways. First, it fosters the independence and neutrality of the Vatican as an important international institution whose decisions and policies have significant legal and social effects within the United States. Secondly, it also serves a broader national interest in human rights and development by placing dialogue and joint action between the United States and the Holy See on a more stable basis of mutual confidence and trust.[86]

Regarding the role of religious groups in American foreign policy, Mark G. Toulouse's contribution is rather unique. His book, *The Transformation of John Foster Dulles: From Prophet of Realism to Priest of Nationalism*,[87] is a good example. It shows how a personal religious and moral understanding could shape a person's view of international affairs, and, in turn, shaped that of a nation. John Foster Dulles, son of a Presbyterian minister and himself a churchman, once began to reflect on his country based on his understanding of the purpose of the church as the principle agent of God's activity in the world and the church as a community of righteousness. What followed was his transformation from being a "prophet of realism" prior to and during

World War II into a "priest of nationalism" by the time he was appointed as Secretary of State by Dwight Eisenhower in 1952.

In his book Toulouse suggests that John Foster Dulles' life was not merely continuity from one period of his life to another. Rather, it was a complex mixture of continuity and change. Dulles did his own study of the Soviet Union and perceived the country as a monolithic communist state, which threatened the United States. His idea later fit into and then reinforced American Cold War attitudes and mentality that viewed the Soviet Union and communism as a monolithic power threatening the free world, especially the United States. These attitude and mentality, in turn, became the main ingredient of U.S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War period. American policies regarding human rights and involvement in a foreign war also receive special attention from writers on U.S. foreign policy. Kenneth W. Thompson is one of the writers who are interested in analyzing church leadership and U.S. human rights policies. In his work, "Human Rights: The Role of the State and the Church," Thompson refers to some religious leaders who "claim for themselves semi-official standing in politics."[88] This kind of claim, according to him, is improper, because in reality people did not listen to them for inspiration in political matters, especially regarding foreign policy. U.S. foreign policy on human rights, for instance, has been clearly directed by influential political leaders rather than by religious leaders. This is obvious in the successive administration of Richard Nixon (with its essentially skeptical view on human rights) to that of Jimmy Carter (with its strong emphasis on the human rights campaign), and to that of Ronald Reagan, which pulled back from too great an emphasis on human rights.

He then suggests that the church has a very important role, not in practical political decisions, but more in contributing to the nation with basic but universal values such as fundamental rights and responsibilities of the individual. Churchmen, Thompson suggests, should keep providing pressures to political leaders to transcend their self-righteousness and narrow view of national interests.

Another writer of U.S. foreign policy, Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer is interested in analyzing American involvement in foreign war. Using the Gulf War as a starting point, Nelson-Pallmeyer, in his book, *Brave New World Order: Must We Pledge Allegiance?*[89] examines the relation of the churches and the United States government in times of the nation's involvement in a war abroad. Praising the eighteen church leaders who in the beginning of the conflict issued a common statement condemning the war, Nelson-Pallmeyer suggests that the religious community should oppose any attempt by the government to create "a new

world order" by way of violence and injustices to the poor. "By naming this book *Brave New World Order*," he writes, "I am stating my grave concern about harmful U.S. policies that are disguised through alluring rhetoric as a 'new world order.'"[90]

In this book Nelson-Pallmeyer, writer of several books on the relation between Christian faith and social justice, attempts to "unmask the veneer of moral purpose surrounding the U.S.-led war in the Middle East and the new world order it reflects and ushers in."[91] Reflecting his optimism about the role of the church in influencing American policy abroad, he states,

[This book] seeks to expose the dangerous idolatry and hypocrisy of church and state. It calls for an authentically new world order involving a radical transformation of national and international priorities, which must begin with a radical transformation of the church itself.[92]

As part of being critical to the United States foreign policy, Nelson Pallmeyer suggests, the church should begin with concrete actions based on Christian and universal values. He suggests some examples such as affirming nonviolence, challenging and breaking with the dominant symbolic order, encouraging biblically-based resistance, making efforts to overcome poverty, and making planetary survival as central issue in foreign policy.[93] In sum, Nelson-Pallmeyer contends that with regard to the church-state relation, allegiance to the state should be secondary to the allegiance to the Christian and universal values of human life, based on the Biblical teachings.

A Common Challenge

As we have seen in this historiography, there are two different schools of thought with two different emphases on the role of religious groups in shaping U.S. foreign policy. It is interesting to see, however, that despite the differences both schools of thought express the same concern, namely how to enhance the role of religious groups in the future American policies in the international communities.

From among the negative ecclesiastical school of thought writers like Douglas Johnson and Edward Luttwark are worth noting. Both are concerned with the lack of religious dimension in American foreign policy. Showing examples of failed American foreign policy due to the missing of religious dimension both suggest that religious consideration should play more important role in shaping foreign policies.

Meanwhile Van Hoogstrate, to mention one of the writers from the affirmative ecclesiastical school of thought, also offers an interesting

suggestion. She suggests that in order to enhance the participation of religious groups in shaping U.S. foreign policy the foreign policy makers should transcend both the Idealist as well as the Realist point of view in international affairs, by including religious and universal human values in their decision making process.

It is a pity, therefore, to realize that literatures on the role of religious groups in the shaping of U.S. foreign policy, particularly from the historical point of view, are far from sufficient. Perhaps this is a common challenge, which awaits response from religious groups, historians as well as American foreign policy makers.

Notes:

1 Ted. G. Jelen, "Religion and Foreign Policy Attitudes: Exploring the Effects of Denomination and Doctrine." in *American Politics Quarterly,* vol. 22, no. 3, July 1994, 382.
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≈ Chapter 5 ≈

War, Expansion, and Race:
American Catholics and the Occupation of The Philippines, 1898-1904[1]

Our government makes no sense unless it is founded on a deeply held religious belief—and I don't care what it is.

-President Dwight Eisenhower

THE TURN of the 20th century witnessed significant changes in both the internal affairs of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States as well as in its church-state relations. During the latter part of the 19th century the Church hierarchy had been hurt by the internal divisions that resulted from conflicting opinions on how Church leadership in America should relate to American socio-political situations. A number of Church leaders promoted active participation in American politics and social institutions; others challenged such a notion for fear of weakening the universal character of the Church. By the turn of the century, however, this division would eventually disappear.

Since its formal organization in 1790, the Church experienced a number of conflicts with the government, but the conflicts were generally local, or statewide at most, in character. There were no conflicts which involved the entire Church organization with the U.S. government. By the end of the 1890s, however, broader conflict between the Church and the U.S. government was no longer avoidable. The United States' declaration of war against Spain in 1898, which resulted in an American victory and the subsequent occupation of former Spanish colonial territories, brought the Church into conflict with the government.

The war created two separate but closely related situations that made American Catholics anxious. First, it disturbed American Catholics'

patriotism, since Spain was a Catholic country. Second, the establishment of an American colonial empire in the former Spanish colonial territories worried many of them, since most of the inhabitants of these territories were Catholic.

Commodore George Dewey's victory in 1898 in the Philippines, followed by the McKinley Administration's decision to occupy islands inhabited by predominantly Catholic population, signified such a situation. Many Catholics supported American control over the islands because they accepted the necessity of spreading American values and tradition to the "lower" races. Many others, however, denounced the occupation, particularly the effort to deprive the population of Catholic faith and provide them instead with Protestant teachings. This study is an attempt to discuss how the American occupation of the Philippines (and the Spanish-American War in general) helped change relations between the Catholic Church in America and the U.S. government, and at the same time helped consolidate the Church itself. It is hoped that a study like this chapter will help generate similar studies on the presence of the Catholic Church in other countries, including Indonesia, and its relations with government's (foreign) policies, along with its impact on the Church's internal and external dynamics within the nation-state.

Americanism

In the late 19th century the Catholic Church in the U.S. suffered from prejudice on the part of many Americans. The Church was considered a "foreign" entity in American society because of its emphasis on loyalty to the Pope in the Vatican. Catholic leadership in the U.S. was divided on its response to this situation.

Led by Archbishop John Ireland of St. Paul, Minnesota, Bishop John J. Keane of the Catholic University, and Msgr. Denis J. O'Connell of the North American College in Rome, one group advocated Catholic involvement in American social and political thought. This group supported the idea of "Americanism," emphasizing the national character of the Catholic Church in the U.S., and the Church's greater independence from European interference, including that from the Vatican. Many supporters of this group desired to have a church different from churches in other parts of the world.

Msgr. Denis O'Connell, one of the strongest supporters of Americanism, was a close friend of Archbishop Ireland. One of his letters to the Archbishop showed how strongly he emphasized the distinctive character and duty of the Catholic Church in the U.S. He wrote,

> Now God passes the banner to the hands of America to bear it—in the cause of humanity... [A]nd it is your office to make its destiny known to America and [to] become its grand chaplain. Over all America there is certainly a duty higher than the interest of the individual states—even of the national government. The duty to humanity is certainly a real duty, and America cannot certainly with honor, or fortune, evade its great share in it. Go to America and say, thus saith the Lord! ... Hence I am a partisan of the Anglo-American alliance, together they are invincible and they will impose a new civilization (Reuter, 1967: 209-210).

On a less rhetorical level, promoters of Americanism desired that the Church leadership participate at all levels of American life. They wanted to remove the notion that the Church was a foreign entity, a notion that had been applied to activities of the Catholic Church in the U.S. for many years. They desired a greater involvement of Catholic clergy in education, trade unions, and politics.

Opposing this "liberal" group was another group, led by Archbishop Michael A. Corrigan of New York City and his friend Bishop Bernard McQuaid of Rochester, New York. This group aligned a formidable bulwark of "conservative" bishops, priests, and laymen who objected to the "Americanization" of the Church (McAvoy, 1957: 88-89). Those who sided with this group wanted to limit the clergy's concerns strictly to ecclesiastical matters (Reuter, 1967: 25). They feared that liberalism introduced by "Americanists" (supporters of Americanism) would weaken the Catholic Church and would possibly promote the separation of the Church in the U.S. from the universal Catholic Church. They accused these Americanists of desiring to show the attainment of new intellectual and religious heights in America, distinctive from other parts of the world. They also opposed the Americanists' idea of lowering the barriers between the churches in the United States.

An important part of the dispute over Americanism was the publication of Father Walter Elliot's *The Life of Father Hecker* in 1897, a biography of Father Isaac Hecker, the American founder of the Paulist Fathers. A convert to Catholicism, Hecker emphasized the importance of compatibility of the Church leadership with American political institutions. He also stressed the adaptation of the Church's approach to modern era, making the Church more attractive to Americans in general, and the importance of

direct involvement of Catholics in American public affairs (McAvoy, 1957: 157; Reuter, 1967: 26).

While Archbishop Ireland and his friends championed Hecker's idea of the Church leadership actively addressing the problems of American society, Archbishop Corrigan and his conservative followers predicted disaster to the traditional teachings of the Church if this was put into practice. Regarding the publication of Hecker's biography, they considered it an attempt to fulfill the need of Americanists to invent a "saint" in order to justify their own ideas (McAvoy, 1957: 196).

The seriousness of the dispute was well reflected in the fact that later Pope Leo XIII himself finally took the matter into his own hands. After careful investigation he issued *Testem Benevolentiae,* a letter on Americanism, to Cardinal Gibbons. The Pope, however, was careful to say that the issue had nothing to do with the legitimate patriotism of the Americans, and that he was not accusing American Catholics of holding these views. The pontiff was merely warning that if such doctrines of Americanism were being taught, they were erroneous (Leo XIII, 1903: 441-453).

War, Expansion and Race

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Total Control

In the late 1890s, while experiencing an internal crisis due to the dispute over the issue of Americanism, the Church was also subject to external pressures. These were brought to the Church by the outbreak of a military conflict between the United States and the Spanish colonial government, a conflict which was generated by a revolution in Cuba.

In the late 1890s there was a Cuban revolutionary uprising for independence from the Spanish colonial government. Initially President William McKinley was reluctant to get the United States involved. However, due to the public pressures following the explosion and sinking of the U.S.S. *Maine* in Havana Harbor, he shifted his policy and supported American involvement on the side of the Cubans. On April 21, 1898 the U.S. officially declared war against Spain.[2] This war, later known as the Spanish-American War, lasted until August 12, 1898. America won a quick victory. Spain was forced to surrender its colonies, including Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines.

At the beginning of the war, many American Catholics were in full support of the American decision to fight against the Spanish. At the Cathedral of St. Paul, Minnesota, Archbishop Ireland urged American Catholics to show loyalty and support to the United States in the war. He said,

> The supreme authority of this Republic has declared war against another nation. What is the duty of Christians in our country's present crisis? It is to accept manfully, loyally, the mandate of the supreme power of the nation, it is to co-operate in all manner of means within our reach, as far as we may be demanded to do so, with the government in the prosecution of the war. Beyond all doubt this is our solemn religious duty (*The Catholic Citizen*, May 14, 1898).

Even before the war started the Catholics had demonstrated their loyalty and support to the U.S. by forming The National Maine Monument Committee to build a monument in memory of the victims of the *Maine* incident. The committee was made up by "leading men of the country," such as Calvin S. Brice, James Cardinal Gibbons of Baltimore, William J. Bryan, and Archbishop Corrigan. They called the 250 victims of the *Maine* incident "the Nation's martyrs" (*The Catholic Citizen*, May 6, 1898).

In the course of the war, on May 1, 1898, an American naval squadron under the command of Commodore George Dewey attacked the Philippines. Along with the support of a Filipino revolutionary by the name of Emilio

Aguinaldo he completely defeated the Spanish Pacific fleet in Manila Harbor. Dewey's victory, in turn, opened up new possibilities of American imperialistic opportunities and caused an abrupt change in American war aims. The Spanish-American War, which had been originally a war of liberation in Cuba, now became a war which included a possibility of territorial acquisition in the Pacific (Reuter, 1967: 13). The American victory over Spain in the Spanish-American military conflict in the Philippines, then, marked the beginning of the American presence in the islands.

When Dewey and his naval squadron began their presence, the population of the Philippines was approximately 7.8 million. Of these, 6.5 million were Christians (Reuter, 1967: 61) most of them loyal Roman Catholics. The Catholic faith had been introduced to the Filipinos when Spanish missionaries landed with Ferdinand Magellan and claimed the islands as the colonial possession of Spain in 1517. When Magellan's fellow explorers returned to Spain after his murder by local inhabitants, some of these missionaries (better known as the *friars*) remained behind and began to teach Christian faith to the natives (Reuter, 1967: 62). By the end of the 19th century these Filipinos were devout Roman Catholics.[3]

Being devout Roman Catholics, however, did not prevent the Filipinos from wanting freedom from Spanish colonization. Many of them determined to fight for freedom and independence. At the same time, they were outraged by the fact that many Spanish friars participated in suppressing Filipino politicians or movement leaders who might threaten the Spanish colonial authority (Reuter, 1967: 63). Under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, members of a native secret society called *Katipunan* launched a rebellion in 1896. The rebellion was put down and Aguinaldo went into exile in Hong K[illegible] after the Spanish signed the Treaty of Biacnabato and paid him $ 400,000 ("First Philippine Commission [Schurman] Report" in Senate Document No. 138, 56th Cong., 1st session: 14).[4]

While George Dewey and his naval squadron were planning to attack the Spanish fleet at Manila Harbor in 1898, a new rebellion broke out. Dewey then persuaded Aguinaldo and his officers to leave Hong Kong and return to the Philippines and to join the new rebellion, under American protection. Aguinaldo agreed to come home and fight the Spanish with the full support of the Americans. He believed in the promise delivered by Dewey and other American leaders that if he joined the American forces, the Americans would help to establish an independent Philippines after the defeat of the Spanish (Paterson et al., 1988). In a very short time American and Filipino forces

defeated the Spanish colonial army and compelled the Spanish government to sign a treaty of peace.

In the Treaty of Peace of 1898, Spain formally ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. The latter, the treaty stipulated, would pay Spain the sum of twenty million dollars within three months after the exchange of its ratification. In return, the U.S. was given formal authority to "occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines"[5]

Following the signing of the treaty, in January 1899 Aguinaldo proclaimed the independence of the Philippine Republic (Reuter, 1967: 64-65). The U.S. government, however, soon rejected the proclamation and any notion regarding Philippine independence. Instead, it wanted to keep the islands under its own control. On May 19, 1898 President McKinley instructed Secretary of War R.A. Alger to occupy the Philippines (Reuter, 1967: 65). Aguinaldo resisted strongly. He rebelled against the Americans and held approximately 130 Spanish clergymen and nuns, including one Bishop, prisoners.[6] In March 1901, after a series of bloody struggles, he was captured by American forces. The struggles continued, and by 1902 over 5,000 Americans and 200,000 Filipinos had lost their lives. Regarding this violent conflict, an American journalist arrogantly wrote, "it is not civilized warfare, but we are not dealing with civilized people. The only thing they know and fear is force, violence, and brutality; and we gave it to them" (Paterson et al., 1988: 208). The end of this "uncivilized warfare" was soon followed by the American military forces having total control over the islands.

Spirit of Imperialism

In the beginning of the occupation many Catholics in the United States enthusiastically supported American control over the islands. To them the basic concern was the future of the Philippines. They feared that if the islands were returned to Spanish colonial government, it would not be able to stop the native uprisings. They also feared that the Philippines might fall into the hands of non-Catholic powers, such as Japan or Germany. This could result in the expulsion of the Catholic Church from the islands; it would be better if the Philippines were under American control. Under the U. S. government the islands would benefit from American traditions such as democracy and the idea of the separation of Church and state. They even thought that the Catholic Church might become more dynamic due to the competition from

Protestant missions. Some of them argued that "if Catholicism had prospered in the free society of the United States, it should prosper in an American-controlled Philippines" (Reuter, 1967: 17).

Many people in the Catholic press supported this view. They looked forward to the day when the Philippine Church would become Americanized and enjoy American religious privileges, such as freedom from the state's interference (Reuter, 1967). A writer by the name of T. St. John Gaffney, for instance, wrote optimistically in *The New York Times*,

> Should the Philippines be transferred to the sovereignty of the United States there seems to be no doubt in the minds of the Catholics in this country that it would be greatly to the advantage of the Roman Catholic Church and its members in these islands. Roman Catholicism flourishes where religious freedom is assured to all sects (*The New York Times*, September 7, 1898).

An expression of support for American occupation of the Philippines also appeared clearly when a "National Jubilee of Peace" was held in Chicago on October 18, 1898 to celebrate the end of the Spanish-American War and the American victory. President McKinley and Archbishop Ireland were among the guests of honor at the celebration. On this occasion Archbishop Ireland delivered a fiery speech showing his support for the U.S. government in the war and the American occupation of the Philippines. The Archbishop described the horrors of war, but at the same time acknowledged the occasional necessity of it, particularly when the life of a nation was threatened.

Archbishop Ireland highly praised American patriotism as well as the courage of American soldiers and seamen during the war, noting the "magnificent... sweep of Dewey's squadron into the harbor of Manila" (Ireland, 1904: 75). The victory over Spain, Ireland maintained, signaled America's taking on a new role in the global community, that of being the world's leader in promoting liberty and democracy.

In an interview in New York, when he was on his way to visit the Pope in the Vatican in December 1898, Archbishop Ireland repeated his support for American colonization of the Philippines, "Who in America knows anything about the Philippines? The Church in the Philippines will, I have no doubt, accustom itself to the conditions under the new regime, as it did under the old." He added, "The Church will accept the conditions that are to be just as she accepts them in this country" (*The New York Times*, December 20, 1898). Calling Aguinaldo "a semi-barbarous, ambitious fellow, impatient with the

priests because they upheld the ruling power in the interest of law and order," Ireland was optimistic that the U.S. government would cooperate with the Catholic priests in the islands.

A spirit of imperialism regarding the occupation was apparently shared by other members of the Church hierarchy. Cardinal Gibbons, for instance, felt that "the Catholic religion was safer under the American flag than anywhere else." (Maynard: 1941) When President McKinley asked him his opinion about the occupation of the Philippines, Gibbons responded by suggesting that it would be a good thing for the Catholic Church, although it might not be very good for the United States (Maynard, 1941).

No Voice

Further development, however, suggested that American occupation of the Philippines did not always produce good things for the Catholic Church. It often brought new ecclesiastical problems. Under the occupation, for instance, the normal life of the Church suffered greatly. The departure of the Spanish friars following the occupation resulted in a lack of priests in the islands. From 1898 to 1900 there were almost no bishops in the Philippine dioceses. Fewer than 675 Filipino priests were available to serve the 967 parishes and missions. Since the seminaries had been closed since 1898, by 1900 the number of the priests was even smaller than that. Most of the seminaries would not begin to reopen until 1904 (Schumacher, 1979: 292).

Some Filipino priests were forced to live in the mountains with the guerrillas. Many others had died both as a result of normal causes and the cruelty of the American occupation. A considerable number of priests were in American prisons for real or suspected connections with the guerrillas. A number of churches, convents, and other ecclesiastical buildings were successively occupied by Spanish, Filipino, and American troops. Many that had not been destroyed or badly damaged often continued to be occupied by the Americans until as late as 1902 (Schumacher, 1979: 292).

Meanwhile, there were reports about American violations of religious freedom in the islands. The *Boston Pilot* published a story about Captain Lynn, who was sent to investigate supplies at the College of St. Catherine in Manila, but instead broke into the convent and, despite the pleas of the nuns, intruded into the privacy of the cloister itself. The *Pilot* reported that one of the two American Catholic chaplains, Fr. Francis B. Doherty, protested the incident to General Otis, who relieved Captain Lynn of his duties and sent him back to the United States (*Boston Pilot*, December 10, 1898). A picture of a church

desecration by American military men was published in the front page of *Collier's Weekly*. It showed some men with U.S. military uniform smoking cigars around the altar, with their caps on, while some others were using a telegraphic instrument whose wire was wound around the tabernacle (*The New York Times*, September 16, 1899).[7]

When the U.S. government sent a Peace Commission to Paris in 1898 to negotiate with the Spanish colonial government, none of the commission members was Catholic (Reuter 1967: 15) despite the fact that the Commission would have to deal with many issues related to the Catholic Church. Similarly, no Catholic was appointed when in 1899 McKinley sent a fact-finding commission to the islands, headed by Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman, president of Cornell University. Based on the recommendation provided by the Schurman Commission,[8] McKinley sent a Second Philippine Commission, headed by William Howard Taft. Despite criticism by the Catholic press of the "anti-Catholic discrimination" of the Schurman Commission, again no Catholic was appointed to this Second Commission (*The New York Freeman's Journal*, July 14, 1900).

Following the occupation, the U.S. government began to establish a public school system to replace the existing Catholic schools, which had been serving the Filipinos during the Spanish colonial period (Reuter 1967). Most of the teachers assigned to teach in the new school system, however, were reportedly non-Catholics. In this U.S.-controlled public school system, religion would not be taught. Catholics would have no voice in managing the system, which eventually would make it impossible for the Catholic Church to maintain itself as a teacher of the young (Reuter, 1967).

To Weaken the Church

The American occupation of the Philippines was followed with great enthusiasm among American Protestants to begin extensive missions in the islands. Members of Protestant missionary societies became enthusiastic "over the prospect of invading these islands and claiming them from Catholicism" (Reuter, 1967: 13). Leaders of these societies then began to discuss the prospect and problems of opening new Protestant missions among Filipinos. By the mid-summer of 1898, in the midst of the debates over whether the U.S. should retain the Philippines or not, the Protestant press strongly supported the idea of retaining the Islands under American control (Reuter, 1967: 13).

On June 11, 1898 *The New York Times* published an article about how one enthusiastic Protestant commission prepared itself to work for the

Philippines. The article said, "Yesterday this Army Christian Commission, the name of the body through which all religious agencies now act, started its first consignment of tents and equipment to the Philippine Islands." The equipment included 50,000 letterheads, and a great number of books, chairs, tables, tents, and fans. The article also stated that "never before did war see the Church so emphatically at the front."

In a separate article published on the same day the paper also reported that the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions had just finished a meeting on starting missions in the Philippines. Participants of the meeting agreed that "now is the time for Churches to secure a strong and permanent foothold" in the islands. They wanted the Protestant missions to the Philippines "to enter upon it as soon as American guns and valor make the work practicable."

There were various reactions from the American Catholics regarding developments in the Philippines following the silence of the guns and the beginning of American interference in the daily lives of the natives. Some Catholic reacted by starting their own programs to help the Filipinos. In April 1900, for instance, General Joseph Wheeler, a prominent Catholic in Washington D.C., made a public announcement about his intention to start a movement to help the Philippines shortly after his visit to the Islands. The General also urged American Catholic women to participate in his effort. "During my recent visit to the Philippines... I was much impressed with the great devotion of the women, and it occurred to me that it would be a grateful thing for the Catholic women of our country to show their appreciation of the piety of their sisters of the east in some substantial way" (*The Catholic Citizen*, April 28, 1900).

In general, however, the reactions suggested a tendency of a growing solidarity among Catholics in the nation due to the feeling of being discriminated against, or left out in the Philippine affairs by the government and American public. Many of the Catholics resented this turn in the direction of the war efforts. Not only did they feel that their patriotism had been challenged, but they now also felt that they were asked to fight a war to extend Protestantism into territories that had been Catholic for centuries (Reuter, 1967: 14-15). They were disillusioned by the reality of American policies toward the newly acquired territory.

When news about violence and church desecration reached the U.S., a great number of American Catholics were outraged. Many of them feared that the deliberate anti-Catholic turn in government policies might result in the destruction the natives' Catholic faith, and turn them over to Protestant missionaries (Reuter, 1967). In reaction to the picture of a church desecration

published in the *Collier's Weekly*, for instance, a writer expressed his strong condemnation of such acts, which he considered an act of anti-Catholic arrogance, in a letter to the editor of *The New York Times*. At the end of the long letter to the editor he wrote,

> ... If anybody still doubts that sentimental grievances are even more effective than material... let him consider this case of the altar in a Catholic Church, as the most convenient and sheltered telegraphic station. And let him no longer wonder that there are millions of Filipinos who are ready to die rather than to submit to the indignities that have been inflicted upon them by the doubtless brave and patriotic, doubtless well-meaning but doubtless horribly uncivilized persons ... wearing to our shame the uniform of officers of the Unites States Army (*The New York Times*, September 16, 1899).

In reaction to attempts to discredit Roman Catholic missions in the Philippines in general, Helene M. Erni wrote in *The New York Times* (September 5, 1898), "let us give the Catholic Church credit and appreciation." Praising the many good works done by the Catholic Church in the islands, Erni also reminded the readers of loyalty and sacrifice offered by American Catholics who "willingly, nay gladly, give the last drop of their blood" to America, just like any other Americans. She argued that any attempt made to weaken the Catholic Church would only strengthen the faith and loyalty of its members to the Church as well as to America.

The *New York Freeman's Journal* condemned the violent way the U.S. government got control over the islands, branding it an act of imperialism based purely on greed. The paper appealed to Americans to oppose the continuation of violence in the Philippines. It read,

> It only remains that you, the free Citizens of America, for the glory of your name throughout the world and for the honor of your flag, shall do justice. Thus shall the hands of your noble sons be no longer stained with innocent blood. Thus shall it not be said that the vile inspirations of greed have banished from your hearts those lofty traditions of liberty and philanthropy which you have inherited from you honest forefathers (*New York Freeman's Journal*, July 21, 1900).

The absence of Catholics in the three commissions on the Philippines also generated strong negative reactions among Catholics. They considered

this a deliberate anti-Catholic attitude on the part of the U.S. government (*San Francisco Monitor*, November 18, 1899). In reaction to the composition of the Peace Commission of 1898 the Catholic press immediately branded it anti-Catholic. They also claimed that the large proportion of Catholics in the United States who had done their share in the war effort considered such a lack of wisdom a deliberate injustice. Many Catholics feared that McKinley purposely discriminated against them. As result, until the end of his life McKinley was under constant attack by the Catholic press. "McKinleyism" or "being McKinleyized" became press slogans for alleged acts of anti-Catholicism committed in the islands (*New York Freeman's Journal*, July 14, 1900).

The absence of Catholics in the First and the Second Philippine Commissions compelled the *New York Freeman's Journal* to ask, "Were there no Catholics in the U.S. capable of a place thereon?" It then expressed the fear of some Catholics that President McKinley deliberately intended to discriminate against the Catholics. Suspicious that Protestant Churches were behind such discriminative policies, it further wrote that "Protestantism is hand-in-hand with Infidelity and secret-chamber hypocrites in trying to wipe out Christianity in the Orient" (*New York Freeman's Journal*, July 14, 1900).

Some other Catholics considered the absence part of policies to leave out the Church in the decision making process. Father Frederick Z. Rooker's letter to Msgr. Denis O'Connell, for instance, indicated such a notion. He wrote that neither Secretary of State John Hay nor Secretary of the Navy John Long, who were very influential in McKinley's Philippine policies,

> have any use for the Abp. [John Ireland] nor for any other Catholic. They have determined and have made the President determine to go with the settlement of any difficulties which may arise in the new policy of the government absolutely without reference to the existence of Catholic authority. Everything indicates that the Church is to be left out entirely in the final arrangements (quoted in Reuter, 1967: 71).

Initially, many American Catholics supported the new public school system. They believed that since the old, parochial school system had created difficulties for the Church; a new and American system of school was needed. Other Catholics, however, were suspicious of the new system. They feared that the public school system would be used to the disadvantage of the Catholic Church (Reuter, 1967). This kind of fear began when they realized that the

Catholic Church was not given sufficient part in planning or running the system. A number of Catholics began to oppose the system publicly.

Articles published in the July edition of the *New York Freeman's Journal* (July 14, 1900) were typical of such reaction. One article considered the system part of an "Anti-Catholic crusade in the Philippines." It stated that the system was clearly a "shameful discrimination against Catholics." It added, "The cry may be 'free religion' or anything else, but it is a notorious fact that Protestantism and unbelief in one form or another are forced upon the children attending public schools."[9]

American Catholics' reactions to the expansion of Protestant missions were no less strong. Quoting a letter from the *Boston Herald*, the *Boston Pilot* warned that "powerful influences" had been brought to President McKinley to assure that the Philippines would be cleared of Catholic religious orders and that it would be open to exclusive Protestant missionary activities. The paper also insisted that religious freedom among Filipinos should be guaranteed. It suggested that,

> if circumstances compel an American protectorate over the Philippines, we shall not abuse our power by endeavoring to force on the people of those islands any form of religion. The United States is not a Protestant country. Religious freedom is a fundamental principle of our Constitution (*Boston Pilot*, June 18, 1898).

Despite the strong reactions of many Catholics, however, there were Catholics who did not worry too much about Protestant activities in the Philippines. They were more interested in seeing the establishment of a just peace which would at least assure religious freedom. To them competition from Protestant missionaries did not seem too important to worry about (Reuter, 1967: 15).

It is important to note that in general, objections raised by American Catholics were not about the Protestants themselves, but about the Protestants' influence in shaping government poli[71]s which were intended to control the islands and eliminate the traditional role of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines (*New York Freeman's Journal*, July 12, 1900). For American Catholics, therefore, the heart of the problem lay in the U.S. government's official policies (Reuter, 1967: 79). They felt that government policies attempted to weaken the Church, and to make difficult, if not impossible, the religious work it was already doing. In addition to the concerns about the proposal to expel the Spanish friars, pushed energetically by most American officials,

Catholics were also concerned about attempts to deny the Church its property and the recommendation to establish a public school system which minimized the Church's role. They realized that any effort to deprive the Church of its income-producing properties and its facilities of education and charity would quickly destroy the Church's position among its faithful.

Eventually Succeeded

Further developments suggested that the concerns and reactions of the Catholics did not go unnoticed. Certain changes occurred in the government's policies.[10] Governor William Howard Taft and President Theodore Roosevelt played a very important role in this. Taft served as a civil governor of the Philippines from 1901 to 1904. As governor he took a liberal stand on behalf of the Catholics, even against the military officials and the municipal government in the islands. He proposed a bill which would guarantee the return of Church properties, which under the provisions of the Treaty of Peace of 1898 were officially given to the U.S. government. Taft maintained this policy should be confirmed by the Congress. It was eventually legalized in the Philippine Civil Government Bill of 1902, which returned the properties back to the Church.

In June, 1902, Taft led a delegation to the Vatican in an attempt to negotiate the problem of the extensive amount of land controlled by various religious orders of the Catholic Church. From the beginning, there was a mutual misunderstanding between the Vatican and the Taft Commission. The Vatican saw the matter purely as a problem of property, while the Commission saw the presence and activities of the religious orders themselves as the central matter. Despite the difficulties in the process, however, the negotiations were finally brought to a successful conclusion in 1903.[11] After patient meetings in Manila between Taft and a new apostolic delegate, Cardinal Giovani Guidi, agreement was reached on the purchase of Church property and the reduction of the Spanish clergy. The agreement represented an important step in the restoration of diplomatic relations between the Vatican and the United States (Alvarez, 1992).

Another major factor in changing the government policy on the Philippines was the Roosevelt presidency. Theodore Roosevelt, who assumed the presidency in September 1901, following the assassination of President McKinley, was more sensitive to press criticism than his predecessor (Reuter 1967: 86). He was concerned that the accusations of the Catholics regarding government's policies in the Philippines might jeopardize his leadership, especially during the congressional election year. The President, for instance,

wanted the charges regarding the public school system to be investigated and reported in the media. This was done shortly afterwards. In defense of the Roosevelt Administration, a report from the investigation stated that, "About 2700 native teachers employed in the islands, all of whom are Catholics, 2 American Catholic teachers in the normal school, 5 in the Manila schools, and 140 native Catholic teachers in Manila, alone. Exceptional that any graduate is other than Catholic" (*Catholic World*, LXXXV, August 1902).

Roosevelt also maintained good relations with a number of Catholics. Although these relations did not always win the support of many Catholics regarding his Philippine policies, they helped him settle issues which most concerned the Catholic Church. His desire to find a solution to the friar's land problem was an example of his aim to find the fair settlement. The task of finding such a settlement would be left to the Taft Commission to the Vatican which, despite difficulties, eventually succeeded both in settling the matters and helping to improve relations between the U.S. government and the Church (Zwierlein, 1956: 40-55).

Became More Aware

Representing one sixth of the total U.S. population by the late 1890s, the Roman Catholic Church in the U.S. was weak, divided, and marked by internal divisions, particularly over the issue of Americanism. The outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898 and the subsequent issue of colonialism, however, apparently became a turning point in Catholic development in the United States (Reuter: 1992). In this respect, the issue of the Philippine occupation played a very significant role. The government's decision to occupy and then to lay out policies which were not beneficial to the Catholic population generated concerns and reactions among American Catholics.

The response to the concerns and reactions to the occupation policies were important for both the government itself and the Catholic Church in the U.S. To the government, the response helped reduce sharp criticism from the Catholic population. For the Catholics, the controversy over the Philippine occupation helped them to gain a new respect from the government and from the American public in general for their opinions. The government was willing to cooperate with Catholics regarding their desires, when it had never before cooperated. This, in turn, helped begin the process of minimizing the anti-Catholic prejudice which had existed in America for so long (Reuter: 1992).

On February 20, 1902, Pope Leo XIII celebrated the 25th anniversary of his pontificate. Cardinal Gibbons, speaking in the name of the American

hierarchy, had sent him a letter of congratulations on March 2, to which the pontiff replied on April 15 with the highest praise for the American Church. Leo XIII told the American bishops that the condition of the Church in the United States cheered his heart with its success in spreading the faith, the provision of educational facilities, the advance of the African-American and Native-American missions, the liberty granted the Church by American law, and the generosity of American Catholics in relieving the poverty of the Holy See (Leo XIII, 1903: 441-453).

By 1904 the Roman Catholic Church in the U.S. not only appeared as a united body, but had also become more aware of the fact that it was the largest single religious body in the nation (Reuter: 1967). There were issues other than colonial questions which helped bring about the greater unity and awareness among American Catholics. Problems related to the occupation of the Philippines, however, became a catalyst which tended to crystallize Catholic opinion nationally. Prior to 1898 the Catholic Church in the U.S. was a church marked by internal controversies such as the dispute over Americanism. It was also a church which lacked national prominence in the nation's socio-political affairs. By 1904, however, the Church became more aware of itself as national body and gained a prominent place in the affairs of the nation.

With regard to Indonesia, it would be interesting to study how the Catholic Church in this country, despite its religious-minority status, responds to various foreign and domestic policies that the Indonesian government conducts and how the response helps or does not help shape the position and role of the Church nationally.

Notes:

1 This chapter was published in *Retorik*, Vol 3-No.1, December 2012 (Yogyakarta: Sanata Dharma University).

2 In the early days of the war many Americans considered Spain a tyrannical power and believed that its Catholicism was one of the reasons why the U.S. declared war on it. A closer scrutiny, however, showed that behind the war declaration there were also great American economic interests at stake. The war, therefore, was justified by a combination of idealism and self-interest (Maynard 1941: 529).

3 After spending four years in the Philippines as civil governor, for instance, William Howard Taft was thoroughly convinced of this sincerity of Filipino Catholicism. See Taft (1905: 364).

4 *First Philippines Commission (Schurman) Report* (Senate Document No. 138, 56th Cong., 1st session), 14.

5 (Malloy, 1910).

6 There were great concerns regarding the prisoner's well-being in the Vatican and among American Catholics as well. The papal Secretary of State, Cardinal Rampulla, acting through the Apostolic Delegate in Washington, formally requested the American Secretary of State

William R. Day for an American intervention to guarantee the safety of the nuns and clergy (Reuter, 1967: 66).

7 These are examples of problems related to violence and desecration suffered by the Church in the Philippines under the American occupation. News about these and some other problems soon reached America and generated strong reactions from the Catholic population. These Americans were irritated by two series of problems. In addition to the problems related to the violence and church desecration, they were also irritated by problems related to U.S. government's attempts to minimize the role of Catholic Church in the islands. They believed that these attempts were done by establishing a public school system which neglected the role of the Catholic Church, by excluding Catholics in the Philippine Commissions, and by greatly supporting the expansion of Protestant missions to the islands.

8 On November 2, 1899, the Schurman Commission submitted its preliminary report to the President. In their recommendation members of the Commission reported their conviction that "Catholicism is the religion, not only of the majority, but of all the civilized Filipinos." (Senate Document, "Religion," in *First Philippine Commission Report*, 109. See Reuter [1967: 70]).

9 To show the close ties between the government, the new school system, and the Protestant missions the writer of the article suggested that anybody connected with the YMCA or anybody recommended by this organization, could get any privilege and go anywhere at government expense. He also argued that with the support of the government, members of the YMCA did not hesitate to discredit Catholic missions in the islands (*New York Freeman Journal*, July 14, 1900).

10 An interview given by Archbishop Ireland in London, while he was on his way back to the United States after an audience with Pope Leo XIII in the Vatican, suggested that by the late 1900s there had been some improvement in U.S.-Vatican relations regarding the Philippine issues. In the interview the Archbishop said that the Pope had told him, "We are well pleased with the relations of the American Government to the Church in Cuba and the Philippines." According to the Archbishop, in the Pope's eyes, "The American Government gives proof of good will and exhibit a spirit of justice and respect for the liberty and rights of the Church." Therefore Pope Leo XIII asked Ireland to "thank in my name the President of the Republic for what is being done (*The New York Times*, October 2, 1900).

11 For analysis on the problems of separation of the Catholic Church from the Philippine government – particularly in matters of land question and education – during the Taft administration as governor, see Reuter (1982).

≈ Chapter 6 ≈

The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962

A Study of the book *The Brink: Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*[1]

Violence and war lead only to death.

-Pope Francis

BORN IN September 29, 1937 David William Detzer, author of the book called *The Brink: Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962,* is a son of a Navy captain. In 1970 he received his PhD from the University of Connecticut. He taught history in Norther Illinois University, DeKalb, from 1962-63. Then he moved to teach the same subject at the University of Pittsburgh, from 1963-66. Since 1966 he taught as an assistant professor in Western Connecticut State College in which in 1974 he became the head of the university's history department.

His works include *Thunder of the Captains* (Crowell, 1977); *The Brink: The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962* (Crowell, 1979); *An Asian Tragedy: America and Vietnam, Millbrook Press* (Brookfield, CT), 1992; *Donnybrook: The Battle of Bull Run, 1861, Harcourt* (New York, NY), 2004; *Dissonance: Between Fort Sumter and Bull Run in the Turbulent First Days of the Civil War* (Harcourt, New York), 2006. Specializing in the 20th century America, Detzer also writes many scripts produced for non-commercial television. He is also an active contributor to scholarly journals. About his writing habit, he says: "I am driven to write, as I am driven to eat, by forces I do not understand, by some internal pressure."[2]

Unreliable Sources

Published by Thomas Y. Crowell Publisher (New York) in 1979, *The Brink* covers a broad spectrum of the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 in the United States, including its background, its day-to-day development, and the reactions to it. Author David Detzer describes the perspectives of different people, from key figures such as Kennedy and Khrushchev to housewives in Los Angeles and children in front of the American Embassy in Moscow.

Using both written and oral sources, Detzer attempts to present the crisis in the contexts of US-Soviet relations, world politics, as well as its impact to the daily lives of the common citizens in Cuba, the United States and the Soviet Union.

Detzer's analysis of Khrushchev's motives for building the missile sites in Cuba is worth considering. According to Detzer, the first reason why Khrushchev wanted missile in Cuba was that "in her military competition with the United Sates [the Soviet Union] was failing behind," (p. 41) especially with the birth of the atomic bomb. By placing nuclear missiles in Cuba, Moscow could make up for the failing, and "doubled Russia's first-strike capabilities" (p. 50). The second reason, according to Detzer, was Khrushchev's worry that Germany would become the center of an economically vigorous and militarily aggressive alliance with the West. By putting missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev wanted to give extra pressure to his demand to the West to leave Berlin. And the third reason, Detzer contends, was probably Khrushchev's attempts to forestall an American attack on Cuba. "If the United States were really contemplating an invasion of Cuba, as Castro seemed to think, the missiles might deter it" (p. 52).

Detzer is also worth of consideration in his analysis of President's Kennedy motives to stop the Soviet effort to build nuclear missile sites in Cuba. According to Detzer, Kennedy's motives was not merely to avoid missile attack on the American soil or the alteration of the world balance of power. It was rather a matter of prestige. Detzer writes, "Was there, therefore, any real threat? Yes, Kennedy thought: not to America's immediate strategic position, but to its prestige" (p. 105).

Throughout the book it is clear that in viewing the crisis Detzer uses black-and- white approach. He seems to consider the Americans as the "good guys", while the Russians and the Cubans (particularly Khrushchev and Castro) as the "bad guys". He, for instance, refers to Castro's beard as "an eccentric means to cover a weak chin or an acned complexion, or a sign of

moral or political extremism" (p. 5). He also describes Khrushchev as "almost a comic figure, a loveable bear" (p. 7).

In writing *The Brink* Detzer uses three categories of sources: (1) published works on the subject; (2) unpublished materials at the John F. Kennedy Library; and (3) interviews with people in the U.S. and Cuba. Among the unpublished materials, he uses collections of memorandums, notes, and analyses in the files of the National Security Council, the CIA, and the Naval Department. He also uses the Congressional Records, magazines and newspapers.

In using his sources in the course of the book, however, Detzer prefers not to use the more common use of footnotes or endnotes in the academic works. Instead of referring to specific word or sentence, he prefers to use his explanation by referring to the page on which the sentence he wants to explain is located. It is a pity to know that among his sources Detzer deliberately include unreliable sources, such as "rumors spread throughout the week" (p.2).

Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy
http://wptschedule.org/episodes/15624/Cuban-Missile-Crisis-Three-Men-Go-to-War/

Irrelevant Subjects

Variety of reviews were written about this book. Nowland McDownell Ulsh, in the *Christian Science Monitor*, Monday, May 30, 1979, praises Detzer for his "broad, intensive understanding" of the crisis, which "transcends the common standard mark of international relations, its significance, and its consequences." However, Ulsh also contends that in part Detzer's book is "highly speculative."

In the *Library Journal*, March 1, 1979 Jane I. Thesing—calling the book as a "blend of history and drama"—considers Detzer's attempt to portray events

from Cuban viewpoint as unique. According to Thesing, however, the book lacks of depth and substantive analysis.

Drew Middleton, in the *New York Times Book Review*, June 10, 1979, writes that in this book Detzer deals with an important subject in US foreign relations in unsatisfactory way. To make his story exciting, he includes descriptions of the characters' physical reaction (such as smile, etc.) which are either unnecessary or hard to verify.

Middleton finds it difficult to put this book in the historiography of the Cuban missile crisis. The book is more a journalistic description of the event rather than a historical account with specific thesis to defend or refute. According to Middleton, probably writing the book based heavily on the result of his interviews on the subject, Detzer gives an impression that he merely wants to answer the "where were you when President Kennedy was shot" type of questions. In describing the context of the crisis he writes about some irrelevant subjects as Castro's father's behavior, Khrushchev's boyhood and physical looks, Major Rudolph Anderson, Jr.'s inclination to tell dirty jokes, or a five-year old "attractive, round-faced little girl" preparing for her Halloween night at Guantanamo Bay. Middleton puts Detzer's book among the "Mimi Latour was washing her clothes when the first American paratroopers landed" school of history.

Deserves Deeper Analysis

Peter Wyden's *Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979) has a similarity to Detzer's book in giving details of the event, but lacks of a complete picture. Meanwhile, James G. Blight and David A. Welch's *On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989) is in line with Detzer's attempt to use as much as possible the oral sources. As in the case of Detzer's book, *On the Brink* also fails to offer a full-fledged study that integrates the many previously secret documents and transcripts that have been released recently. The publication of the declassified letters of Kennedy and Khrushchev during the crisis in June of 1992 in *International Affairs* would probably help them to use more sources for deeper analysis.

In his attempt to emphasize the combination of history and drama sometimes Detzer is carried away with his narrative and journalistic style. The book does not offer a clear thesis. It only offers a "mosaic-like" description, without sufficient historical arguments and analysis. This makes it hard for someone to judge Detzer's book from historical point of view.

As we all know, the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 was a very critical moment—not only in terms of the history of US-Soviet relations, but also for other nations of the world. The crisis involved the possible use of nuclear military power by two superpowers which could put the survival of human kind at high risk. This kind of crisis, many would think, deserves deeper analysis than what this book offers.

Non-aggression Pact

The publication of the declassified letters written and exchanged by Kennedy and Khrushchev reveals more about the "internal side" of the crisis which Detzer's book is lack of.

From his letter of October 22, 1962, it is now clear, that President Kennedy viewed the Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba as an act of disturbing world balance of power and "a dangerous attempt to change the worldwide status quo." On his letter of October 23, 1962 he warned Khrushchev that he should not let the situation out of control.

Khrushchev saw the missile issue differently. To him the missile issue was partly an act of rejection to Kennedy's proposal in Vienna in June 1961 to maintain a "global standstill" agreement. The proposal, in Khrushchev's view, was a capitalist attempt to subvert the world status quo and as an attack on the revolutionary process itself. It was as if the United States asking the Soviets to sit like a schoolboy with his hands on the top of the desk, Khrushchev said.

It is now also clear that Castro initially disagreed that the missiles were sent to Cuba secretly. To him the secrecy would only benefit President Kennedy. The secrecy of the missile deployment, in Castro's opinion, would only help Kennedy to rally for international help. And Castro was probably right. The secrecy of the affairs helped Kennedy to depict the U.S. as the "victim" of Soviet aggressive secretive attitudes. Had Khrushchev sent the missiles publicly it would be hard for Kennedy to rally for international support, due to the deployment of American nuclear missiles in Turkey.

Despite Khrushchev's claim that he sent the missiles upon Castro' request, the Cuban leader had not initially wanted nuclear missiles at all and reluctantly accepted them only on the premise that the nuclear deployment in Cuba would strengthen the entire socialist camp and redress the global balance in favor of the USSR. From the letters we now also know that even after October 28, Castro and Khrushchev refused UN inspection on their nuclear missiles. On October 30, 1962, Khrushchev wrote, "We shall not accept inspection, this I say to you unequivocally and frankly."

Military Aid

It should be added that October 27 and 28 Kennedy promised to lift the quarantine around Cuba and Khrushchev promised to withdraw "the weapons you describe as 'offensive'." Kennedy made his pledge conditional on two stipulations: (1) that the "weapon system" be removed under UN supervision, and (2) that the Soviet willing to halt the further introduction of such weapons system into Cuba. Khrushchev announced the withdrawal of the ballistic missiles from Cuba on October 28, 1962, but the crisis was not over until November 20 of the same year.[3]

During the crisis, Adlai Stevenson, US ambassador to the UN, specified the "offensive weapons" as the IL-28. The confrontation over the removal of the IL-28 created a second crisis that lasted until November 20, when Kennedy announced publicly that the Soviets had agreed to remove the bombers and the U.S. was lifting the quarantine. The IL-28 were Cuba 'bargaining chip' to secure a firm agreement with the United States not to invade Cuba. Yet, unknown to Castro, Khrushchev gave up the bombers on November 13, two days before the Castro wrote a strong letter to the UN, expressing Cuba's position. The IL-28 crisis thus made it clear that the Soviet Union would not provide a security umbrella for Cuba.[4]

In January 1992, at a conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, held in Havana, Castro suggested that Kremlin officials judged that Kennedy had humiliated Khrushchev in the crisis and its aftermath, though the President had admonished his advisers not to describe the outcome as a victory. Castro conjectured that the Cuban Missile Crisis contributed to Khrushchev's outset from power two years later, which, Castro argued, ultimately confronted the United States with a more virulent and debilitating arms race than it would have faced had the more pacific Khrushchev remained in power.

The correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev demonstrates that both leaders had little understanding of and regard for Castro as Cuba's "maximum leader." The US and Soviet attitudes nonetheless reinforced Cuba's belief that it was vulnerable to a future US attack and that it had been betrayed by the Soviet union. It is notable, then, that after the crisis Cuba increased its support for revolutionary movements in Latin America, in part in an effort to "overextend" the United States and to undermine U.S. ability to strike at Cuba. In response, the US stepped up military aid to the region, and in the 1970s despotic military regimes in Latin America used such aid to gain or hold on to power.

Efforts to Reconcile

Both Khrushchev and Kennedy understood that the crisis had brought humankind to the brink of global disaster. On November 19, 1962, Khrushchev himself wrote that the crisis had "brought humanity to the brink of thermonuclear war." Earlier, on November 11, he wrote to President Kennedy that "we were very close to that abyss."

Different reactions came from the U.S. following the dismantlement of the sending of Soviet missile to Cuba. Averell Harriman, assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs, for instance, was supportive to the idea of a non-aggression pact between the U.S. and USSR. Meanwhile Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, was skeptical about the idea.

By November 1963 Kennedy was gone and by October 1964 Nikita Khrushchev had fallen from power. We will never know what the world would be if both leaders stayed in power for a few more years. What we now know is that had they not resolved the missile crisis, the 1960s would have been a decade of unprecedented instability and danger—not only for the US, USSR and Cuba, but also for the rest of the world.

The declassified correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev demonstrates the limitation of the two leaders who brought the world to the brink of nuclear destruction, and then with extraordinary wisdom avoided war. The lesson from the missile crisis is that in nuclear age, crises cannot be managed, but must be avoided. And crisis avoidance is best achieved through efforts to reconcile the conflicting interests of the all parties involved.

Notes:

1 David William Detzer, *The Brink: Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962.* New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Publishers, 1979.

2 http://www.encyclopedia.com/arts/educational-magazines/detzer-david-1937 assessed February 15, 2017.

3 Philip Brenner, "Cuba and the Missile Crisis", *Journal of Latin American Studies,* Vol. 22, No. 1 (Feb., 1990), pp. 115-142.

4 Brenner, pp. 115-142.

≈ Chapter 7 ≈

Woodrow Wilson and the Idea of The League of Nations

Peace cannot be kept by force; it can only be achieved by understanding.

-Albert Einstein

SEVERAL FACTORS helped shape President Woodrow Wilson's ideas regarding the League of Nations. The included his personal background as well as the recent political development both in the U.S. and abroad. Among the personal factors were Wilson's observation of the Civil War, his religious formation as a southern Presbyterian, his view of democracy and American leadership in the world, cooperation among nations, and the "passion" for his own leadership both in the U.S. as well as in the international community.

These personal factors, this chapter will show, became intertwined with contemporary political development in the U.S. and in Europe. The Republicans' strong support for Ameri participation in a world federation for peace and stability, along with the outbreak of World War I in 1914 and reactions to it, further developed Wilson's desire for a league of nations.

His success in selling the idea abroad, however, was not followed with the same success at home. The U.S. Senate refused to ratify American membership in the League. Wilson's failure in getting approval for the American membership, in turn, reveals certain aspects of his personality and leadership.

Central Role

Thomas Woodrow Wilson was born in Staunton, Virginia, on December 28, 1856. Along with his family he moved to Augusta, Georgia, the following year. The early years of his childhood witnessed the tensions leading to the

war between the Northern and Southern parts of the U.S. About this period Wilson wrote, "My earliest recollection is of standing at my father's gateway in Augusta, Georgia, when I was four years old, and hearing someone pass and say that Mr. Lincoln was elected and there was to be war."[1]

When Wilson was almost eight years old he saw thousands of Confederate troops marching on their way to defend Augusta, and saw deceased and injured soldiers inside his father's church.[2] It is important to note that at an impressional age Wilson witnessed the horrors of a devastating war and its aftermath—a war that had torn apart his nation, his church, and his own family. The memory about the war was well-impressed in Wilson's mind thereafter. As Wilson himself once said, "A boy never gets over his boyhood, and never can change those subtle influences which have become a part of him."[3] Many years later he recalled the Civil War as an unforgettable "tragedy" in terms of human lives, properties and money.[4] In turn, this memory perhaps became one of the reasons for his great desire to help stop war, and to ensure peace and cooperation among men.

Wilson's father, the Reverend Dr. Joseph Ruggles Wilson, played a central role in shaping Wilson's early life. He was responsible for his son's religious education and upbringing in a Presbyterian household. An ardent Southern sympathizer, he was a prominent Presbyterian. Because of his strong belief, the Presbyterian tradition with its requirement of obedience to divine law, particularly in promoting good against evil, heavily influenced the Wilson family.[5]

Since the early national period, American Presbyterians placed a strong emphasis on the idea of a covenant involving the special relationship between the United States and Providence. They believed that America would prosper as long as it remained faithful to the covenant. This covenantal tradition, which referred back to the Biblical story of the Covenant between God and Abraham, made deep impact on Joseph Wilson's theological as well as political views. He held that not only America but also all nations of the world were administered in harmony with moral law, which came from God. In this theological, political view, he believed that there was a comprehensive scheme in which the individual, the church, society, and nations of the world would converge and live under the same covenant. Through him, this Presbyterian covenantal religious tradition was passed down to his son, the young Woodrow Wilson.

The young Wilson had a very close relationship with his father, whom he considered as his "best instructor, the most inspiring companion." He remembered that in facing a Southern presbytery he could not think of

himself as the president of the United States. He said, "I can only think of myself as the son of Joseph R. Wilson."[6] Thanks to his father the Presbyterian tradition had impact practically on every aspect of Wilson's life, including his views on public matters. John M. Mulder, one of Wilson's biographers, even argues that the key to understanding Wilson's "years of preparation" is this Presbyterian covenantal religious tradition, the spiritual curriculum that the elder Wilson imparted to his son.[7]

As a student at Princeton, for instance, Wilson formed what he called a "solemn covenant" with one of his classmates in a joint quest to "acquire knowledge that we might have power."[8] Wilson even described his forthcoming marriage to Ellen Louise Axson in 1885 as "a compact," and proposed that they form "an Interstate Love League," complete with a constitution. Later in his life he revealed in public "the stern Covenantor tradition that is behind me sends many an echo down the years."[9]

In his covenantal view of life Wilson believed that the highest objective of a nation and of an individual were identical, in that both were directed "towards a fuller realization of his kinship with God."[10] This deep religious conviction strongly influenced his dealing with political affairs. In reaction to the break of World War I in 1914, for instance, he wrote to Colonel House on August 3, "We must face the situation in the confidence that Providence has deeper plans than we could possibly have laid for ourselves."[11]

To him the "deeper plans" of Providence implied a personal invitation to help stop the war and bring peace. He believed that the war, as any conflict and disorder, was result of the absence of faithfulness to the covenant, the lack of the Christian moral sense on which a community of nations should be based.

When in 1914 the Great War broke out in Europe, the horrors it caused were many times more than the horrors of the American Civil War, which Wilson witnessed in his childhood. If in the Civil War armies marched in numbers as many as 100,000, in the war which started with the German attack of Poland the numbers were millions. The casualties were therefore also counted in millions. By the end of 1916 Russia alone, for instance, had lost 3.6 million of its people, and losing another two million as prisoners to the Central Powers. Meanwhile the lost of lives suffered by other European powers such as Britain, France and Germany, added the number with several other millions.[12] These grotesque facts of the course of the war surely reached Wilson almost everyday and became a great concern in his mind.

Unlike in his childhood in which he was merely a passive observer of a war, however, in the case of the European war which was later known as

World War I. Wilson wanted to participate in stopping it, and in bringing order and stability to Europe and to the world in general. In his now famous war message to Congress regarding American participation in the war on April 2, 1917, for instance, he made it clear that the motive behind the involvement was not revenge but the welfare of mankind. He said,

> We must put excited feeling away. Our motive will not be revenge, or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion.[13]

He understood that if disorder and invasion of rights had provoked war, then ordered relationships and obligations would promote a moral sense of community among nations. In this, Wilson believed, Christianity would play a central role.

A World Federation

Wilson had long been fascinated with both English culture and political traditions. At the age of seventeen he formed an imaginary group called "Royal United Kingdom Yacht Club." In this club he appointed himself, "Lord Thomas W. Wilson," as a commodore.[14] In the January 1884 issue of the *Overland Monthly* Wilson wrote his familiar criticisms for the American politics and his advocation of the British parliamentary as a means of reform. He wrote, "First or last, Congress must be organized in conformity with what is now the prevailing legislative practice of the world." Then he suggested, "English precedent and the world's fashion must be followed in the institution of Cabinet Government in the United States."[15] In comparing the American President to the British Prime Minister, Wilson maintained that the American President's usefulness "is measured, not by efficiency, but by calendar months. It is reckoned that if he be good at all he will be good for four years." According to Wilson, while "a Prime Minister must keep himself in favor with the majority, a President needs only keep alive."[16] Many English writers such as Walter Bagehot, Thomas Babington Macaulay, and Edmund Burke had deep influence on Wilson's writings.

In 1887, when he expressed his idea of a world federation in his book *The Study of Administration*, he was referring to a "federation of parts of empires like the British," which should constitute "a wide union ... of governments joined with governments for the pursuit of common purpose."[17] This fascination

later played an important role when he was pondering the idea of a league of nations.

Wilson addressing crowd

https://www.reference.com/history/rejected-wilson-s-fourteen-points-plan-cf2e4d3d35844b7a

American Internationalism

Wilson had a strong desire for democracy. This is obvious, for instance, in his writing "The Modern Democratic State" (1885), in which he expressed his reflections on the nature of democracy, political leadership, relations among nations, and the future of the United States.[18] In this work he wrote, "Democracy is the fullest form of state life... for a whole people." His argument was that democracy made politics "a sphere of moral action" and strode inexorably toward "the universal emancipation and brotherhood of man."[19]

Wilson's view of democracy, however, was quite conservative. He believed that democratization required a great deal of time. Democracy was "a stage of development ... built by slow habit [and] its process is experience." To him democracy was "not the habit of revolution, but the habit of resolution." Other countries, therefore, could attain democracy slowly "through a period of political tutelage."[20] He also believed that the United States had been able to practice democracy to a relatively full degree, because it possessed none of the tradition and institution—such as entangling foreign alliances and standing armies—that hindered "the free action of social and political forces."[21]

Wilson found the theoretical ground for his conservative view of democracy in Edmund Burke's works. In the early 1890s he discovered Burke's philosophical views interesting, especially his condemnation of the excesses

of the French Revolution. He realized that Burke's ideas of democracy were in line with his own conservative political views. Although admitting that revolutions were sometimes both necessary and productive, Wilson agreed with Burke in doubting its benefit in reforming society. Referring to Burke, he argued that "it is both better and easier to reform than to tear down and reconstruct."[22]

Democracy, in Wilson's view, was also socialistic. He wrote, "For it is very clear that in fundamental theory socialism and democracy are almost if not quite one and the same."[23] He believed that both democracy and socialism "rest at bottom upon the absolute fight of the community to determine its own destiny and that of its members."[24] He warned that democracy could be jeopardized by the presence and influence of big business. He argued that "the modern industrial organization has so distorted competition as to put it into the power of some to tyrannize over many, as to enable the rich and strong to combine against the poor and weak."[25]

Wilson was also interested in Burke's emphasis on law's role as part of the democratic process in human cooperation.[26] Therefore the democratic system he referred to was a democracy based on the process of law. Later he would attempt to apply this conception to the international society.[27]

To Wilson the beginning of the 20th century was the beginning of the new role about to be played by America in the modern world. He considered America

> a nation hitherto wholly devoted to domestic development [which] now finds its first task roughly finished and turns about to look curiously into the task of the great world at large, seeking its special part and place of power.... The past of America lies at the center of modern history.[28]

Inspired by this view on the international role of the United States, in 1908 Wilson joined the American Peace Society, an organization that sought to spread world peace and international cooperation based on Christian principles and morality.[29] In this Society Wilson learned much from his fellow peace-seekers about American internationalism.

Good Works

Since his adolescence, Wilson showed a passion for leadership. He was fascinated by great leaders and thinkers. Other than the British writers, he

also deeply admired great political leaders such as Otto von Bismarck, William Gladstone, George Washington, and Abraham Lincoln.[30] He, for instance, considered Gladstone as "the type of what a man may make of himself when fired by high ambition and resolve."[31] He believed that real statesmen were those "who stood alone at the inception of a movement, and whose voices ... [were] the more sensitive organs of society—the parts first awakened to consciousness of a situation."[32]

Concerning the issue of leadership, in his writing called "The Real Idea of Democracy," he stated that "the problem of every government is leadership: the choice and control of statesmen and the scope that shall be given to their originative part in affairs; and for democracy it is a problem of peculiar difficulty."[33] To his wife Ellen Axson he once expressed his personal fascination of leadership. "I have a strong instinct of leadership, an unmistakably oratorical temperament, and the keenest possible delight in affairs," he wrote her. "I have a passion for interpreting great thoughts to the world..."[34]

In line with his passion for leadership and great thoughts, Wilson was very much interested in founding or revamping debating groups throughout his academic career. He did so as a law student at the University of Virginia, as an attorney in Atlanta, as a political science graduate student at John Hopkins University, and as a professor at Wesleyan University.[35] These exercises helped him in his practice as a leader to bring order and rationality to anarchic conditions, which would become a central part in the formation of any international federation for peace. In addition, the exercises also helped him to promote the cause of democracy and that of Christian duty to perform good works through political debates.

Other Sources

For two consecutive years, from 1892 to 1894, Wilson taught courses in international law at Princeton University. While teaching these courses he synthesized his thoughts about the nature of democracy, public debate, reform, the state, sovereignty, and man's responsibility to God.[36] During this period he began to ponder the idea of the formation of a community of nations. He discovered that there were three factors, which brought nations into being communities. The first factor was the recognition of Roman law as the basis of all Western legal systems. The second one was the simple fact of commerce—in ideas as well as in goods. The third and most vital factor, he believed, was Christianity.[37] In regard to Christianity Wilson maintained that

by establishing standards of morality and common principles of civilization and education it had prepared the way for international law. Christianity, in his view, promoted the growth of international law because the concept of the fatherhood of God implied the brotherhood of men, which, in turn, created natural bonds between nations.[38]

By 1912 Wilson already had, at least intellectually, a solid concept for a community of nations—through the proliferation of democracy and appropriate amendments to international laws as well as through an emphasis on the concept of Christian fellowship. He understood the objective of international cooperation to a democratic but moralistic and legalistic system, which was obviously similar to his father's theological and political view of a world order. This understanding was also influenced by his reading of Burke and perhaps by his tentative understanding of socialism.

Based on this understanding Wilson believed that his main task, in conjunction with the "deeper plans" of Providence, was to replace "disorder and violation of right which provoked war" (as it occurred both in the Civil War and World War I) with "ordered relationships and recognized obligations" that promoted "a moral sense of community among states."[39] Moreover, he believed that in order to build such an international community what was needed was the "imperative forces of popular thought and the concrete institutions of popular presentation," or, in short, the promise of democracy. In the democratic system, Wilson expected the presence of "the rule of counsel, the catholic spirit of free debate ... [and] the ascendancy of reason over passion."[40] Eventually, through the idea of formation of a league of nations, he would attempt to bring his conception into international cooperation.

Wilson's personal conception and quest for democratic international cooperation, however, was not the only source from which he got the idea for the formation of the League of Nations. Important external factors (both in the United States as well as in Europe) also played important role in the development the idea. He acknowledged that the idea of the Covenant of the League was not his own "private invention."[41] In a speech on May 27, 1916, he publicly announced that he had gotten the idea from the Republicans. He said, "I, along with thousands of my fellow countrymen, got the idea twenty years ago, chiefly from the Republican public men." He then referred to a particular Republican when he said, "take men like ex-Senator Burton of Ohio. He has been preaching a league of nations for twenty years."[42] He then added, "the leading spirit in the conception of this great idea were the leading figures of the great Republican party."[43]

At the same speech he quoted at length part of a speech given by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, showing how Lodge had proposed the formation of an international alliance to ensure world peace. "If we were to promote international peace at the close of the present terrible war, if we were to restore international law as it must be restored," Wilson repeated Lodge's speech, "we must find some way in which the united force of the nations could be put behind the cause of peace and law."[44] He also quoted Lodge as saying, "The league certainly has the highest of all aims for the benefit of humanity, and because the pathway is sown with difficulties is no reason what we should turn from it."[45]

Wilson then turned to another renowned Republican, Theodore Roosevelt, as saying: "The great civilized nations should combine by solemn agreement in a great world league for the peace of righteousness; a court should be established."[46] Even the famous Article Ten, Wilson said, had its origins in Roosevelt.[47] Roosevelt, Wilson quoted, had once said that, "[t]he nations should agree on certain rights that should not be questioned, such as territorial integrity, their right to deal with their domestic affairs, and with such matters as whom they should admit to citizenship."[48]

Wilson was probably correct. Soon after World War I broke out, Theodore Roosevelt publicly announced his support for the creation of an international league. He said, "Surely the time ought to be ripe for the nations to consider a great world agreement among all the civilized military powers to back righteousness by force." Then he added, "Such agreement would establish an efficient world league for the peace of righteousness."[49]

Wilson also acknowledged that he was influenced by the League to Enforce Peace (LEP). Founded by about 120 conservatives on June 17, 1915, LEP urged American active participation in an international league of postwar world order. In this league, the LEP members suggested, representatives from all nations would assemble periodically to make appropriate changes in international law in order to ensure peace and sovereignty of nations.

Despite the acknowledgement, however, Wilson reminded his audience that the League's ideas were not unique. There were leagues similar to LEP outside the U.S. He said,

> Just as there was in North America a league to enforce peace, which even formulated a constitution for the league of peace before the conference was thought of, before the war began, so there were in Great Britain, and in France, and in Italy, and I believe, even in Germany, similar associations of actually influential men, whose

> ideal was that some time there might come an occasion when men would be sane enough and right enough to get together to do a thing of this great sort.[50]

Clearly, Wilson did not want to take credit concerning the idea of the League of Nations to himself. But neither did he want to give it exclusively to the LEP members. In continuation of the same speech, Wilson said that he wished he could claim the great distinction of having invented the idea, but he could not do so because it was "a great idea which has been growing in the minds of all generous men for several generations."[51] In other words, Wilson believed that the idea did not come exclusively from him, nor did it come from the LEP members. Wilson considered himself not as an inventor of the idea. Instead, he claimed himself merely as a spokesman for America. "I was her spokesman," he said, "and when I advocated the things that are in this League of Nations I had the full and proud consciousness that I was only expressing the best thought of my fellow countrymen."[52]

His personal connection to the Covenant, he contended, was only minor, emanating from pragmatic needs. He claimed that the only special personal connection with the League of Nations Covenant were "things that I was careful to have put in there because of the very considerations which are now urged." Among the urgent considerations, Wilson said, was an act against "any provision which would put the United States at war without the consent of the Congress of the United States."[53]

It is clear therefore that Wilson did not draw the ideas of a league of nations exclusively from himself. He derived the ideas also from other sources, such as the Republicans. Moreover, it should be noted here that the broad concept of a community of nations had long been discussed by different groups of activists in the labor, peace, and socialist movements in the United States as well as abroad.

Concept of Power

As much as the American domestic social and political upheavals of the late nineteenth century altered Wilson's thinking about America, so did the events abroad.[54] His view of American foreign policy, for instance, was shaped by the development of U.S. policy toward the Philippines. On the issue of the Philippines he tended to consider it as part of the American duty in "spreading the American dream," which, in turn, was part of the idea of expanding Western culture to the world.[55] In an early 1904 address he said, "the East

is to be opened and transformed." In practice, the process of opening and transformation, according to Wilson, was mainly the imposition of Western standards upon the East.[56] Christian belief had a very strong influence in his view of spreading the Western standard. He believed that "God planted in us visions of liberty... that we are chosen and prominently chosen to show the way to the nations of the world how they shall walk in the paths of liberty."[57]

Reactions outside the United States to the outbreak of World War I also helped develop Wilson's idea of a league of nations. In the second week of August 1914, when World War I had just entered its early stages, some London peace-seekers founded Union of Democratic Council (UDC). It was an organization with a radical antiwar philosophy.

Members of UDC agreed to blame not only Germany, but also the British as well as French and Russian Foreign offices for the "drift into war."[58] They demanded a negotiated settlement and, in November 1914, published their demands in their manifesto, which contained four main requests:

1. The liberation of territory under foreign control;
2. The democratic control of British foreign policy, through the Parliament;
3. The abandonment of the British government's policy of "balance of power" and the search for a concerted efforts along with other nations to maintain peace;
4. The reduction of British arms industries as part of the efforts to maintain peace.[59]

Through one of UDC's most distinguished members, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, Wilson became acquainted with the manifesto.[60] In the December 1914 issue of *Atlantic Monthly* Dickinson presented his case in an article "The War and the Way Out." In this article he argued that the war was the inevitable culmination of the intrigue and connivance of the governments, not the peoples, of the belligerent countries.

He then reasoned that the central condition for peace was the rehabilitation and proliferation of democracy. This would be done specifically by the establishment of democratic control of foreign policy throughout Europe, the recognition of the rights of small states, and the application of self-determination in the disposition of colonial possessions.

Dickinson, a Cambridge classicist, also suggested a compact on the arbitration of disputes between nations by a council of arbitration; on ending of the use of resources on armaments; and on the relinquishment of existing armaments to an international authority. Such a compact, Dickinson believed, would permit a "league of Europe" to flourish and rekindle the light of

civilization.[61] To Wilson, Dickinson's idea of a compact from which a "league of Europe" would be established was of course inspiring. It was in line with his own idea of an international covenant as the basis for the establishment of a league of nations.

Furthermore, the ideas of the UDC clearly influenced Wilson's view of the war and his own reaction to it. At the beginning of the war, for instance, Wilson's main concern was to keep the U.S. out of the war. He pursued American neutrality. This, in Wilson's mind, would enable America to play an important role in mediating the warring nations. By the pursuit of neutrality, he believed, the U.S. would "play a part of impartial mediation and speak the council of peace."[62]

It was in this context of mediation that the objective of an international security system emerged as a central part in Wilson's foreign policy during the war. In his pursuit of mediation, Wilson then suggested impartial critical attitudes toward all the warring nations. Clearly reflecting the ideas of UDC he wrote,

> It may be found before long that Germany is not alone responsible for the war, and that other nations will have to bear a portion of the blame in our eyes. The others may be blamed, and it might be well if there were no exemplary triumph and punishment. I believe thoroughly that the settlement should be for the advantage of the European nations regarded as Peoples and not for any nation imposing its governmental will upon alien people.[63]

There were three important features of Wilson's idea of global cooperation that further reflected the ideas of the UDC, which at the same time summed up his idea of American foreign policy in regard to the war. First, his condemnation of national conquest and his assertion of equality. This notion implied his view of imperialism/ colonialism as the root cause of the war. Second, that another primary cause of war was race for military and naval supremacy among the great powers. Third, the concept of balance of power should be replaced by a concept of power within the framework of a new community of nations.[64]

In Limbo

Wilson's next step was to transform his concept into a trans-national cooperation. In late 1914 he turned to Latin America as the arena for such a

step. Under the Pan-American Pact of 1914, Wilson attempted to launch a new era in hemispheric relations, to promote disarmament and the practice of arbitration and conciliation, and to impress upon the World War I belligerents the urgency of mediation.[65]

For him, the Pan-American Pact could serve a two-fold diplomatic purpose. On the one hand, it would serve as a covenant of friendship and cooperation between the U.S. and the Western Hemisphere nations. On the other hand, and more importantly, the success of the Pact might provide a powerful lever to move the European belligerents toward American mediation.

As part of his endeavor, Wilson supported Treasury Secretary William Gibbs McAdoo's idea to sponsor a Pan-American Financial Conference. When the delegates met, Wilson himself gave the opening remarks in which he emphasized the importance of commercial cooperation between the U.S. and Latin American countries based on common interests. "The basis of successful commercial intercourse," Wilson stated, "is common interests, not selfish interests."[66]

On the same occasion, Wilson expressed his real concern in his diplomatic endeavor, which was bringing peace to the European belligerents. To the delegates he spoke, "I cannot help harboring the hope, the very high hope, that by this commerce of minds with one another, as well as commerce in goods, we may show the world ... the path to peace."[67] Wilson said explicitly that the Western Hemispheric cooperation was hoped to "set *an example* to the world in freedom of institutions, freedom of trade, and intelligence of mutual service." Clearly, he attempted to show "an example" to European warring nations regarding the importance of forming an international cooperation and accepting American mediation.[68]

Wilson's push toward the Pact indicated his effort to construct a new regional political system to promote peace and security, theoretically based on the principles of equality and sovereignty, which he hoped would attract the belligerents to an American mediation. But at the same time in the economic components of Pan-Americanism Wilson also hoped to promote a program advantageous to the American economic and political interests.[69]

Due to the slow formal response from Chile and the German-American tensions over submarine warfare, however, throughout most of 1915 the Pact was in limbo. In addition, some Latin American countries, such as Brazil, feared that the Pact would only pave the way for greater American economic interference in Latin America. The Tampico and Vera Cruz incidents of April 1914 in which Wilson sent American forces to bombard and occupy Vera

Cruz was probably a sufficient evidence for them to suspect Wilson's sincerity in building cooperation with Latin American countries.

Preventing Future Wars

In January 1915 Wilson sent Colonel Edward M. House, his most intimate adviser, to Europe. By so doing he now pursued his ambition for offering an American mediation and for measuring the possibility of materializing the League of Nations concept in Europe.[70] In other words, House's mission to Europe would constitute the first stage in the evolution of the League of Nations in Wilson's transatlantic diplomacy. More importantly, perhaps House's mission to Europe illustrated Wilson's desire to lay a foundation for domestic support for the kind of international structure of cooperation under the American auspices that Wilson had in mind.[71]

On December 18, 1916, Wilson urged the European belligerents to stop the war. It was then followed by his greatest contribution in formulating war aims that for the first time gave some meaning to the conflict. As early as January 22, 1917, he had called for a peaceful reconciliation and establishment of a postwar league of nations. But soon afterwards Wilson thought that American neutrality could no longer be maintained. On April 2, Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war so that America could help to preserve civilization and "make the world safe for Democracy." Congress adopted the war resolution on April 6, 1917, and therefore ending the American policy of neutrality and starting the American involvement in the war.

Despite his decision to abandon the hope for a peace without victory Wilson continued to voice his plea throughout the world for peace based on democracy and self-determination, without annexations and indemnities. His famous Fourteen Points Address of January 8, 1918, clearly formulated and expressed the plea.

After some handling, the Allies agreed to Wilson's plea. An armistice was signed on November 11, 1918, followed by a peace conference involving the former belligerents. The Peace Conference, which was opened in Paris on January 18, 1919, continued until the Versailles Treaty with Germany, and was signed on June 28, 1919.

In relation to his Fourteen Points Wilson proposed the formation of a League of Nations, with responsibility for executing the treaty and preventing future wars. He was certain that American leadership in the League and the passing of time would rectify the injustices of the settlement.

Ended Any Possibility

President Wilson's success in selling the Covenant of the League of Nations abroad, however, was not followed by the same success at home. Many U.S. senators opposed the idea of American membership in the League. The opposition to American membership, and particularly to the blanket commitment to collective security contained in Article 10 of the League constitution, actually had been manifested as early as March 1919. By July 1919 many Republicans, led by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman of the Foreign Relation Committee, were demanding explicit disavowal of this commitment.

Senator Robert La Follette of Wisconsin was one of the strongest critics of the idea of American membership in the League. Previously he had been strongly supportive to Wilson's earlier efforts to maintain American neutrality. But he soon grew disillusioned with Wilson as the noble guardian of peace.[72] People who endorsed the League, according to La Follette, were people who did not really read and understand its provisions.

La Follette criticized Wilson for calling the League of Nations as a league to prevent war and to guarantee peace. In *La Follette's Magazine* he wrote,

> ... when you come to examine the terms of this Compact, you find that it has little in it to prevent war, but contains provisions certain to bring on another and greater war in the near future, and so far as the United States is concerned, makes her a policeman for all of Europe and parts of Asia and Africa. This is not my conclusion. It is written in the so-called Covenant of the League in express term.[73]

He further challenged Wilson when he wrote that if the documents of the provisions of the League were documents intended for making peace, "it would not be necessary for him to spend his time on the hustings trying to bully Senators into accepting it."[74] President Wilson did try to persuade Senators to ratify the Treaty and American membership in the League, but he was unsuccessful in getting adequate support.

Unable to obtain necessary support from the U.S. Senate President Wilson set out upon a tour of the West to generate public demand of ratification. He traveled 8,000 miles and delivered some 37 addresses. He attempted to assure the necessity of the formation of the League of Nations and that of American membership in it. He explained that the League of Nations was the only means to prevent the "dreadful catastrophe" of an international war from

happening again in the future. He stressed that the prevention of such a war was the only purpose of the League of Nation. In his address at Columbus, Ohio, on September 4, 1919 he reminded his fellow Americans,

> When gentlemen tell you, therefore, that the League of Nations is intended for some other purpose than this, merely reply this to them: If we do not do this thing, we have neglected the central covenant that we made to our people, and there will then be no statesman of any country who can thereafter promise his people alleviation from the perils of war.[75]

Yet Wilson eventually failed to get the two-thirds vote in the Senate required for the ratification. This ended any possibility of Wilson's dream of the American membership in the League of Nations.

Failing to Get Support

Several factors helped Wilson to come up with the idea of an international federation to ensure peace and cooperation in the post-war world. The dynamics of the idea and its realization into the League of Nations reveal much about these factors and about Wilson himself. On the personal level, Wilson's childhood experience, religious belief, personal ideas and inclinations helped him to desire for an international community for peace and cooperation under the American (and his own) leadership. On the political level, the peace movement and reactions to World War I strengthened the desire for an international cooperation in the form of a league of nations, based on an international covenant.

From observing how he dealt with the idea of the League of Nations we can see that the depth of his idealistic fervor gave force to his political leadership. This, in turn, was further strengthened by his outstanding oratorical capacity.

At the same time, however, the intensity of that fervor crippled his ability for effective compromise. Despite his bipartisan emphasis in his speeches, he was impatient with partisan opposition. It seems that there was much of the intolerant religious conviction in his refusal to deviate from the path that he believed himself appointed by Providence to tread. His illusion that the nobility of ideals would suffice to obliterate the stubborn facts of political life took his international policy down the road to failure.

Though a great leader, apparently he lacked the political intuition and skillfulness that might have strengthened his contribution to the peace conference and brought the United States into the League of Nations. As we all know, the result of all these was Wilson's failure not in selling the idea abroad but, ironically, in failing to get support from the U.S. Senate for the American membership in the League.

Notes:

1 See Woodrow Wilson, "Abraham Lincoln: 'Man of the People,'" Feb 12, 1909, in Arthur S. Link, David W. Hirst, John E. Little, Manfred F. Boemke, Denise Thompson and Frederick Aandhal (eds.), *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, 69 volumes to date. (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1966), XIX, 33. Hereinafter cited as PWW.

2 Wilson claimed to have seen General Lee in Augusta. See "An Address on Robert E. Lee," ca. January 19, 1909. *PWW* XVIII, 635.

3 "An Address on Robert E. Lee," ca. Jan 19, 1909, *PWW*, XVIII, 631 as quoted in Thomas J. Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 3.

4 John J. Mulder, *Woodrow Wilson: The Years of Preparation.* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), 141.

5 John M. Mulder, *Woodrow Wilson: The Years in Preparation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 3-28; see also Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters*, 8 vols. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1927-1939), I, 1-27, and 49-55; and George Osborn, *Woodrow Wilson: The Early Years.* Baton Rouge, 1968, 13-17. See Mulder, *Years of Preparation*, 37 and 271.

6 *PWW* XXXIII, 50.

7 See Mulder, *Years of Preparation*, 37 and 271. See also Arthur Link, "Woodrow Wilson and His Presbyterian Inheritance," in Arthur Link, *The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson, and Other Essays.* Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1971; For Wilson's testimony to his father's influence on him, see *PWW*, XXX, 74-75 and 103-108, and ibid. XXXIII, 49-50.

8 Wilson to Ellen Louise Axson, Oct. 30, 1883, *PWW*, II, 500.

9 Speech at Mansion House, London, Dec. 28, 1918, *PWW*, LIII, 534.

10 *PWW*, V, 90.

11 *PWW* XXX, 336.

12 Knock, 31-32.

13 Woodrow Wilson, "War Message Delivered at a Joint Session on the Two Houses of Congress, April 2, 1917," John Randolph Bolling (comp.), *Chronology of Woodrow Wilson Together with His Most Notable Addresses, A Brief Description of the League of Nations, and the League of Nations Covenant.* (New York: Stokes Company, 1927), 221.

14 "The Royal United Kingdom Yacht Club" ca. July 1, 1874, *PWW* I, 54-56.

15 "Committee of Cabinet Government," c. January 1, 1884. *PWW* II, 617, 625, as quoted in Mulder, 77.

16 "Congressional Government," *PWW* IV, 138, as quoted in Mulder, 78-79.

17 "The Study of Administration," *PWW*, V, 380.

18 "The Modern Democratic State" ca. Dec. 1-20, 1885, *PWW* V, 61-92.

19 *PWW* V, 92, 59, 84.

20 *PWW* V, 63, 71-75.

21 *P*[195]V, 92.
22 "Edmund Burke: The Man and His Times," *PWW*, VIII, 343.
23 "Socialism and Democracy," ca. August 1887, *PWW* V, 561.
24 "Socialism and Democracy," ca. August 1887, *PWW*, V, 561.
25 "The State", printed in *PWW*, VI, 304.
26 Wilson's lecture notes, ca. July 2-10, 1894, *PWW* VIII, 597-599.
27 "Democracy", ca. Dec. 5, 1891, *PWW* VII, 348.
28 September 9, 1901, *PWW* XII, 184.
29 See letter from Wilson to Jacobus, Feb. 11, 1910, *PWW* XX, 119-120.
30 See *PWW* I, 624-42; *PWW* V, 89, 494; *PWW* VI, 271, 176-182; *PWW* V, 328, 398.
31 News report of a talk to the Philadelphian Society, May 3, 1901, *PWW*, 140, as quoted in Mulder[195]5.
32 See "[195]rs of Men," June 17, 1890, *PWW* VI, 664.
33 "The Real Idea of Democracy," c. August 31, 1907, *PWW* XI, as quoted in Mulder, 155.
34 Wilson to Ellen Louise Axson, *PWW* IV, 664.
35 See Wilson to Axson Dec. 15, 1884, ibid. III 554 n.3.
36 See Wilson's notes for the course, March 8, 1892-May 1, 1894, and notes for a classroom lecture, March 8, 1892, in *PWW*, VII, 453-457.
37 [76]*W*, IX,50-93.
38 Thomas J. Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 8.
39 Knock, 9.
40 PWW, VI, 261. Also in "[68] Modern Democratic State," *PWW*, V, 90.
41 Hamilton Foley (comp.), *Woodrow Wilson's Case for the League of Nations*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1923; reprinted by Kraus Reprint Co., New York, 1969), p. 133. The author of this paper uses the reprint. Hereinafter cited as Foley.
42 Foley, 136.
43 Foley, 137.
44 Foley, 139-140.
45 Foley, 139-40.
46 Foley, 140.
47 Foley, 141.
48 Foley, 141.
49 "The Belgian Tragedy," *The Outlook*, 108 (September 23, 1914) as quoted in Knock, 48.
50 Foley 134.
51 Foley,134.
52 Foley, 134.
53 Foley, 134-35.
54 Knock, 9.
55 Knock, 10.
56 News Report in Montclair, N.J., January 28, 1904, *PWW* XV, 143.
57 Campaign address, May 26, 1912, *PWW* XXIV, 443.
58 [18]ck, 37.
59 Marvin Swartz, *The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics in the First World War*. (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1971), 42, as discussed in Knock, 37.
60 Swartz, 37.
61 Swartz, 38.
62 Wilson's appeal was carried on the front page of most daily newspapers throughout the United States.It is printed in *PWW*, XXX, 393-394.

63 *PWW*, XXXI, 458-460.
64 Knock, 222.
65 See Mark T. Gilderhus, "Pan-American Initiatives: The Wilson Presidency and 'Regional Integration,' 1914-1917." *Diplomatic History*, (Fall, 1980), 409-423.
66 A Welcome to the Pan American Financial Conference, May 24, 1915, *PWW* XXX, 245.
67 *PWW* XXX, 245.
68 The quotation is taken from the final sentence of Wilson's address to the Pan-American Financial Conference. See *PWW* XXXIII, 244-245.
69 Knock, 43.
70 Knock, 45.
71 Knock, 47.
72 Ralf Stone, *The Irreconcilables*. (Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 1970), 6.
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≈ Chapter 8 ≈

Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Reform

The stage is set, the destiny disclosed. It has come about by no plan of our conceiving, but by the hand of God who led us into this way. We cannot turn back. We can only go forward, with lifted eyes and freshened spirit, to follow the vision. It was of this that we dreamed at our birth.

-President Woodrow Wilson

THE PROGRESSIVE Era began in the early years of the 20th century in the United States of America when many people felt that the Unites States was facing a series of serious and challenging social, political and economic problems caused by the rise of a new kind of complex corporate industrial structure. A number of large companies merged and established the so-called "trusts" or amalgamation of several companies, resulting in a monopolistic system of economy, which in turn caused an uneven economic distribution.

In reaction to this, many people began to work toward socio-economic reform. Those who promoted such reform were called the Progressives. The Progressives believed that the government could and should take actions in order to reform the society by abolishing the monopolistic system of economy. They argued that government should become an agent in promoting "social progress" by formulating and executing policies to improve collective socio-economic conditions. In opposition to the 19th century ideas of limited governmental interference in business and individualism as an American ideal which geared the American economy towards unlimited competition, the Progressives advocated government intervention in promoting the welfare of the society as a whole.

Two American leaders were known as "Progressive Presidents," although they had different ideas regarding government's role in reforming society.

President Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909), who labeled his reform ideas in the so-called "New Nationalism," suggested that socio-economic reforms could be achieved by promoting a thoroughgoing and effective regulation of big business, and not by using anti-trust acts to break up monopolies. President Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921), who promoted his reforms under a program called the "New Freedom," believed that socio-economic reform should be achieved by enforcing anti-trust laws in order to break up the monopolistic structure of big business in America.

A convert from conservatism to Progressivism, Wilson began to promote Progressive ideas in 1901 and during his years of presidency. There were many reform legislation ra[illegible]ed during his administration. Among the most significant ones were the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, the Federal Trade Commission of 1914, the Clayton Anti-trust Act of 1914, the National Defense Act of 1916, the Shipping Act of 1916, and the Federal Transportation Act of 1920.

Despite his central role during the Progressive era, there were different views of Wilson as a Progressive reformer. This chapter attempts to demonstrate examples of such views as they were expressed by American writers, especially William Allen White, John Morton Blum, Arthur S. Link, Larry Walker, and Arthur A. Elkirch, Jr. By discussing these views we hope to see that despite their many successes and failures, Wilson's reform policies had great impact on the American tradition of reform.

Defending Wilson

As Wilson's contemporary, William A[illegible] White met the President in person several times. Although in his book, *Woodrow Wilson: The Man, His Times, and His Task* (1924), White explicitly expressed his disappointment regarding the meet[illegible]s, he tends to praise Wilson. For instance, he writes that Wilson "worked against te[illegible]le odds, many of which were in his own heart. He added that "his sincerity, his honesty, his consecration to the work before him never were questio[illegible]d." In the book he also states that Wilson "was neither God nor friend," but a shy, middle-aged gentleman-politician who demonstrated "the hoar-f[illegible]t of the cloister upon his public manner." He added that the President was "an academic with respect for facts and with a Calvinistic addiction for digesting the facts into his own God-given truth" (White: 1924).

In his book White was also very apologetic on behalf of Wilson. An instance of this is that with regards to Wilson's intolerance to critics, White writes that such intolerance was caused by the President's "single track mind,"

which signified his unwillingness to deal with many things at once. "When any one failed to comprehend Wilson's purpose," White writes, "he was liable to encounter the train on his single-track mind." The blame for the single track mindedness, according to White, should be put on Wilson's Scottish-Calvinist heritage, and not on Wilson himself (White: 1924).

White saw three main achievements of Wilson during his first administration, which later brought him to his re-election. The first achievement was Wilson's ability to propose a constructive reform program. The enactment of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and the formation of the Federal Trade Commission were examples which reflected his ability as a leader in defining regulations for the business community. The second was Wilson's success in demonstrating a strong quality of leadership. The third achievement was the President's capability in showing moral leadership both in the U.S. as well as abroad. As a liberal President, White contends, Wilson succeeded in carrying out specific demands of the Roosevelt Progressive platform. Wilson was successful in reviving a "custom" established by President George Washington in emphasizing the President's legislative rather than administrative leadership. This, according to White, was obvious in Wilson's ability to lead the Congress rather than just to enforce its acts. This way Wilson was able to set America upon "the highroad away from plutocracy into which it had been drifting during the first three decades after the Civil War."

White summarizes his personal view of Wilson when he said in the last paragraph on his book,

> If vision becomes reality, then all the petty faults which men saw and fumed about will fall away from him. His strength will survive; his moral courage will stand out. The fire of his words will not be quenched, and the sword of his faith will flame at the gates of a new order. This much we may know of Woodrow Wilson surely: If fame does come to him through the conjunction of time and chance working upon the genius of the race to preserve the structure which he previsioned in his hour of trial, Fame will find a man here--a clean, brave, wise, courageous man--ready-made for heroic stature. Little will crumble from him in that day. He will remain as we know him who worked with him. And the man he was in our pride of him need suffer little change as his poor finite clay turns to memorial bronze (White: 1924).

John M. Blum, a professor of history at Harvard University, expressed his view of Wilson in his book *Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of Morality* (1956). In this book he writes that as a reformer Wilson believed that a change in the government meant more than a change of the Democratic party. It necessitated a national willingness "to cleanse, to reconsider, to restore." In such willingness, according to Blum, Wilson included governmental programs to reduce tariffs, to reform the currency and banking system, and to restrict the trusts. There was a two-fold task which Wilson as a Democratic President had to face in the beginning of his first administration: to unite his party so that he could use it to pass his proposed legislation, and at the same time to re-shape the party so that it would reflect the dispositions of a majority of Americans and thereby win their political allegiance.

Blum saw Wilson's executive leadership as a strong one. This was evident in the President's capability in the process of welding popular aspirations, partisan objectives, and the presidential as well as congressional wills into legislation. Wilson's leadership, according to Blum, was incontestably "a magnificent performance" (Blum: 1956). In his reform policies, for instance, Wilson did not hesitate to challenge the financial establishment, such as that of the Wall Street. In a public statement the President boldly proclaimed that the Wall Street was attempting to defeat reform bills by creating artificial fears of impending panic. In the appointment of Louis Brandeis, Blum states, Wilson succeeded in combating the fierce conservative opposition which he faced (Blum: 1956).

The Federal Reserve Act of 1913, according to Blum, was a solution for "long recognized financial deficiencies without violating the prevailing dicta of sound economists and imaginative financiers." This act, he contends, "gave the United States its first efficient banking and currency system since the time of Andrew Jackson" (Blum: 1956). Moreover, the act was a fulfillment of what Wilson had promised in his campaign and his message to Congress. The Federal Reserve Board's regulatory authority assured a larger degree of government control over banking. The act also promoted a fluidity of currency and credit required for short term needs of business and agriculture. Indeed the Federal Reserve System facilitated the relatively easy adjustment of American finance to the strains imposed upon it during World War I.

Defending Wilson, Blum writes that in 1916 when Wilson had trouble in executing his reform programs, it was not because of the President's inability to lead. It was caused by the Democratic Party's inefficiency in carrying out the program and by the immaturity of the society in its "directive temper" (Blum: 1956).

Against monopolistic practices
https://saladofpearls.wordpress.com/2015/02/14/notes-from-adorno-theses-on-need/

Great Influence

The most prominent biographer and historian of Woodrow Wilson, Arthur S. Link demonstrates in his book *Wilson: The New Freedom* (1956) the President's ability to translate his campaign of the New Freedom into appropriate regulation. Link demonstrates how str[135]Wilson was in promoting Underwood bill for tariff reduction. On April 8, 1913 Wilson appeared [61] person before a joint session of Congress to chart the tariff revision. "We must abolish everything that bears even the semblance of privilege of any kind of artificial advantage," Link quotes Wilson, "and put our business men and producers under the stimulation of a constant necessity to be efficient, economical, and enterprising masters of competitive supremacy, better workers and merchants than any in the world" (Link: 1956). As Link states, the main purpose of the Underwood bill—which Wilson strongly promoted and was officially adopted by the Senate on October 2, 1913—was not primarily to create a free trade. It was instead directed toward "the destruction of the special privileges and the undue advantage that the Republican protectionist policy had conferred upon American producers; relief for the mass of consumers in such basic items as food and clothing; and the placing of American producers in a genuinely competitive position with regard to European manufacturers" (Link: 1956).

According to Link, the Federal Reserve Act was intended to "destroy monopoly and unleash the potential economic energies of the American people." In his view, compared to the fight for the Underwood bill, the controversy that raged over currency and banking legislation was much greater. In praise of Wilson, Link states that by the end of the fight for the Federal Reserve Act, the President "had demonstrated more fully than before the qualities that made him a leader" (Link: 1956).

Unlike William Allen White, Link wrote this book as a professional historian and with less personal bias, but with a wider perspective and more substantial sources. He succeeded in clearly demonstrating his view that Wilson was a reformer and not a radical. Link writes that what Wilson had in mind when he launched the idea of the New Freedom was that "the Democrats had an obligation to remove any remaining special privilege in tariff legislation, to take over Wall Street's control over credit, and to rewrite anti-trust legislation to return the competitive spirit in American business. It was this, and not "the uplift of depressed groups by ambitious projects of federal intervention," which Wilson understood as the mission of the New Freedom program.

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Larry Walker, an associate director of the Center for State and Local Government at the University of Florida, writes an essay on Wilson as a prominent progressive reformer in the *Political Science Quarterly*. Emphasizing Wilson as a Progressive President and academic reformer, in an essay called "Woodrow Wilson, Progressive Reform, and Public Administration" (1989), Walker demonstrates that Wilson was responsible for all of the reform accomplishments which occurred during his presidency. With his strong executive leadership, Walker contends, Wilson actively participated in the policy making in the reform policies during the Progressive era.

Such a move, Walker suggests, was consistent with Wilson's idea in his academic writings regarding the active role of the nation's leadership in promoting reform. As a scholar Wilson had promoted strong executive power. This fact, according to Walker, suggested that Wilson was a reformer even before he became president. In his writings, such as *Congressional Government* (1885) and "The Study of Administration" (published in *Political Science Quarterly* in 1887) Wilson the scholar had suggested that government should take more active role in promoting the welfare of its citizens. As president he attempted to practice what he had proposed.

246 The provisions of the legislation ratified during his administration produced expansion of national government control over areas which were not regulated by the national government prior to Wilson's presidency. By creating

ma commissions, boards, public corporations and administrations—such as the Federal Trade Commission, the Tariff Commission, the Federal Power Commission, the United States Shipping Board, and the Federal Reserve System—the legislation of Wilson's presidency enhanced the role of government in promoting the welfare of the people.

The ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, Walker states, was another major contribution of Wilson in his reform program (Walker: 1989). It signified the transformation of the federal revenue system because it authorized federal taxation of income. With the tariff-reducing Underwood-Simmins bill of 1913 Wilson also helped the national government to shift its reliance from tariff revenue to the progressive income tax. By imposing a progressive taxation, Walker argues, Wilson "relieved indirect taxation on poor people and imposed higher taxes on those better able to bear the burden" (Walker: 1989). The high increase of federal program's annual grants to state governments, in Walkers' view, also signified Wilson's achievement in his domestic-assistance policies, along with the centralizing character of the grant-in-aid administration during his presidency.

"In sum," Walker concludes, "Wilson as President had a great influence on American public administration." The Progressive, pro-government regulation and the President contributed to great growth in the functions and powers of the national government. He also contributed to the major increases in the number of national administrative agencies, and to the establishment of national government control over the states, such as the manner of control through the grant-in-aid administration program. The enhancement of the government's role which Wilson promoted through his reform policies, Walker believes, reached both national as well as state levels (Walker: 1989).

Tragedy

In comparison to the four previous writers, Arthur A. Elkirch, Jr. was the most critical one of Wilson and his reform policies. Putting the Progressive era in a broader perspective in his book *Progressivism in America: A Study of the Era from Theodore Roosevelt to Woodrow Wilson* (1974), he sees some similarities between American progressive reforms and European social movements. Elkirch believes that many of the American Progressive ideas were borrowed "from the political and social thinking in Western Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries," such as from the British liberals or laborites, and German Social Democrats. At the same time he also believes that both American progressivism and European social democracy were parts of a

common and broader world movement toward a global civilization (Elkirch: 1974).

In this context of the universal interrelation of reform ideas, Elkirch sees Wilson as one of the leading American Progressives who thought of reform in moral, or even religious terms, such as Walter Rauschenbusch, William Dwight Porter Bliss, and Washington Gladden of the Social Gospel as well as other prominent Progressive figures such as William Jennings Bryan, Jane Addams, Theodore Roosevelt and "Golden rule" Sam Jones of Toledo. Along with these Progressives, Wilson considered socio-economic reforms as part of a crusade for social justice.

For many liberal and progressive-minded Americans, the incoming Wilson Administration offered what seemed like a "promised land." Failing with the Populists and Bryan Democrats, disappointed by Roosevelt, and frustrated by Taft, Elkirch argues, these people turned to the New Freedom "as the last alternative to so[illegible] Old World version of socialism or state capitalism." Elkirch contends that the outbreak of the First World War soon brought a disillusionment to many Americans toward the New Freedom's promises (Walker: 1989).

Elkirch saw some inconsistencies in Wilson's reform policy. On the one hand, Wilson supported the ratification of the La Follete Seaman's Act which was intended to promote social justice by enforcing safety restrictions and fair labor standards in the American Merchant Marine. On the other hand, the President was reluctant to listen to the pleas of Afro-Americans regarding the problems of race relations.

As Elkirch points out, Wilson's reform legislation against the trusts were embodied in the ratification of the Clayton Anti-trust Act and the formation of the Federal Trade Commission. Elkirch argues that instead of launching policies to abolish economic monopolies as desired by many Democrats, the Clayton Anti-trust Act "merely made more specific the original Sherman Anti-trust Act's stipulations against unfair business practices in restraint of trade" (Elkirch: 1974). Meanwhile, the Federal Trade Commission, which had been expected to abolish practices of unfair business which limited economic competition, "indicated the surrender of the New Freedom to the ideology of Roosevelt's New Nationalism." In his view, "the New Freedom, however noble an ideal, appears retrospectively to have been an unrealistic goal in twentieth century America." He believes that the unfulfilled promises of the New Freedom was a tragedy—not only for Wilson, but also for the American people (Elkirch: 1974).

Lasting Impact

Ever since his years as a scholar Wilson had been captivated by the idea of reforming the American society. As one of the most prominent Progressives of his time, Wilson believed in the importance of the government's more active role in dealing with the socio-economic ills of the society caused by the domination of big corporation's in a monopolistic system of economy. He kept this idea with him throughout his political career. When he became President in 1913, he transformed his ideas into reform policies. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913, the Federal Trade Commission of 1913, The Clayton Anti-trust of 1914, were examples of legislation which embodied Wilson's idea of reform as he had formulated in his New Freedom campaign program.

Despite many successes which Wilson's reform policies created, the New Freedom did not succeed completely. There were several reasons for the President's failure in realizing the promises of the New Freedom. As Link and White indicated in their books, Wilson's extremely staunch Presbyterian sense of destiny often made him think of himself as being chosen by God and the Democratic Party to carry out a certain mission of which only he himself knew with certitude. This, in turn, resulted in Wilson's weaknesses such as his high-minded and high-flying oratorical rhetoric, his tendency to act as though he had a monopoly upon truth and righteousness, and his intolerance of critics. All these, in turn, helped limit the fulfillment of the New Freedom's promises during his administration.

It should be noted, however, that Wilson's influence in the American socio-economic reform was very significant. His reform policies, which were directed against the tariff system, the trusts, and the "special interests," were clearly reflected in reform policies of the New Deal and the Fair Deal of a later Democratic generation. Wilson's reforms were a mixture of failures and successes. His successes, however, had lasting impact on American reform tradition.

≈ Chapter 9 ≈

The United Nations and the Promotion of Human Rights

The purpose of the United Nations should be to protect the essential sovereignty of nations, large and small.

-Nikita Khrushchev

PRESIDENT WOODROW Wilson's efforts to form an effective League of Nations might looked unsuccessful. His own nation refused to join the league, and barely two decades after the formation of it another global war broke out. However, the idea of forming an international body to minimize the possibility of another global war and to maximize the possibility of international peace lived on. In the wake of World War II many nations felt the need to form an international institution—not dissimilar to Wilson's League of Nations—in order to maintain international cooperation to work for international peace, security, war prevention and human rights. Instead of League of Nations, it was now called United Nations.

Since its foundation in 1945, the United Nations has become the twentieth century's most prominent multilateral political organization. Despite the fact that it is not a world government, its influence as a global forum has been very significant. Founded as an organization "to maintain international peace and security"[1] and to achieve international cooperation in "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,"[2] the organization has demonstrated a great commitment and performed numerous task in the promotion and protection of human rights worldwide. Many UN documents and institutional organs indicate such commitment and works.

Particularly in recent years the United Nations has been putting greater efforts in the field of human rights. As David Forsythe observes, now the UN promotion of human rights has been increasingly accompanied by protection

attempts. "Considerable diplomacy," he writes, "is extended at the United Nations on trying to implement [human] rights..."[3]

This chapter attempts to show UN determination in human rights promotion as it is reflected in the UN human rights documents and organs. It will also show difficulties the organization has to face in the work of implementing the commitment, and will suggest actions that the UN might want to consider in order to improve its efforts in promoting and protecting human rights in the world.

The United Nations and Human Rights

Human Rights Categories in International Law

In international law there are three categories of human rights: the first-generation human rights; the second-generation human rights; and the third-generation human rights. Each of these categories emphasizes certain rights and freedoms, and the way to protect them.[4]

The so-called *first-generation human rights* emphasizes the individual's freedoms from state interference. These rights are also called "fundamental rights" and constitute both basic rights and freedoms such as the right to life; freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and freedom from torture or inhuman treatment. These rights are considered as having characteristics of ius *cogens*, which implies that they ought to be regarded as fundamental both within the realm of international human rights law as well as international law in general.[5]

The *second-generation human rights* are not as fundamental as the first-generation ones, but nonetheless they are very important to each individual and must be protected. Among the rights categorized in this group are economic, social, and cultural rights. Different from the first generation rights these rights are not amenable to immediate protection. Promotion of these rights are best fulfilled through a progressive reporting system.[6]

The *third-generation human rights,* also called "solidarity rights," consist of peoples' rights to benefit from international cooperation, such as the rights to economic, political, social and cultural self-determination, and from social and economic development.[7] These rights are collective in nature and depend upon international cooperation.

Despite the different emphases, the UN promotes and protects human rights in all three categories. Today the UN does not only concern itself with protecting basic individual rights and freedom from government interference

but also is concerned with the creation of social conditions by the government in which the citizens may fully enjoy and develop their rights in these three categories.

UN Principal Documents and Conventions on Human Rights

The *Charter of the United Nations,* although limited in scope, contains a number of provisions which express the UN's commitment to promote human rights.[8] The Charter's Preamble, for instance, emphasizes the importance of "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small."[9] Echoing the same commitment to human rights, Article 1 of the Charter states that one of the purposes of the UN is to promote and to encourage "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."[10] This determination is also clearly expressed in the Charter's articles 56, 62, 68, and 76.

The strongest emphasis on the commitment to human rights promotion, however, is best articulated in Article 55 of the Charter. In a great length the Article states,

> With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for a peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
>
> a. Higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;
> b. Solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
> c. Universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.[11]

It is this article which eventually became the basis for UN global endeavor in promoting and protecting human rights. This article is regarded as a legal norm which binds all member states to implement it. At the same time, it is evident that Article 55 is not self-explanatory. As David Forsythe points out, the article "seems to suggest that human rights are limited to those subjects mentioned in paragraph *c*, and that the subjects in *a* and *b* are not rights at

all but only policies that should be promoted."[12] Nonetheless in general the Charter's human rights provisions are legally binding particularly because it is a multilateral treaty. Therefore they have the power to oblige member states to protect the human rights of their citizens.[13]

Despite its mention of determination to promote and protect human rights, the UN Charter failed to include a list of protectable human rights. This fact concerned UN member states which then began to draft a declaration with such a list, based on the foundation provided by the Charter's provisions on human rights.[14] In 1948 the UN member states proposed the draft of The *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, which was adopted by Resolution 217 (III) of the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948.[15] Article 2 of the declaration clearly states its determination to promote and protect human rights. It declares that

> Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.[16]

The declaration, which was adopted as a simple resolution, was not intended to be legally binding norms. Instead, it was proposed as a basis for "teaching and education to promote respect for [human] rights and freedoms."[17]

There are three weak points in the declaration. First, since the declaration was adopted as a simple resolution of the General Assembly, it does not have legal power to bind member states; it is merely a UN recommendation. Second, the human rights mentioned in the declaration are too general. The affirmation that "everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person" in Article 3 of the declaration is almost as general as Article 55 of the UN Charter. Third, the declaration fails to provide means to implement its provisions.[18]

Despite these weaknesses, at present the declaration has become part of the general principles of law recognized by many nations. Most of today's written constitutions contain a commitment to the protection of human rights as listed in the declaration. The fact that some of the declaration's provisions either constitute general principles of law or represent elementary considerations of respect for human rights encourages many countries to absorb the declaration's ideals into their law and constitution. In addition to this, the declaration is considered important because of its status as an authoritative guide, produced by the General Assembly, to the interpretation

of the Charter. As Ian Brownlie Q.C. states, "in this capacity the Declaration has considerable indirect legal effect, and it is regarded by the Assembly and by some jurists as a part of the 'law of the United Nations.'"[19]

Today, many decades later, the declaration still plays an important role in international law. Despite its non-binding status, the declaration was able to prove itself as "the most authoritative statement on international human rights norms."[20] In many countries the provisions of the declaration became the standard of many governments' human rights legislation and practices. This includes a country's participation in international human rights treaties as well as domestic legislation which deals with human rights issues. Ever since its ratification, the declaration's moral and political potency has been very strong. It became the basis for the drafting of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It also became the foundation of regional human rights treaties, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. In addition, the Declaration became the standard for the drafting of provisions for the establishment of numerous human rights non-governmental organizations.[21]

In 1952 the General Assembly assigned the UN Commission on Human Rights to draft international covenants which dealt with human rights issues on economic, social and cultural rights and those on civil and political rights. The Commission then proposed the drafts of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which both were approved by the General Assembly on 16 December 1966.[22]

Despite their simultaneous ratification, the two covenants represent two different emphases. One emphasizes social, economic and cultural provisions, while the other emphasizes provisions on civil and political freedom. Although its contribution for the development in respect of human rights is very significant, *the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (ICESCR) fails to provide adequate machinery to implement its provisions. Its language is more a language of recognition than that of obligation. The covenant, which came into force on 3 January 1976, only requires member states to submit reports on measures taken regarding its provisions "to the maximum of their available sources."[23] The reports then will be presented to the UN Secretary-General, who in turn will forward them to the Economic and Social Council for reconsideration.[24]

Adopted by the General Assembly at the same time as the ICESCR, the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (ICCPR) entered into force on 23 March 1976. Compared to the ICESCR's provisions, the ICCPR's provisions are more specific and precisely worded. The covenant's language of obligation is clear. Part IV of the covenant obliges the establishment of a Human Rights Committee as a supervisory body in the implementation of its provisions by party states. As in the case of ICESCR, this covenant requires submission of reports form party states. The reports then go to the Human Rights Committee. Under Article 41 the covenant provides optional procedure whereby a party state may declare that it recognizes the competence of the Human Rights Committee to receive communications from other party states alleging that it is not fulfilling its obligations under the present covenant. The covenant declares that "a State Party to the present Covenant may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the present Covenant."[25] In practice, this procedure is done in an elaborate way and in secret. The covenant also provides immediate civil and political rights protection by requiring party states "to respect and ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant."[26]

Under the *Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, which entered into force on 23 March 1976 any state party to the covenant may recognize the competence of the Human Rights Committee to respond to complaints presented by individual or non-governmental organizations regarding violations of human rights protected by the covenant.[27] Article 1 of the covenant states that

> a State Party to the Covenant that becomes a party to the present Protocol recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subjects to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.[28]

Both the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were clearly influenced by Western idea of individual rights and freedom, in a sense of being free from any state interference. This reflects the Western emphasis on the first-generation human rights. At the same time it also reflects the UN membership of the period, in which most of the member states

were Western countries. When in the 1950s and 1960s the UN membership was expanded by the joining of many ex-colonial, non-Western countries following their independence, the UN's emphasis on human rights began to change. The drafting and adoption of the ICESCR and the ICCPR in 1966 reflected such change. Both covenants put a great emphasis on communal, positive, and socio-economic rights rather than individual rights. The rights being emphasized there are the second- and third-generation human rights. The focus is more on "freedom to" rather than "freedom from". Therefore, instead of stressing the "blocking" of government interference, the two covenants encourage government's participation in protecting and promoting human rights.[29]

In its works of promoting human rights, the UN does not only take action in the general issues of political, social, economic and cultural rights. It also works in more specific issues of human rights protection and promotion, such as in the issues of genocide, racial and sexual discrimination, torture, and children rights.

In 1948 the General Assembly adopted the *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*. The drafting and adoption of this convention, which came into force in 1951, were motivated by the Nazi extermination of millions of Jews, Gypsies, Slavs and other groups both prior to and during the Second World War.[30] The Convention defines genocide as

> ... any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical, racial or religious group, as such:
> (a) Killing members of the group;
> (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
> (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
> (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
> (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.[31]

Article I of the Convention clearly expresses the Convention Parties' stand against genocide. It states that "the Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and punish."[32]

In 1965 the General Assembly adopted the *International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination*, which entered into force in 1969. The convention demonstrates the UN's determination to combat one of

the most pervasive human rights violations, which is racial discrimination. It both condemns and prohibits such discrimination, which it defines as

> ... any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or imparting the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.[33]

In order to supervise the implementation of its provisions, the convention established the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) which consists of eighteen members. The committee is charged with a reporting system which was a direct model for that of the Human Rights Committee. In practice, however, the provision for complaints by one state against another has never been used.[34]

In its efforts to battle any form of discrimination based on gender, in 1979 the General Assembly adopted the *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women*. This convention, which entered into force in 1981, became one of the major instruments in combating discrimination against women. It defines discrimination against women as

> any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose or impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of women irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.[35]

The convention established a twenty-three-member expert body called the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). CEDAW operates very much like the Human Rights Committee in its review of reports but is not authorized to receive individual communications.[36]

In order to seek a remedy for the practices of torture worldwide as well as to provide a supervisory mechanism for it, the General Assembly adopted the *Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment* in 1984. The convention which entered into force in 1987. It defines torture as

> ... any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected or having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.[37]

Supervision on the implementation of this convention is given to the Committee Against Torture which consists of ten members and elected by the state parties but whose members serve in their individual capacities. The convention provides several ways of supervision, such as a periodic reporting system (Article 19), an optional interstate complaint procedure (Article 21), and a right of individual petition which also optional and depends upon state acceptance (Article 22). Article 30 of the convention allows disputes between state parties to be referred to the International Commission of Jurists for adjudication. At the same time, it allows state parties to avoid this obligation by entering a timely reservation.

In 1989 the General Assembly adopted the UN *Convention on the Rights of the Child*, which entered into force in 1990.[38] The convention promotes the protection of traditional civil, political, economic and social rights. In addition to these traditional rights, the convention includes certain "new" rights which apply to the child alone. Among these "new" rights are the right to a name, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents, the preservation of the child's identity, freedom from sexual abuse and exploitation.[39] Article 2 of the convention defines a child as "every human being below age of 18 years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier."[40] The convention also obliges the State Parties to adopt necessary measures which will help children to develop their maximum potential.

Supervision of the implementation of the convention is given to the Committee on the Rights of the Child. Article 45 of the convention obliges the Committee to forward a biannual report of its activities to the General Assembly through the UN Economic and Social Council. UN human rights organs, such as the UNICEF, are entitled to participate in considering the implementation of the obligations.

UN Universal Declaration of Human Right
http://home.bt.com/news/world-news/december-10-1948-united-nations-adopts-universal-declaration-of-human-rights-11364027932835

UN Organs and Human Rights

In implementing its commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights, the United Nations works through its many human rights organs. Each of the organs has its own status and responsibility within the UN system.

As a UN plenary organ, the *General Assembly* has an [illegible] competence provided by the Charter in dealing with human rights issues. Under Article 13 (1) (b) of the Charter, its obligation in the field of human rights is "assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, languag[illegible] religion."[41]

Based on this provision the General Assembly had commissioned a [illegible]ber of human rights studies and had made numerous recommendations [illegible] respect to human rights. Despite the fact that such recommendations are not legally binding on the UN member states, they have considerable significance, particularly when taken in conjunction with the obligation required by the UN Charter's articles 55 and 56. When stated with sufficient precision the recommendations could even create legal obligati[illegible][42]

As required by Article 22 of the Charter, the General Assembly has established several subsidiary organs to deal with human rights issues. Some of the widely k[illegible]n of these organs are the UN Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Decolonization Committee and the Special Committee on Apartheid. Each of these organs focuses on specific human rights issues as its name implies.

Consisting of 54 members, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is a UN political organ. In dealing with human rights issues, one of its main responsibilities is to promote respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms world-wide. ECOSOC is responsible for receiving reports from and coordinating activities with UN agencies which have special competence on human rights, such as UNESCO (the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), and WHO (World Health Organization). It is also responsible for coordinating UN activities with private and non-governmental organizations. On the practical level ECOSOC's works on human rights are mostly undertaken by UN human rights commissions, such as the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, the Commission on the Status of Women, and the Commission on Human Rights.[43]

The *Commission on Human Rights* (CHR) was established at ECOSOC's first session in 1946. It is responsible for the outstanding human rights issues which could not be resolved during the original drafting of the Charter. A UN political body, CHR consists of 43 governmental representatives chosen from the UN member states.[44] Since its creation, the CHR has done a great number of works in promoting human rights within the UN. It was the main agent behind the drafting of the UN's principal documents on human rights, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICESCR, and the ICCPR. It also drafted many other UN declarations and conventions on human rights.[45]

In 1970 ECOSOC approved a resolution which authorized the CHR to examine "communications, together with replies of governments, if any, which appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms."[46] This was approved by ECOSOC in its Resolution 1503, and therefore the system is known as "the Resolution 1503 procedure".

The *Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities* was established by ECOSOC in 1947. Working closely with the CHR the Sub-Commission is responsible for making recommendations to the CHR with respect to the protection of racial, national, religious and linguistic minorities, as well as any violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is also responsible for performing any other tasks which may be assigned to it by ECOSOC or the CHR.[48]

The *Commission on the Status of Women* was established by ECOSOC in 1946. There are two main tasks of the Commission. One is preparing recommendations and reports to ECOSOC regarding the promotion of women's rights in political, economic, civil, social and educational fields.

The other task is making recommendations to ECOSOC on urgent problems requiring immediate attention in the field of women's rights. The goal of this second task is to implement the principle that men and women shall have equal rights. The Commission is also charged with developing proposals to implement those recommendations.[49]

Established in November 1946 the *United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization* (UNESCO) focuses on the promotion and protection of cultural rights. As stated in Article 1 of its constitution, UNESCO's purpose is

> ... to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion.[50]

Initially UNESCO refused to respond to complaints or reports from individuals alleging human rights violations. In 1978, however, it adopted a procedure to respond to such complaints or reports. Within this procedure, however, UNESCO will respond to complaints only after local remedies have been exhausted. In addition to this, it will only respond to complaints about violations of human rights which are under UNESCO's competence. Furthermore, UNESCO would only consider complaints which are within the competence of the Committee on Conventions and Recommendations, whose primary function is to secure "a friendly solution." With such a solution UNESCO seeks to advance human rights promotion which is within its fields of competence.[51]

Established under ICCPR, the *Human Rights Committee* (HRC) is charged with supervising the states parties' human rights obligations.[52] It is composed of 18 members who must be nationals of the state parties to the covenant. These members, according to the covenant, "shall be persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the field of human rights consideration being given to the usefulness of the participation of some persons having legal experience."[53]

UN Difficulties in Promoting Human Rights

Based on the documents and organs discussed above theoretically the United Nations has become the most powerful forum in which human rights violations in *any* country in the world (even those which are not UN members) may be addressed. In practice, however, the reality is different. Despite the impressive number of documents and organs there are many difficulties which the UN has to face in implementing its determination to promote and protect human rights.

It is public knowledge, for instance, that the powerful UN member states and party states of human rights treaties and conventions are often the principal violators of human rights. These powerful states, therefore, would tend to stop the UN human rights organs from becoming too powerful in their missions. Furthermore, as Jack Donnelly states, "the members of the Commission on Human Rights are representatives of and directed by states, not independent experts."[54] Consequently it is almost impossible to expect objective reports from such representatives regarding the government they represent, particularly if the reports could jeopardize the government's international reputation. At the same time it is hard to expect them to be cooperative in the implementation of UN's human rights provisions if such implementation is not in line with the policies of the government they represent. It is therefore understandable, for instance, that regarding the Convention of the Rights of the Child, LeBlanc doubts that in the non-Western countries the convention's provisions will be implemented adequately,[55] since there are so many particular interests threatened if it is implemented fully.

In many cases the UN's difficulties in the practice of promoting human rights are also caused by its own complex and time-consuming procedures. Because of the complexity in the systems of monitoring, reporting, and communicating human rights violations, many human rights problems are delayed in finding solutions or even remain unsolved. The human rights violations in Uganda under Idi Amin, in Cambodia under Pol Pot, in East Timor under the Indonesian occupation, and in the clan war in Somalia all suggest the UN's inability in dealing with human rights violations, even when they are internationally known.

The UN and Human Rights Non-Governmental Organizations

Outside the UN human rights organs there are many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which also work for the promotion and protection of

human rights. Many of them work on a global basis and address broad issues of human rights, but many others limit themselves to specific issues of human rights. Big NGOs such as Amnesty International, the Human Right Watch, the International Commission of Jurists, the International Human Rights Law Group, and the *Federation Internationale des Droits de l'Homme* promote human rights as they are addressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international treaties and conventions. Small NGOs, on the other hand, tend to focus their works on specific human rights issues, such as promoting the wage increase of workers in a certain town.

Despite their size and emphasis most of these NGOs demonstrate a serious commitment to promote human rights. The 1993 World Human Rights Conference which was held in Vienna, Austria—which the author attended—witnessed the enthusiasm of NGOs in promoting human rights on the global level. Some 800 NGOs (two thirds of them at the grass-root level) actively took part in bringing up human rights issues to the conference.[56]

Particularly in recent years, the UN has been very open to the idea of cooperating with these NGOs. The ECOSOC, for instance, basing itself on Article 71 of the UN Charter has been arranging special consultation with certain human rights NGOs. Furthermore, some NGOs have been granted "consultative status" in the ECOSOC. Such arrangements and cooperation are very important, since some NGOs, as Davidson argues, "are able to make communications to competent international institutions on behalf of victims of human rights abuses where those victims themselves are incapable of engaging the appropriate procedures because, for example, there are being held incommunicado."[57] In addition to this, the NGOs are independent from any government so that their efforts in the promotion of human rights are free from government interference.

Conclusion

Expanding the ideals of the League of Nations, since its foundation in 1945, the UN has demonstrated a great commitment and performed numerous works for the promotion and protection of human rights. This commitment proves itself to be very influential in the global efforts for the promotion of human rights. Today's development in human rights promotion and protection is very strongly based on UN documents such as Article 55 of the UN Charter, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICESCR, and the ICCPR.

At the same time, it has to be acknowledged that in carrying out its tasks in the field of human rights the UN faces many difficulties. Parts of the

difficulties come from vested interests of its member states, others from its own procedures which in some cases are very complex and time-consuming.

It is therefore important for the UN to take the following two actions into considerations. One is reforming the UN organs' machinery by reducing its unnecessary bureaucratic procedures. As the then-US Ambassador to the UN, David E. Birenbaum, stated in 1995, over the years the UN has been experiencing "the ever growing demand for more and more meetings, transcripts and reports." All these, Birenbaum continues, have been done "at great cost and, too frequently, little gain to our organization not only obstructs the accomplishment of key UN objectives, but also has a negative impact on the UN's ability to produce high quality and timely reports."[58] Such criticism should be put into consideration. Shorter but more effective bureaucratic procedures would help the UN in its human rights promotion.

Another action that the UN should put into consideration is a closer cooperation with human rights NGOs. Since many of these NGOs work at the grass roots level and are independent from government interference they could offer enormous help to the UN in monitoring human rights practices as well as in implementing the UN's human rights programs in many countries.

In the end it must be said that every human rights promotion program—be it a program by the UN or non-governmental organizations—has its limits. As Hannum reminds us, the promotion and protection of legally and internationally recognized human rights "cannot by itself reform society, redistribute wealth, protect the environment, achieve peace, and ensure tolerance."[59] At the same time, however, it should be realized that in a society in which democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights flourish, the achievement of such goals becomes more possible.[60]

Notes

1 *The Charter of the United Nations* Chapter I, Article 1 (1).
2 *Charter*, Chapter I, Article 1 (3).
3 David P. Forsythe, *The Internationalization of Human Rights* (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1991), 71.
4 For a broader discussion on the concepts and theories of human rights, see for instance, Jack Donnelly, *The Concept of Human Rights* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985).
5 Scott Davidson, *Human Rights* (Buckingham and Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1993), 40-41.
6 Davidson, 41.
7 Davidson, 44.
8 Charter was drafted in two sets of meetings between August and October 1944 at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, D.C. In the UN Conference on International Organization in San Francisco on 25 April 1945 the delegates from 50 states finalized the Charter. On 28

July 1945 the US ratified the Charter, and by October of the same year the Charter entered into force (had sufficient number of countries to ratify in order to take effect). Karen A. Mingst, and Margaret P. Karns, *The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), 19-20.

9 *The Charter,* Preamble.
10 *The Charter*, Article 1 (3).
11 *The Charter*, Article 55.
12 David P. Forsythe, *Human Rights and World Politics* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press), 9.
13 Davidson, 65.
14 The draft was prepared by the Commission on Human Rights, under the leadership of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt. A.H. Robertson and J.G. Merills, *Human Rights in the World* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press), 25-26.
15 Ian Brownlie, Q.C.(Ed.), *Basic Documents on Human* Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 2
16 "Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948," Article 2, in Ian Borwnlie, Q.C. , 22.
17 Resolution 217 (III) of the General Assembly, as quoted in Robertson and Merrills, 26.
18 Forsythe, *Human Rights and World Politics, 9.*
19 Brownlie, 21.
20 Donnelly, *International Human Rights*, 7.
21 Davidson, 66-67.
22 Originally the General Assembly intended to draft a single covenant which dealt with both categories of human rights. See Robertson and Merrills, 229.
23 Davidson, 41.
24 J.A. Andrews and W.D. Hines, *International Protection of Human Rights* (New York, New York: Facts on File Publications), 12.
25 *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, Article 41.
26 *International Covenant*, Article 2 (1).
27 Andrews and Hines, 13.
28 *Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, Article 1.
29 Forsythe, *Human Rights and World Politics*, 11.
30 Davidson, 90.
31 *The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, Article II.
32 *The* [illegible]*ntion*, Article I.
33 *The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination*, Article 1 (1).
34 Donnelly, *International Human Rights*, 69.
35 *The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women*, Article 1.
36 Donnelly, *International Human Rights*, 76.
37 *The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment*, Article 1).
38 For a comprehensive study on the lawmaking process of this convention, see Lawrence J. LeBlanc, *The Convention on the Rights of the Child* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1
39 *The Convention on the Rights of the Child*, Article 7 and 9.
40 *Convention*, Article 2.
41 *Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter IV, Article 13 (1) (b).
42 Davidson, 67.
43 Davidson, 68.
44 Davidson, 68.

45 Davidson, 68.
46 Resolution 2144 (XX) of the General Assembly as quoted in Robertson and Merrills, 75, and Donnelly, *International Human Rights*, 59.
47 Robertson and Merrills, 75.
48 Davidson, 69.
49 Davidson, 71-72
50 Article 1 of UNESCO's Constitution, as quoted in Davidson, 72.
51 Davidson, 72-73.
52 *ICCPR*, Article 28 (1).
53 *ICCPR*, Article 28 (2), Davidson, 77.
54 Donnelly, *International Human Rights*, 58.
55 lanc, 62.
56 United Nations, *World Conference on Human Rights: The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action June 1993* (New York: United Nations, 1995), 1.
57 dson, 20.
58 Statement by Ambassador David E. Birenbaum, United States Representative to the United Nations for UN Management and Reform, on Agenda Item 119, Pattern of Conferences, in fth Committee, November 8, 1995, 1.
59 Hurst Hannum, *Guide to International Human Rights Practice* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press), 37.
60 Hannum, 37.

≈ Chapter 10 ≈

Schumpeter and His Theory of Imperialism

We must all build national unity, build all revolutionary forces, into one powerful wave to sweep away our main enemy, political imperialism and economic imperialism.

-Sukarno

CONSIDERED AS an example of the most complicated of the writer's style,[1] Schumpeter's book *Imperialism and Social Classes* (New York: 1951) consists of two essays: "The Sociology of Imperialism" (1919) and "Social Classes in an Ethnically Homogeneous Environment" (1927). The first essay was written to elaborate a critique of the Hilferding theory, and to offer an alternative theoretical framework into which the war and its antecedents could be appropriately fitted.[2] In the second essay Schumpeter intended "to present... a sharply [unlimited] series of problems, together with their corresponding solutions" (Schumpeter, 1951: 136) regarding social classes.

Schumpeter on Imperialism

Schumpeter believed that the so-called "rational" ends (such as economic ones) in imperialism were often based on non-rational or irrational intentions. He also believed that the drive toward imperialism did not only exist among the military class: it also existed among the people in general, in what was called *Volksimperialismus* or popular imperialism.[3]

He argued that it was inadequate to explain war and imperialism from concrete economic interests. The reason was that if we wanted to see a concrete interest as the cause of a war, three conditions should be fulfilled:

1. the presence of the concrete interest;
2. the conduct of the state which promoted this interest;
3. the possibility of proving that this interest was actually the political driving force behind the action. He viewed that in reality such conditions were not frequently fulfilled, therefore it was inadequate to explain the causes of war and imperialism based on economic interests (Schumpeter: 4-5).

Schumpeter disagreed with those who attempted to explain imperialism from the economic-structural influences that shaped life in general and formed the relations of production. He also disagreed with the neo-Marxists, who viewed imperialism simply as the reflex of the interests of the capitalist upper stratum at a given stage of capitalist development (Schumpeter: 7).

He did not believe that imperialism was the outgrowth of capitalism. He contended, rather, that essentially capitalism was anti-imperialist. In explaining his contention Schumpeter used sociological and historical comparison of how imperialisms functioned in different ages and cases. He wrote as part of his arguments,

> ... we propose to analyze the birth and life of imperialism by means of historical examples which I regard as typical. A common basic trait emerges in every case, making a single sociological problem of imperialism in all ages, though there are substantial differences among the individual cases (Schumpeter: 8).

In contrast to Lenin, who viewed imperialism as an inevitable stage of capitalism (Lenin: 1939), Schumpeter contended that imperialism was not a necessary stage in the development of capitalism (despite the fact that Schumpeter wrote about imperialism almost at the same time as Lenin did). Moreover, unlike Lenin who saw imperialism as an expansion for economic and political gain, he considered it as an objectless expansion. He then proposed as the definition of imperialism "the objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion" (Schumpeter: 7). Obviously, there is no mention of economic factors in this definition.

Modern imperialism, according to Schumpeter, was not a result of economic factors but a product of pre-capitalist ideas. It was the result of an alliance between a small group of highly selfish capitalists and the members of a small group of people who retained aristocratic outlooks and warrior-like attitudes (Schumpeter: 7-8; Boulding: 34). These aggressive attitudes, in

Schumpeter's view, had re-emerged in the real and concrete interests of the people. But these interests, however, did not have to be economic in character; to extend to the entire population of the state; nor to serve avowed interests (Schumpeter: 5).

Basing his argument on this contention, Schumpeter proposed a theory which stated that imperialism was atavistic: it was the reemergence of aristocratic and warrior-like tendencies that had characterized a pre-capitalist and "less civilized" stage of society. As a consequence, he believed, "the cases of imperialism should decline in intensity the later [these cases of imperialism] occur in the history of a people and of a culture" (Schumpeter: 84). A purely capitalist world could not offer fertile soil to such tendencies. Unlike "less-civilized" societies, according to Schumpeter, capitalist societies embraced an "un-warlike disposition" (Schumpeter: 90). He argued that the mode of life in capitalist societies did not favor imperialist attitudes. The alignment of interests in a capitalist economy did not lead in the direction of imperialism (Schumpeter: 118).

Schumpeter disagreed with Marx who held that capitalism would collapse from internal necessity (Schumpeter: 50). However, along with Marx, he believed that capitalism was a transitory, not a final, stage of social evolution. He wrote, Society is bound to grow beyond capitalism, but this will be because the achievements of capitalism are likely to make it superfluous, not because its internal conditions are likely to make its continuance impossible (Schumpeter: 108).

Nationalism and militarism, while not creatures of capitalism, in his view, became 'capitalized' and in the end drew their best energies from capitalism. Capitalism helped to keep nationalism and militarism alive politically as well as economically (Boulding: 58).

There is a point in which Schumpeter's essay on imperialism and that on the social classes found their juncture: the transition from the feudal to the bourgeois pattern turned out to be a protracted symbiosis, because the declining class upheld and asserted its doomed standard, thereby corrupting the rising class (Heimann: 188). This view of modern imperialism as a protracted symbiosis of the declining class (i.e. the warrior-like, aristocratic class) and the rising class (i.e. the capitalists) led him to what he called "an ancient truth" which stated that "the dead always rule the living" (Schumpeter: 30).

Significant Points

It is now becoming evident, as Schumpeter had argued, that in the 19th century imperialism was more a social lag than an economically profitable enterprise. Countries which refused any attempt at imperialism, such as Sweden, developed at a relatively fast (economic) rate, whereas Britain, France, and Spain developed more slowly. Indeed, Portugal, an imperialist power for four centuries, now has the lowest per capita income in Europe (Boulding: xiii). The Dutch were economically successful as an imperialist power, but they were probably an exception.

As in his book *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York: 1950), Schumpeter was right when he argued against the popular argument that imperialism, monopoly, protectionism, colonialism, and war were products of capitalism, or, as proposed by Lenin, the highest stage of capitalism. For him modern imperialism predated monopolistic and protectionist capitalism (Heimann: 188). In regards to this notion it is interesting to see that Schumpeter's description of pre-capitalist aggressiveness fit the nature of that of Fascism and the Nazis (Schumpeter: 14, 34, 65, and 69).

It is important to compare the Schumpeter thesis on imperialism and capitalism with other theories on the matter. Rodbertus (1875), for instance, believed that the pressure of goods which were unsaleable in the domestic markets, as a result of the inadequate purchasing power of workers, will drive the capitalists into foreign markets. In these markets they would clash with the capitalists of other capitalist countries. In turn, they would have to resort to more violent measures of monopolization which could lead to armed conflicts (Heimann: 177). Like Rodbertus, J.A. Hobson (1902) traced the scramble for foreign markets to the inadequacy of purchasing power at home. But, unlike Rodbertus, he thought that a reformed capitalism, through redistribution of income, could remedy the ill. In other words, instead of proposing a revolutionary solution, Hobson suggested a liberal reform that would re-strengthen capitalism and imperialism.

Karl Marx, in contrast, insisted on the importance of colonies for the accumulation of capital as the origin of capitalism. He said that capitalism needed expanding markets. As it found them abroad, the fall of the profit rate was counteracted by more intense exploitation of unorganized colonial labor, and by the cheapening of constant capital through a cheapening of raw materials. Marx, however, did not say that the scramble for foreign markets must produce imperialist conflicts. Only later Lenin would emphasize the inevitability of such conflicts.

A Marxist economist, Rudolf Hilferding (in his *Das Finanzkapital*, 1910) linked imperialism to what he called "monopoly capitalism". He also linked it to the protective tariffs which made it possible to raise prices and to dump on foreign markets products which could not be sold at home. But he rejected the Marxist theory of the inevitable economic collapse of capitalism. He replaced this theory with a vision of a "general cartel" which would establish the correct proportions in production and distribution, could also regulate colonial expansion or make it unnecessary, and would ultimately fail not for economic reasons at all, but for the political reason of the intolerably widening gap between the few in power and the many under their absolute control. Hilferding's focus on the rise of an aggressive ideology of domination at home and abroad, rather than the economic necessity of collapse and imperialism, apparently attracted Schumpeter. This notion is obvious in Schumpeter's view of imperialism.

It is clear that there were tensions between the Marxists, who viewed crisis and monopoly as necessary products of capitalism, and the liberals, who believed that crisis, monopoly, war, and imperialism were "illegitimate political intervention" in the harmonious capitalistic system. In these tensions Schumpeter held a "middle position." On the one hand, under the framework of the Hilferding thesis, he believed in a close causal connection between imperialism and "monopoly capitalism." On the other hand, he also believed in the peaceable-ness of pure capitalism. He strongly argued that monopoly and imperialism were not the necessary outgrowth of capitalism. It was instead a corruption of capitalism by pre-capitalist interests which reemerged in the capitalist society (Boulding: 181).

In his "middle position," however, Schumpeter had a problem to solve: to find a connection between the abstract assumption of a pure, consistent capitalist system (by both the Marxists and the liberals) with historical experience (Schumpeter: 181). As we read in these essays, he found the "solution" of the problem in his socio-historical study and comparison of different peoples and societies.

Imperialism in action
http://www.nuttyhistory.com/imperialism-thru-years.html

Some Inadequacies

In order to understand Schumpeter's essay on imperialism more clearly, it is important to know its background at the time of writing. This essay was not merely a work of pure academic inspiration. It had some practical notions. It was written during World War I (1917), in the imperial Austria which was the ally to death of Germany. Schumpeter despised this alliance. In this essay he argued that aggressiveness (such as that of Germany during World War I) was not part of the nature of bourgeois society; when remnants of such attitudes did survive from earlier social pattern, they would be gradually worn out and overcome by the victory of bourgeois attitudes, which was the victory of the civilian over the military. It is not surprising, then, that this essay is, at least implicitly, anti-German while explicitly pro-British (Heimann: 182-83). The fact that Schumpeter limited himself to 18th century England could be considered as an example of his pro-British inclination, with the consequence that he left the war in India as well as the Boer War in South Africa unexplained (Heimann: 183). Another example of this inclination would be his mention of the British imperialism merely as "a plaything" (Schumpeter: 30).

The main emphasis of Schumpeter's argument was to show that capitalism was essentially anti-imperialist. To do this, he developed a very specialized definition of imperialism which he then expounded with references to certain selected societies in history (the Persians, the Assyrians, the Arabs, the Egyptians, and others). He also set up a very specialized explanation of capitalism, which he showed to be inconsistent with his definition of imperialism, thereby "proving" that capitalism was essentially anti-imperialist (Greene: 453). This way of proposing an argument is, of course, inadequate.

Schumpeter failed to see that economic profit could be a means for expanding power through expanding investment. He did not see that forcible political expansion for the sake of economic expansion, however without definite object or limit, is a logical possibility (Heimann: 184). In his socio-historical explanation he failed to see that imperialism for economic motives is well-known throughout history, whether in already stratified societies or not (Heimann: 192). But Schumpeter excluded examples expansion to obtain fertile land, grazing areas, hunting grounds, or other badly needed natural resources. The Japanese expansion in East and Southeast Asia in the late 19th and in the 20th centuries would be an example of an economically motivated imperialism.

There is a strong impression that in order to analyze capitalism, Schumpeter used this questionable syllogism: what is not the expression of warrior-class social structure is not imperialism; capitalist society is not a warrior-class social structure; therefore capitalist society is non-imperialist (Green: 456). He then suggested that what appeared to be capitalist imperialism was merely a reappearance of the remnant of a declining past, which was not essential for capitalism (Greene: 456).

Conclusion

In the end it must be said that the Schumpeter thesis which defined imperialism merely as the expression of a warrior-class social structure is inadequate as a generalized theory of imperialism. Its inadequacies appear most clearly in its application to capitalism. This application resulted in a distortion of the nature of capitalism, including the postulating of unacceptable supporting explanations, such as his atavism theory. Schumpeter's attempt to explain the nature of imperialism based on his socio-historical comparison of the imperialist tendencies in the past resulted not in a comprehensive theory of modern imperialism but in what Green called "an unhistoric abstraction" (Greene: 463).

Notes:

1 See Paul M Sweezy in the "Introduction" to the book, p. xix.
2 Sweezy, p. x.
3 Sweezy, p. xvii.

≈ Chapter 11 ≈

United Kingdom and European Integration

I believe the United Kingdom will be worse off outside the E.U. It will not have the influence it has in the world today.

-Mark Rutte

AS AN island-nation the United Kingdom (UK) has a unique geographical position in regard to the rest of other European nations. On the one hand, this unique position had helped to enable the UK to be a strong power separated from the continental nations. The industrial revolution which began in England in the 18th century and the mightiness of British naval power throughout the 19th century—with its vast colonial empire abroad—showed the strength of the UK. On the other hand, as it was proved in the two world wars, the UK could not stay aloof in her benign isolation without being entangled with the dynamics of power in the continent.

Following the conclusion of the Second World War, when several continental states began movements toward a European integration, the UK appeared to be indifferent. When in 1973 eventually the UK became member of European Community (EC), it was not followed by public enthusiasm in England. Only as late as 1992, following the publicity surrounding the 1992 campaigns and the role of EC in the areas such as environmental and social policies did the public begin to realize the importance of British membership. The result of the 2016 referendum (the British exit from the European Union popularly known as "Brexit"), however, demonstrates once again the uneasiness of the membership.

This chapter is a small effort to look at the British attitudes regarding her role in the European integration process since the end of Second World War up to the 1990s, and how the EC membership affected British social, economic and political life.

Toward European Integration

Different Perspectives

The European integration is properly referred to as an "integration" because the movement would not only be in the form of working together in order to achieve higher economic standard for Europe; it would eventually be directed toward the integration of national political systems. In other words, the process of integration is not merely a cooperation. Instead, it would transform the existing individual national policies.[1]

By the end of the Second World War there was a tendency in the continental Europe that the European integration would encourage regionalism of Europe. The tremendous socio-economic devastation caused by the war made continental Europeans more concerned about regional reconstruction than global order.

This tendency is different with that of Britain which suffered much less devastation from the war. It has been predominant factor in the British policy that the European integration should not result in some form of regionalism. European regionalism was considered by the British as a disruptive factor to the wider international world order.

Different perspectives on European integration also involved the tension between supra-nationalism and nationalism. Under the administration of the Labour Government, the UK was concerned about defending Europe against the spread of communism, but rejected the idea of supra-nationalism. For British government, surrendering part of their sovereignty was beyond their willingness. Their pride of the British constitutional tradition made them to stick on the idea of British nationalism. This disposition was, of course, in contrast with that of the continental European states. In the continent, as it was exemplified in the Schumann Plan of the establishment of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in May 1950, European integration required the willingness of surrendering certain portion of nationalism and giving way to the supra-nationalistic integration.

Britain and European Union
http://eu-digest.blogspot.co.id/2014_06_01_archive.html

Different Approaches

At least there were three different approaches toward the integration of Europe. The three were federalist, gradualist and functional integration movements.[2]

Originated among the resistance groups during the Second World War, there had been movements toward the establishment of a federal Europe. For the resistance fighters the war was not mainly a war of nationalism. It was for them a war of ideologies, in which they fought the fascists and Nazis. Their idea therefore was to establish a post-war federal united states of Europe based on a federal European constitution. This was later realized in the establishment of European Union of Federalists (*Union Europeene des Federalists*—UEF) in 1946.[3]

The federalist attempt to form a new federal European constitution, however, was halted by the reluctance of the European nations to surrender each state's sovereignty. In particular the UK was the strongest opponent to this idea. The failure, in turn, gave way to the less direct approach toward European integration that is the gradualist approach.[4] Instead of bringing Europe to a political, federal integration, the gradualists preferred to achieve it through indirect ways, such as economic cooperation. This economic approach is also known as functional integration.

This approach to European integration stressed functional economic steps rather than frontal confrontation with national political sovereignties. The establishment of Organization for European Economic Cooperation

(OEEC) in 1948 and that of ECSC in 1951 were examples of the movements based on the idea of functional integration. The predominant concern of this movement was the creation of a European market which was larger than that of each single state.

The Road to Integration

The European Defense Community

Among the federalists grew the strategy of European integration by way of creation of a united defense system. This led to the announcement of Pleven's Plan for European Defense Community (EDC) in October 1950. However, the international crisis resulted from the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and the failure of parliamentary ratification, including in France in 1954, eventually brought the EDC to its collapse.

The collapse, in turn, gave way to an alternative for a European defense organization, suggested by British Prime Minister Anthony Eden. In October 1954 a treaty creating Western European Union (WEU) was signed. WEU itself was an expansion of the Brussels Treaty of 1948, signed by France, the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.

The creation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 with British strong support, however, resulted in the widening gap between Britain and other signatories of the Brussels Treaty of 1948, especially France. Whereas France and other signatories were more concerned about the German military revival, the UK's was the Soviet Union's communist threat toward European peace. The entry of West Germany into WEU and later into NATO worried France which eventually decided to withdraw from NATO in 1956, under President Charles de Gaulle's administration. The withdrawal marked another tension between France and the UK.

A European Common Market

By the end of the Second World War the Benelux states (Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg) had formed some kind of a common market, by abolishing tariff barriers in trade among themselves. In the 1950s these states suggested that this kind of cooperation would be practiced in a wider community of western European nations.

This suggestion was obviously in line with Monnet's scheme of economic cooperation among Western European countries. The two ideas of creating a European common market were then enthusiastically discussed in the Messina

Conference in 1955. In the Treaties of Rome of March 1957 the schemes were further realized in the setting up of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC).

In response to this development, however, the UK preferred to take a different stand. The UK clearly showed its preference to OEEC as a forum for handling the economic cooperation among European nations.

European Economic Community

The formation of EEC proved to be a success story in the European integration process. The member states agreed upon elements of a common agricultural policy and external tariff for industrial imports.[5] The success was mainly due to the skillful works of the European Commission of EEC as well as the willingness of France to make the venture a success. The commission was able to act as a broker in the conflicts of interests among the member states. France, under de Gaulle, was willing to support EEC because she thought that EEC would help to accelerate French industrial power and, in turn, would enhance her national prestige both in Europe and in the global community.

The Pompidou Era

It was obvious that under de Gaulle administration France was very ambitious in making the European integration process to serve her own interests, both economically and politically. This ambition had often brought Paris in conflicts of interests with London. President de Gaulle's decision to veto British admissions of EC membership in 1963 and 1967 could be considered as examples of the President's effort to eliminate the UK as a potential rival in French economic and political ambitions in the continent.

The situation changed when in June 1969 President de Gaulle was defeated in a French referendum and succeeded by Georges Pompidou. Bolt moves were soon taken by the new President. In order to make French exports more competitive he devalued the franc. Then, to widen market for French industry, Pompidou agreed to reopen talks with the UK regarding the British entry to the EC. This last move would eventually change French-British relation, and in turn would also change British role in the subsequent process of European integration. In the Pompidou administration a new era of British relation with EC had begun.

A Broader Integration

The Hague summit in December 1969, initiated under Pompidou administration, brought further steps toward a broader integration of Europe. First, the member states agreed upon giving budgetary power to the European Parliament. Second, they also agreed to negotiate with the UK along with Denmark, Ireland and Norway for their memberships in the EC. On the third step, the Hague summit tried to establish an economic and monetary union.[6]

The third step was less successful. The second step, on the other hand, was the most important success regarding the British relation with the EC members. On 1 January 1973 the UK was granted membership to EC, along with Ireland and Denmark.[7]

Following the "barren period" after 1974, in which EC was dominated with internal disputes over British net contribution to common budget, European integration resumed speedy move in the 1980s. In 1981 Greece was accepted as the tenth member of the EC. By 1984 negotiations on the entries of Spain and Portugal were complete, and in 1986 the two were granted membership.

Another important move taken in this period was the agreement of the Single European Act of 1986. It was a significant move toward closer integration of Europe. This Act, George wrote, would guarantee majority voting in the Council of Ministers and increased the powers of amendment of the European Parliament for the legislation.[8]

The UK, suspicious of the move toward federalism, responded less enthusiastically toward the agreement. This marked another sign of disagreement with the rest of EC members. Still another disagreement occurred following the 1989 fall of communism in the Eastern European countries. France and other EC members considered the freedom of Eastern European countries as a stimulus for deeper internal EC integration. Without deeper internal integration, the members afraid, EC would disintegrate, caused by different response toward the events in the Eastern Europe. The UK, on the other hand, worried that EC deeper internal integration would cause Eastern European countries to be left alone, without help to further development.[9]

British Attitudes toward European Integration

On 1 January 1973 the UK officially became a member of EC. This historic moment, however, had been preceded by a long series of attitudes, negotiations, applications, and refusals. Along the process the UK had moved from aloofness to a formal membership.

Aloofness: prior to 1960s

It was obvious that prior to 1960s the UK kept herself detached from the idea and movement of the integration of Europe. Strong among the British then was a tendency to keep themselves away from the rest of the European people. In 1930 Winston Churchill seemed to lay foundation for this, when he wrote:

> We see nothing but good and hope in a richer, freer, more contended European commonalty. But, we have our own dream and our own task. We are with Europe, but not of it.[10]

When in late 1940s several European nations gathered in Brussels and began to formalize movements toward European integration, the UK preferred to still remain distant.[11] As Urwin put it, whereas integration sympathies were widespread in many continental nations, they had little purchase in the UK.[12] The British involvement in the establishment of NATO on 5 May 1949 was obvious sign of British closer tie to the United States rather than to the European continental nations.

In 1955, when invited by the six original members of EC to attend a foreign ministers' meeting, the UK only sent a lower rank civil servant who eventually withdrew before the meeting ended. The withdrawal was a sign of British opposition to the meeting's agenda of establishing a European common market. As an alternative, in December 1955 British foreign minister Selwyn Lloyd at a NATO Council meeting announced what was called as the Grand Design.[13] Among the design's goals was the proliferation of any existing European institutions and their replacement with a single European assembly which would serve them all. This design, in turn, showed British attempt to sabotage European integration—especially regarding the establishment of a European common market—and, again, the British closer tie to the US.

Rivalry for Leadership: 1960s-1970s

The second half of 1950s witnessed important decline in British political and economic affairs. The fall of British control over Suez Canal to Egypt in 1956, for instance, marked the decline of British power in foreign policy both in the Commonwealth and in the global community. The US began to interpret her "special relationship" with the UK either differently or preferred to ignore it.[14] At the same time the British economy was in trouble. These factors helped British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to consider the possibility of joining the EC early in the 1960s.

The road to membership, however, was far from easy. With Charles de Gaulle on top of French leadership, British application to EC was confronted with a straightforward refusal. De Gaulle simply considered the UK as not yet ready to accept a "European vocation" and would act as a "US Trojan horse" inside the EC.[15] As mentioned above, the French President then vetoed British admission in 1963 and, again, in 1967.

Behind the drama of the refusals was of course the long standing history of French-British rivalry for European leadership. For de Gaulle EC was directed to ensure the French economic prosperity and as a bloc to support France's foreign policy.[16] In other words, France considered the integration as a way of increasing her own interests within Europe, especially over the future of Germany, and without American participation.[17] Derek W. Urwin summarized the situation clearly: after all, the Europe of the Six [original members of EC] was very largely a French creation.[18]

All these were obviously in conflict with British concerns in joining the EC. At least there were three British main concerns: First, to prevent the fall of EC under de Gaulle's domination, and a turning of the EC into a regionalist grouping that did not play a full part economically or politically in the global capitalist world order; second, to ensure that Britain remained the leading partner of the United States in Western Europe; third, to add British influence in the world. Economic considerations came a poor fourth.[19] It is interesting to see that economic concern was only came as the fourth concern, indicating its less importance compared to British political interests in regard to her tie to the US, her bid for European and global leadership, and her rivalry with France. The rivalry with France raised a dilemma for other EC member states: while without British participation EC might suffer,[20] the EC would be hard to exist without French membership.[21]

Always Maverick: 1970s-present

Among the EC members the UK had been viewed as a European "maverick" in regard to her relation with the Community. The notion of being maverick was said based on British attitudes which tended to separate itself from the rest of Europe, and even to jeopardize any attempts toward European integration. This kind of attitudes existed in the 1950s and persisted during de Gaulle's years in 1960s. The attitudes as a maverick, however, did not ceased after British membership was granted in 1973. For the next decade, Urwin wrote, the UK was to be the "problem child" of the EC.[22] The events in the 1970s

showed that it was not untrue—as so did the decision of the UK to leave the European Union in 2016 as previously mentioned.

Only about one year after the membership, in April 1974, British Foreign Minister James Callaghan began to launch harsh criticism. He criticized EC's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), plans for European Monetary Union (EMU), and British budgetary contribution to EC. The Labour Party even rejected British terms of entry to the EC.[23] Some British citizens considered British membership as the scapegoat for the British economic problems.

The anti-EC membership attitudes became more hostile when in 1979 Margaret Thatcher became British Prime Minister, following the victory of the "more-pro European" Conservative party. In the same year, in the European Council meeting in Dublin, she plainly said, "I want my money back".[24] Mrs. Thatcher's complaints were continued in the form of budget grievances, presented in an aggressive self-centered diplomacy toward EC, adding the credit to the British reputation as the maverick of Europe.[25]

Reasons for Aloofness

As we can see from the previous observation, there were many reasons for British aloofness from the EC. Here we will only mention the most relevant ones.

The unique geographical position as an island-nation separated from the continent was one of the reasons for the aloofness. The position made the daily contacts of the British with the people in the continent less frequent compared to the contacts among the continental people themselves.

The robust economic and political power prior to the 1960s kept the British not in need of cooperation with the continent. Steps toward cooperation was sought only in the early 1960s, when economically and politically the UK was no longer powerful. The close ties to the member states of the Commonwealth and to the US[26] also made the UK to keep herself away from the continent, not to say her attempts to undermine any European integration movement such as the establishment of a common market in the Messina Conference.

What could be considered as the most prominent reason for the aloofness, however, was probably the lack of British leaders in favor of the closer cooperation with the continental nation. George wrote: "Had there been a leader who was committed to the ideal of European integration, and brave enough to defy the dominant ideology of narrow nationalism in public statements, there might have been a change in the electorate."[27]

The French attitudes toward the UK was another significant factor in maintaining the distance in British relation with EC. French view of the UK as a major rival in her bid European leadership prevented British membership as it was showed in the two refusals. Charles de Gaulle was obviously the main "actor" behind the refusals. He clearly expressed his personal anti-British sentiment in the EC when he said, "Britain will enter common market one day, [but] no doubt I shall no longer be here".[28] This sentiment was shared by a widespread belief in the continent that "any British proposal was a wolf in sheep's clothing".[29]

Membership and Its Consequences

Membership in the EC brought significant consequences to the UK. Among others, the consequences were easily recognized in terms of British constitutional affairs, in economy, in environmental and social policies.

Constitutional

In the postwar Europe, three states (France, Italy and later West Germany) adopted constitutions with clauses that allowed the possibility of the abrogation of national sovereignty in favor of European supra-nationalism.[30] Such clauses enabled these countries to relatively easy to establish or to join any European integration movement, such as the EC. In 1962 Norway and, in 1972, Ireland were required to "adjust" their constitutions in order that their request for membership in the EC to be granted.

The same requirement was put forward to the UK when she applied for EC membership. Although prior to the membership the UK did not have any written constitution, she had Acts of Parliament and common laws as source of her legal system. The EC membership required that the UK should adopt the notion that she would be willing to surrender some of her national sovereignty to European supra-nationalism. As one of the consequences of being a member of EC, therefore, now British citizens had to live both under their own constitutional tradition as well as the EC constitutions.

Economic

British membership in the EC appeared to be economically profitable. It altered the intensity and pattern of British trade. By 1986, half of British total trade was with EC members. The UK now had more quantity of imports and exports from and to EC.

The membership also attracted the Japanese to invest in the UK. It was important for Japan to use the UK as a gateway to a broader market among the EC members. This made the UK also to be called as "Trojan horse for Japan" in the walls of the Community.[31] At the same time the EC common policy in agriculture helped enhance British big farmers' productivity in food. It occurred, however, at the expense of the British smaller farmers and environment.

Environmental

British coal-fired-power industries had resulted in heavy airborne pollution, which affected not only England but also the continental states. The pollution was considered as the major cause of acid rain in Europe. West Germany complained that the pollution caused by Britain resulted in the death of German forests. The status as an EC member bound the UK to listen to such complaints and to make some domestic policies with regard to her industry and its effects to the European environmental problems.

Therefore, the membership in the Community had helped the UK to be more aware of other EC members' environment. In turn, it also changed British attitudes toward her own environmental policies.[32]

Social Policy

The consequences of British membership in terms of her social policy were mostly related to the rights of women in the workplaces. Prior to EC membership British female workers were not treated equally to their male counterparts. EC legislation required equal pay for men and women in workplaces. They should also have equal access to training, employment and promotion.[33] In England women groups put pressures on the government to adopt EC legislation on workers.

Conclusion

British support and membership to the EC was a long and difficult history of relations. Different factors, both in the British side and in the side of the Continental states (led by Charles de Gaulle's France) helped create the situation. It was then added by non-European factors, such as British ties with the Commonwealth nations and the US.

It was very clear then, that the British role in the EC was ambiguous. On the one hand, the British decline of economic and political power in the late

1950s led the UK to be in great need to join EC. On the other hand, the British pride of their own tradition of global political and economic leadership kept them away from a total membership. This made the UK to be considered as the "maverick" among European nations.

However, the constant EC growth and British-EC interdependent relation made the two sides to be in need of constant mutual relation with each other. British growth is in need of cooperation with the EC, and European integration will suffer without British participation. In the years to come, London's decision to exit the European Union in 2016 will certainly have long-term impact on both the UK itself and the continental nations of Europe.

Notes:

1 Stephen George, *Britain and European Integration Since 1945* (Oxford, the UK and Cambridge, USA: Blackwell, 1991) p. 1.
2 For the terms "federalist", "gradualist" and "functional" see George, pp. 2-7.
3 George, p. 2.
4 Paul Taylor, *The Limits of European Integration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983) p. 27.
5 George, p. 14.
6 George, p. 22.
7 Norwegian membership was also granted by EC members, but was rejected by Norwegian people in a referendum. See George, p. 22.
8 George, p. 29.
9 George, p. 30.
10 Derek W. Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945* (London and New York: Longman, 1992), p. 31.
11 Urwin, 34.
12 Urwin, 34.
13 Urwin, 92.
14 Urwin, 119.
15 George, 17.
16 Urwin, 16.
17 Urwin, 32-33.
18 Urwin, p. 95.
19 George, p. 46.
20 The UK's entry was considered as elevating redistributive mechanism in the EC, making it as the second explicit pilar of integration. William Wallace (*Ed.*) *The Dynamics of European Integration* (London and New York: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990), p. 33.
21 Urwin, p. 126.
22 For the terms "maverick" and "problem child" see Urwin, p. 199.
23 In 1974 the Labour government was cautious in its attitude toward Europe. It took short term view of its interests, by insisting on a "juste retour": a fair return from the Community which inevitably focused attention upon the balancing of books in the shorter term. See Taylor, p. 72.
24 Urwin, p. 201.

25 Taylor wrote that in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the UK there was a majority in favor of withdrawal from the Community. See Taylor, p. 55.
26 See Taylor, p. 150. Also Cyril E. Black, et. al. *Rebirth: A History of Europe Since World War II* (Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 1992) pp. 105, 108.
27 George, p. 67.
28 Urwin, p. 129.
29 Urwin, p. 96.
30 Urwin, p. 28.
31 George, p. 95.
32 George, p. 100.
33 George, p. 101.

≈ Chapter 12 ≈

World War II and the Indonesian Struggle for Independence

Freedom is the atmosphere in which humanity thrives. Breathe it in.
-Richelle E. Goodrich

BEGINNING IN the 17th century Indonesia was under Dutch colonial rule. It was known as the Dutch East Indies, or the Netherlands East Indies. Comprised of more than 13,000 islands, the colony fringed the equator for a distance of 3,660 kilometers (2,275 miles) between mainland Asia and the northern parts of Australia. The Dutch Indies, which covered 741,117 square miles (1,919,494 square kilometers) had five main islands: Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan (southern part of Borneo), Celebes (now called Sulawesi), and the western part of New Guinea (later renamed Irian Barat or West Irian, then Irian Jaya, now Papua). Ever since the Dutch colonial days, Java has been the seat of the central government, with Jakarta (formerly Batavia) as the capital of the Dutch East Indies and now that of present-day Republic of Indonesia.[1]

Under the Dutch Indonesians suffered from the subjugation of colonial rule, in which they were deprived of political freedom and economic prosperity. In reaction such subjugation there were independence movements against the colonial government. Up to the 1930s, despite the struggle of many Indonesian nationalists for independence, the colonial government always succeeded in suppressing their activities. Consequently, during the Dutch colonial rule the Indonesian struggle for independence never spread to all parts of the colony simultaneously. The struggle was usually local and only lasted for relatively short period of time. This, however, changed with the outbreak of World War II as the war moved into the Southeast Asian theater and opened the invasion and subsequent occupation of the Dutch East Indies by Japan. The course of

the war in the region, a course involving of power shift between forces and allies, and a shift within the objectives and strategies of the allies themselves, opened up new doors for Indonesian independence struggle.

This chapter attempts to demonstrate the impact of the Southeast Asian theater of World War II and of the Japanese occupation of Indonesia on the Indonesian struggle for independence. As this chapter will show, the Japanese colonial policies toward Indonesia along with the course of the war helped the Indonesian nationalists gain momentum to declare independence and successfully defending the independence against the will of the Dutch who, with the help of the World War II's Allied forces, wanted to resume their colonial power.

Administration-in-exile

During the Dutch colonial period, Indonesia provided considerable contribution to the Netherlands' economy. In the period between the 1920s and the 1930s, for instance, revenues from this colony contributed around 14 percent of the Dutch national income, one of the world's highest economic contributions of a colony to a mother country.[2] Although the revenue mostly came from oil, other raw materials such as tin, bauxite, copra, and coal also greatly contributed to the Dutch economy.[3] Such great economic importance made the Dutch colonial power willing to defend its claim over the territory at any cost. The flow of economic richness to the mother country was maintained by developing all the infrastructures needed to help it, such as systems of agriculture, transportation and communication, as well as harbor facilities.

For the Dutch colonial government, however, maintaining its colonial possession was not easy. The land area of the Dutch East Indies, which was 30 times larger than the Netherlands itself, and the population of the Indies, which was seven times greater than that of Holland, made it difficult for the government to control the colony directly and effectively.[4] In running such a vast colony, therefore, the government relied heavily on the support of native princes. It also depended on military presence which was financed with revenues from the colony itself. In addition to this, the Dutch put a great emphasis on political surveillance, reportage and internment among the Indonesian populace, particularly toward anti-colonial activists, in order to ensure the prevailing of *rust en order* or "law and order." Such reliance and emphasis on the surveillance policy, however, along with the lack of policies attentive to the needs of the native population (such as health and education),

in turn, helped create skepticism among the Indonesian population toward the government, which ultimately generated the desire for independence.[5]

Such skepticism was clearly expressed by many Indonesian nationalists who sought an independent Indonesia, free of colonial rule.[6] By the 1930s at least there were two groups of Indonesian nationalists which politically challenged the Dutch colonial government. One was the "radical" nationalist group, in which Ir. Sukarno, Dr. Mohammad Hatta, and Sjahrir were prominent figures. Another was the "moderate" group, which included Soetardjo and many other members of the *Volksraad* (the Dutch-sponsored People's Council). While the radical nationalists fought for a total Indonesian independence dealing in a non-compromising way with the government, the moderates preferred more conciliatory measures in doing so. Instead of demanding a totally independent Indonesia, the moderates preferred to have a semi-independent Indonesia that would maintain strong tie with the Netherlands.

Consequently, while the moderate nationalists were greatly tolerated by the government, the radicals became targets of the government's political surveillance, reportage and internment policies. One of the perfect targets of such policies was Sukarno, the leading and most outspoken Indonesian nationalist. In an attempt to limit and even ban his independence activities, the Dutch colonial government accused him of "laboring to devise a politically potent synthesis of ... nationalism, international communism, theoretical Marxism, trade unionism, modernized Islam, and regional millenarian movements."[7] Sukarno, better known in Indonesia by his *nom de guerre* Bung Karno, was often arrested, tried, imprisoned, and even exiled. He and other members of nationalist groups such as the Partindo (*Partai Indonesia*, or Indonesian Party) and P.N.I. (*Partai Nasional Indonesia*, or Indonesian National Party) were considered a serious threat by the colonial government. They often created "problems" for government's surveillance policies. For the government, the only solution for such problems could be summed up in what the Dutch Governor General de Jong wrote in his diary in early 1933, which was "to limit the right of assembly of the worst faction, the Partindo, ... and the PNI, and to arrest Partindo's leader, Engineer Sukarno."[8] In practice, the government not only limited Sukarno's activities, but also suppressed any movement for independence. Such suppression, however, suddenly changed with the coming of World War II in the Southeast Asian theater of the war.

In Southeast Asia the Second World War was an expression of three major conflicting interests: those of the empire of Japan, the North Atlantic imperial powers (the Netherlands, Britain, the United States, and France),

and the people of Southeast Asia themselves.[9] For the Japanese, on the ideological level, the involvement in World War II was considered a "holy war for Asian liberation," directed toward the liberation of the Asian people from Western colonialism.[10] On a more practical level, however, the involvement was also intended to establish the so-called "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," in which Japan would benefit from its colonization of Southeast Asian territories.[11]

For the North Atlantic imperial powers, united as an alliance during the war, the Southeast Asian theater of the war was a war to defend the Southeast Asian territories under their colonial control from the Japanese invading army. The United States needed to defend its strategic interests the Philippine islands and Great Britain intended to defend its colonial possession of Malay Peninsula, Singapore and Northern Borneo. France, at the same time, was concerned with its colonies in Indochina. With such combined strength of other colonial powers hoping similarly to protect their own interests in Southeast Asia, the Dutch greatly hoped that the war would help save them from losing their precious colonial rule over Indonesia.

Indonesian Struggle for Independence
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The Southeast Asian peoples had their own interests. For them, the outbreak of the war in the Southeast Asian theater was a long-awaited opportunity to gain freedom from outside powers. Tired of living under the colonial rules of Western nations, it was not only the Indonesians who wanted

to be independent, but also the other peoples of Southeast Asia. The Filipinos wanted to be free from the Americans; the peoples of Indochina from the French; and the Malaysians, Singaporeans, and the people of North Borneo from the British.

Early in the beginning of the war Japan already began plans to invade the Dutch East Indies.[12] This territory was considered economically very important, since it was rich in the natural resources that the Japanese needed in pursuing the war, particularly oil. In November 1941 the task of invading Indonesia was given to General Imamura Hitoshi, when he was appointed as the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese 15th Army. The principal task of Hitoshi's army was to invade Java, the main island of the Dutch East Indies, in order to break a "deadlock" in the war there. What the Japanese government meant by the "deadlock" was control over Indonesia's oil. For them the control over oil in Indonesia was essential for maintaining both war and peace in the area.[13]

The Japanese invasion of Indonesia began on January 11, 1942, when the Japanese navy captured areas of Celebes. The following day, January 12, the Japanese army occupied Borneo. On February 14, Japanese parachutists captured Palembang and the oil fields of southern Sumatra. The Japanese fleet then approached Java which had been surrounded from the east, north, and west. The air above Java had been under full Japanese control by units operating out of Singapore, while the Java Sea had been swept nearly clear of the Dutch forces. On March 1, 1942 the Japanese fleet landed in Java without significant challenges.[14] The Dutch attempted but failed to defend Java from the invaders. They retreated to the city of Bandung, in West Java, leaving Jakarta open to Japanese march on the capital.[15]

In their attempt to halt the invading Japanese forces, the Dutch forces were aided by the Allies through the American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command, under the leadership of General Archibald Wavell. The ABDA Command, however, was no match for the Japanese Empire's forces. The course of the war both in the Pacific and in Europe, which involved Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States, made the Command forces less ready to fight compared to the Japanese forces. The latter were more disciplined, better-coordinated, and much closer to home than the Allied forces. They were also greatly motivated by desire to prove their military superiority over the North Atlantic forces, their "blue-eyed enemies" (Friend: 1988).

After nine days of fighting, the defenders of Java failed to halt the invading forces. On March 8, 1942 these defenders–almost 100,000 regular troops, about half of whom were Dutch—surrendered to 40,000 Japanese.[16] Following the

surrender, the Dutch colonial leaders fled to Australia, leaving Indonesia under Japanese occupation. There these leaders formed an administration-in-exile, called Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) under the leadership of Lieutenant-General Hubertus J. Van Mook.

Considered Insufficient

Shortly after landing on the western coast of Java, instead of military resistance the Japanese found a friendly welcome from the local populace. Along the streets of the town of Banten, West Java, for instance, they were greeted by people waiving Japanese paper flags. These people shouted *"Banzai!"* to show their excitement to the invading army. At the same time, they also shouted *"Merdeka!"* or "freedom" in hope and anticipation of their own freedom and independence from any foreign power. A certain traditional belief helped explain how such a friendly reception occurred.

Prior to the invasion many Indonesians had believed that the Japanese victory over the Dutch (like the victory over the Russians in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-905), symbolized the ability of Asians to defeat the white race. Many of them also believed that the Japanese invasion and occupation would be merely a transitional period in a process leading to a time of lasting freedom and independence. This kind of belief was particularly strong among the Javanese. For them, the period of 1942 and after, was a period of the fulfillment of the so-called *Joyoboyo* prophecy. The prophecy predicted that the coming of a Ratu Adil or a righteous king would liberate the Javanese from their present suffering and subjugation. For them, the coming or the Japanese was the beginning of the liberation period, which would be followed by the arrival of the king and a much-anticipated time in which they would be masters of their own lives, free from centuries of colonial yoke.[17]

The Japanese, some Indonesians believed, were not fighting for the benefit of the Japanese alone. Even Sukarno believed in such a notion. In his speech on July 7, 1943, for instance, he said that the Japanese "were standing up to face attack with their own selves to attain a sublime aim, the liberation of East Asia."[18] Such a notion understandably pleased the Japanese. Not surprisingly Yamamoto Moichiro, the *'Somubucho'* or chief of the Office of General Affairs from April 1943 to November 1944, declared himself "an Indonesian benefactor, a promoter of independence under imperial instruction."[19]

Such a remark, of course concealed the true goals the Japanese had in their minds. There were at least three principal goals the Japanese wanted to achieve in their colonial policies. The first one was the isolation of the

Indonesian people from the outside world, in order to make them faithful subjects of the Japanese colonial government. The second was freeing the people from Western influence. The third goal was to organize Indonesian political, social, economic, and cultural activities along with the lines of Japanese colonial aims. In order to ensure the achievement of these goals the Japanese government laid a policy of control, surveillance, and intelligence among the populace. Almost every aspect of the people's lives was controlled and directed to support the Japanese war efforts. The use of certain Japanese words in the government offices became mandatory. The dating system was changed into that of the Japanese. Thus year 1942 became 2602. The time zone was switched to that of Tokyo. In Java, for instance, the sun rose at seven-thirty, instead of between half past five and six o'clock in the morning as it did before.[20]

In 1942 the Japanese initiated the "Triple-A movement" (*Gerakan Tiga-A*), which was intended as a means of propaganda. The slogan stood for "Japan the Light of Asia," "Japan the Protector of Asia," and "Japan the Leader of Asia." This movement clearly reflected the ideas of Pan-Asianism under Japanese control and the spirit of anti-Europeanism. In its further development the movement proved to be ineffective. By September 1942 it ceased to be used as a means of propaganda.[21]

The failure of the Triple-A movement was followed by the establishment of a Commission for the Study of Customs and Polity (*Komisi Menyelidiki Adat-istiadat dan Tatanegara; Kyukan Seido Chosa Kai*). Members of the Commission included prominent Indonesian nationalists such as Hadji Agus Salim, Oto Iskandardinata, Husein Djajadiningrat, Soetardjo, and Supomo. Their initial main task was to study matters regarding Indonesian social, religious, and administrative structures and make a report to the government. By establishing such a commission the Japanese hoped that Indonesian nationalists would be preoccupied with useless debates on such matters. The Japanese, however, miscalculated these people. Instead of only doing what the government assigned them to do, members of the Commission demanded more substantial participation in the government. This demand eventually led to the formation of *Chuo Sangi-in* (Central Advisory Body) on August 1, 1943, in which Indonesian nationalists were given greater participation in politics.[22]

In their colonial policies the Japanese strongly encouraged military training for Indonesians and formation of local paramilitary groups. Young men aged fourteen to twenty-five were recruited into *Seinendan* (youth corps). There were about six hundred thousand members of this group.[23] Over a million people were enlisted as members of *Keibodan* (vigilance group), an anti-air

raid corps which often assisted the police.[24] Fifty thousand Indonesians were recruited as members of *Jibakutai,* a group which clearly expressed the most militant Japanese spirit. The literal meaning of the name was "self-explosion corps". In Indonesian, it was called *Pasukan Berani Mati*, or "the corps that dares to die". Armed with bamboo spears they resembled the *kamikaze* pilots who were ready to die any time for the emperor and Greater East Asia—in this case for a "New Java."

In September 1943 a regular military corps was formed, named Peta (*Pembela Tanah Air*; Defenders of the Fatherland). With a membership of 120,000 armed men by 1945, Peta played a very important role in the Indonesian struggle for independence and was to become the "backbone of the Indonesian Republic's army."[25] As late as February 1945 the Japanese also initiated the formation of Hizbullah, a "self-sacrifice corps" consisting of young Muslims.[26]

On March 9, 1943 the Japanese military government gave approval to the formation of the first-full scale national organization. In Japanese, it was called *Minshu Soryoku Kesshu Undo*, which means "people's total power concentration movement" which reflected Japanese effort to gear the population for the war effort. In Indonesian, however, the name was translated into Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (Putera), which means "Center of People's Power."[27] These different emphases in meaning reflected the difference of interests between the Japanese officials and the Indonesian nationalists:

> For the Japanese [the Putera] was primarily a means of for rallying Indonesian support behind their war effort, wherein certain concessions to the nationalist leaders had to be made in order to keep them in line. To these nationalist leaders it was primarily a means for spreading and intensifying nationalist ideas among the masses and forcing concessions from the Japanese leading toward self-government. Secondarily and subordinately, they conceived of it as an organization dedicated to helping the Japanese war effort, but only to the minimum extent necessary in order to allow the furtherance of their own long-term nationalist aims.[28]

On March 1, 1944, however, as the Allies drew closer to Indonesia, the Japanese wanted to involve more Indonesians in the war effort. The Putera was considered insufficient, since it only included native Indonesians, particularly Javanese. Against the will of many Indonesian nationalists, the Japanese replaced the Putera with *Jawa Hokokai* (*Perhimpunan Kebaktian Rakyat Jawa*,

or People's Service Association of Java), which included people with Chinese, Arabic and Eurasian heritage.[29]

Not to Indonesia

From its administrative and military policies it was clear that the Japanese government intended to "Nipponize" the Indonesians by way of mobilization and nationalization. For Indonesian leaders, however, the true goal was nationalization, with mobilization merely as a means. To them Nipponization was inescapable, but it was merely an insignificant by-product.[30] Therefore, although initially meant to meet any incoming Allied attack, the formation of such paramilitary groups, in turn, helped give the Indonesian nationalists a means of gaining two crucial aspects they needed in their struggle for independence: militant-self-assertion and military capacity.[31] As it would later prove, all military and paramilitary training became a central factor throughout the Indonesian struggle for independence.

Shortly after the beginning of the occupation, the Japanese began to realize the possibility of Indonesian revolt against them in order to gain independence. Even in the *Joyoboyo* prophecy mentioned above they noticed that there were seeds of rebellion. A central part of the prophecy predicted not only the coming of liberators from the north, but also their quick departure. "There will come from Nusa Tembini [the Northeast] yellow-skinned men, short of stature," the prophecy said. "They will occupy Java and rule it as long as the life of corn [*saumure jagung*]. Afterward they will go home to their country, Nusa Tembini. Java will return to its original state, governed by its own sons."[32] The phrase "saumure jagung," which referred to the four-and-a half month period corn needed to ripen, worried the Japanese officials most. The officials were concerned that the hope of the swiftness of Japanese occupation predicted in the prophecy could generate social unrest against the government.[33] To suppress any possibility of native unrest or revolt against them the Japanese began to react by making a series of arrest, interrogations and fearful threats carried out by their well-known repression agency, the *Kenpetai*.

Originally meant as an organization of "law soldiers" or "judicial soldier" (*ken pei*) during World War II, Kenpetai became an effective means of suppressing indigenous rebellion against Japan throughout Southeast Asia. In Indonesia, the cruelty of the Kenpetai became part of larger Japanese repression against any local attempt to lessen the military effort in anticipating a possible Allied invasion. During the period between July 1943 and March

1944, for instance, in the so-called *Koo* operation, the Kenpetai helped the government arrest many Javanese considered "dangerous" to the colonial policies. As a result of the operation 239 Javanese were executed without trial. In Sumatra, in the *Ji* operation, the Kenpetai provided the same help to the government. At the end of 1943, in the Borneo town of Pontianak, the Kenpetai helped torture and execute 1,500 people, also without trial. The basis for the tortures and executions was merely rumors which said that those people were making a plot against the government.[34]

The Indonesian nationalists' reactions to the Japanese colonial policies varied. Some nationalists like Soetan Sjahrir preferred a non-cooperative policy toward the Japanese. Indonesian independence, in their view, had to be gained through a direct confrontation with the Japanese. Other nationalists, like Hatta, supported the idea of limited cooperation with the Japanese in order to make Indonesian independence a reality. The most well-known nationalist since the Dutch colonial period, Sukarno, believed that an independent Indonesia could only be achieved through a full cooperation with the Japanese colonial government.[35] As later developments demonstrated, Sukarno's approach toward the Japanese was more dominant than the other two.[36]

Sukarno's cooperative approach toward the Japanese, known as "collaboration," became most evident in the controversial case of his help in providing the colonial government with Indonesian forced labor, known as the *Romusha*. In their war effort of defending the Southeast Asian colonies, the Japanese needed Indonesians to work as source of forced labor, both inside and outside Indonesia. Sukarno successfully persuaded thousands of Indonesians to enlist themselves as romusha, with a hope that the Japanese would eventually grant Indonesia independence. Unfortunately, as it turned out, an incalculable number of romushas would suffer greatly in the labor camps and thousands of them would die.

It was difficult to count the actual number of Indonesian who worked in forced-labor camps as romushas. There were different estimates regarding their number. The figure deduced from the post-war reports provided by the Dutch and the British, however, was probably the most reliable one. According to these reports, there were about 300,000 romushas transported to different places in Indonesia and to other parts of Southeast Asia, particularly Burma. Among over 50,000 romushas sent abroad, only about half of them came back alive. Half of them died in misery.[37]

For Sukarno's part, it was clear that while supporting the romusha project and filling his speeches with mobilizing rhetoric—phrases like "forging

unity for spirit" (*memadu roch*); "with joyfulness of soul" (*dengan kegembiraan roch*); and "burning enthusiasm" (*semangat yang menyala-nyala*)—he kept his primary goal of Indonesian independence and sovereignty.[38] But despite such incalculable sacrifice, the Japanese refused to grant independence to Indonesia. In January 1943 Premier Tojo announced that Japan would grant independence to Burma and the Philippines but not to Indonesia. Sukarno was deeply grieved by this decision. He angrily asked why the Japanese destroyed railroads in Indonesia and gathered up so many Indonesian forced laborers for the sake of Burma, and then promised independence to Burma, but not to Indonesia.[39]

Republican Form of Government

There were cases which indicated that several Japanese officials who were in favor of the Indonesians' quest for independence. Count Hayashi Kiyujiro, the most influential of the three Japanese civilian advisers to the colonial government, was an example. To the Indonesian nationalist leader Hatta he admitted that "Japan's behavior in China was imperialism of the same order as that of the Europeans."[40] Several times he approached the Japanese government in Tokyo to grant independence for Indonesia, but always failed.

Despite such individual cases, the general policy of the Japanese colonial government was to delay independence for Indonesia as long as possible. In mid-1944, Tojo's cabinet agreed on the formation of a commission to work on a policy toward granting Indonesians independence. Under the leadership of Koiso Kuniaki, the commission produced the so-called Koiso declaration, in which the Japanese promised that they would give Indonesians independence sometime in the future.[41] Indonesian nationalist leaders were skeptical about such a promise. Hatta's response, for instance, was flat and full of skepticism: "How long is sometime in the future?"[42]

Hatta and other Indonesian nationalists were right not to trust too readily the promise of the Japanese. The promise was merely a tactic to appease Indonesians, and to suppress their struggle for independence. The Japanese knew that only by generating a certain hope (false as it might have been) would they be able to persuade Indonesians to help them in their war efforts.[43] For the Japanese, independence for Indonesians was not a matter of reward for "good behavior" (such as providing thousands of romushas) but a means of gaining local support in facing any impending danger.

Such an impending danger soon became reality. By mid-February 1945, as American forces had been successful in defeating the Japanese forces in

Leyte and were gaining control over Manila, in Blitar (East Java) officers of the Peta paramilitary group, which the Japanese had trained, revolted against the Japanese government. To avoid any possible spread of similar revolt in other parts of the territory, the Japanese military administration officials decided to take immediate steps in order to appease the local population. On March 1, 1945, they authorized the formation of an Investigatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (*Badan Penyelidikan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, or BPKI) in order to study the preparation for Indonesian independence. By now Indonesian nationalists who were members of the BPKI had been familiar with Japanese tactics of delivering empty promises regarding independence. They knew that it was not good behavior toward the Japanese but pressure (both from the course of the war and from the threat of internal revolts) that would make the Japanese fulfill their promises.[44]

After being delayed for three months, eventually the BPKI were allowed to meet in May 1945. Even in this meeting the Japanese officials told the Commission members that their main task was not to vote but to study and give advice on the possibility regarding Indonesian independence. Members of the BPKI, they said, should not consider themselves as "a prospective mother," but as "a midwife." Sukarno, who was also a member of the Commission, reacted by adding his own metaphor: "Independence seems like a marriage. Who shall wait until the salary rises...? Marry first!"[45] Against the initial intention of the Japanese, Sukarno and other Indonesian nationalists used the BPKI as an effective forum to truly prepare for Indonesian independence which they thought would come to reality in the near future. Members of the BPKI then discussed necessary matters needed for a new nation such as a form of government, territorial boundaries, and a constitution. By July 16, 1945 they completed the drafting of the constitution.[46] They chose a republican form of government for independent Indonesia. Regarding territorial boundaries members of the BPKI agreed that an independent Indonesia would comprise of all the former Dutch colonial possessions in the Malay archipelago.[47]

An Independent Nation

On August 14, 1945, the Japanese imperial government surrendered to the Allies, following the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, and Nagasaki on August 9. Initially, the Japanese colonial government officials were reluctant in making any announcement to the Indonesian people regarding the surrender. When Subardjo, one of the Indonesian nationalists, asked Admiral Maeda Tadashi at the Office of Naval Liaison regarding the

unconfirmed news about Japanese surrender, the Admiral simply said that the Allied broadcasts said so. Meanwhile, officials of the Japanese military government in Indonesia acted as if Japan was still fighting a war.[48] The unusual number of drunken Japanese at the naval headquarters, however, was for Subardjo a strong indication that something terrible must have occurred to the Japanese in the course of the war.[49]

Since news of the surrender was bound to spread, the Japanese attitudes in Indonesia began to change. More than just acknowledging their defeat in the war, a number of Japanese officials began to help Indonesians in their struggle for independence, motivated by the anti-Allied sentiment shared by Indonesian nationalists and Japanese officials. At the same time these officials were under pressure from Indonesian nationalists who by now were more eager and determined to declare Indonesian independence.[50] Although several hundred Japanese soldiers took similar measures by deserting their post and joining Indonesians in their fight for independence, the Japanese support for Indonesia never took the form of official armed assistance.[51]

The struggle for Indonesian independence reached its most historical moment in mid-August 1945. Shortly upon learning about the surrender of Japan to the Allies, a group of young Indonesian nationalists (the *pemudas*) planned to start an uprising against the existing Japanese forces. At the same time they pressed Sukarno and other Indonesian senior nationalists to declare independence immediately in order to avoid the establishment of a Japanese-created puppet state.[52] Sukarno and his fellow nationalists refused such a plan. They chose a more cautious way since they were concerned with the possibility of a Japanese counter-attack despite the empire's formal surrender to the Allies. In a bitter dispute between the two groups Sukarno, Hatta and other senior nationalists were kidnapped by the pemudas and were detained in a secret place outside Jakarta.

After long hours of debates and discussions which occurred between August 14 and 17, eventually the Indonesian nationalists came upon an agreement on the date, time, and text of the proclamation of independence.[53] The text, which was very concise, was signed by Sukarno and Hatta on behalf of the Indonesian people. In the morning of August 17, 1945 Sukarno read the text, attended by Hatta and many other nationalists. The text reads,

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> We, the people of Indonesia, hereby declare Indonesia's independence. Matters concerning the transfer of power and other maters will be executed in an orderly manner and in the shortest possible time.[54]

The proclamation ceremony was followed with the raising of Sang *Saka Merah Putih,* the Indonesian national flag, and the singing of the Indonesian anthem, the *Indonesia Raya.* For the Indonesian people it was the most important moment in their struggle for independence so far, in which they declared themselves, at least unilaterally, an independent nation, free from centuries of colonial subjugation imposed by other people.

Would be Easier

Meanwhile, in the surrender agreement the Allies required the Japanese to "prohibit the Indonesian flag, ban the national anthem, and withdraw recognition from the BPKI."[55] In practice this was very difficult for the Japanese to do. The Indonesians were so exuberant about their independence that they expressed their sense of freedom and victory by waving the flag and singing the anthem everywhere. In many places the celebration of independence was followed by taking control of cities from the Japanese hands. In Yogyakarta, for instance, thousands of people gathered at the Sultan's residence to celebrate the proclamation of independence. They then used the celebration as an opportunity to take over the town from the Japanese. Similar actions occurred in several other important cities. By September 28 the town of Bandung was in Indonesian hands. Soon, other cities like Solo and Malang were also taken over by the Indonesians.[56] Any Japanese attempt to halt such actions failed.

Despite the exuberant celebration, the newly-proclaimed republic was politically and economically very weak. It was inexperienced and ill-prepared to meet any attack from the outside, such as an attack from the returning Dutch forces. At the same time, the *de facto* control of several Indonesian key cities and infrastructures by Indonesian nationalists, along with the militant self-assertion and military capacity the Indonesians had gained during the Japanese occupation, would make any attack by the Dutch very difficult.[57] Consequently, as a British report said, when the Dutch did eventually return to Indonesia they "did not return as conquerors of the Japanese in the same degree as [the British] did in Burma [where re-invasion preceded Japanese surrender] and Malaya."[58]

The Allies' change of war strategy in the Pacific added reason for the difficulty of the Dutch to return to Indonesia. In December 1944 General Douglas McArthur was planning to attack the Japanese on Java, but the plan was opposed by both American and British Chiefs of Staff. The Chiefs of Staff worried that an attack on Java would unnecessarily overextend the Allied forces needed to strike Japanese home islands. McArthur gave in to

the opposition and in July suggested that the British Lord Louis Mountbatten assume responsibility over the Southeast Asian territory south of the Philippines. This suggestion, as well as the change of plan was made into a policy at the Potsdam Conference later that month. Mountbatten would assume his responsibility on August 15.[59]

The change of plan deeply disappointed van Mook, who had expected an American liberation of Java. The liberation, van Mook had hoped, would destroy any military power the Indonesian nationalists (who by now had become revolutionaries) might have, and would make it easier for the NICA to restore colonial power, as it was stated in van Mook's agreement with McArthur in December 1944. The change of plan and command frustrated van Mook's expectations. The invasion of Java never took place. Had the Allied forces invaded Java, van Mook knew, it would be very difficult for Indonesian revolutionaries to defend themselves against the return of the Dutch, and therefore it would be easier for the Dutch to resume colonial authority.

Special Target

The sudden Japanese surrender and the absence of Allied powers following the surrender, created a "power vacuum" in Indonesia. This power vacuum, as we have seen, was then quickly used by Indonesian nationalists to declare independence and take control of important cities. The control of the cities by Indonesian revolutionary forces would make any attempt by the Dutch to re-conquest Indonesia difficult. Despite such possible difficulties, the Dutch did attempt to return to Indonesia to restore power, under the leadership of NICA personnel. By now, however, they were in an almost impossible position to reclaim such power. In addition to the lack of military support from the Allies, NICA leaders also lacked support from the Dutch government in the Netherlands itself, because its greatest concern now was the rebuilding of the war-torn nation.

On their return to Indonesia, therefore, the NICA leaders were powerless. In the words of historian Theodore Friend, they were

> like seismologists without recording equipment, engineers without bulldozers, farmers without seeds. A political earthquake was underway and they did not realize it; the ground was riven beneath them and they had no machinery to close it; the people were hungry and they had little to feed them with. They brought to bear a legalistic

> and moralistic restorationism that made them view Sukarno as an unforgivable collaborator and his government as "Japanese formed and completely under Japanese control."[60]

Upon returning to Indonesia, the Dutch began to suppress Indonesian independence by prosecuting leading Indonesian nationalists. They expected that the Allies would help them by prosecuting these nationalists whom the Dutch considered as collaborators to the Japanese. In this prosecution plan Sukarno again became a special target. The Dutch accused Sukarno of an act of "treason" and claimed of having plenty of "evidence" for the accusation, such as:

> an oath of "eternal fidelity" to Japan; criticism of Italy for lacking the will to fight; a tribute to the "gallant German nation" on V-E day for holding out against a numerically and materially stronger enemy; an "ecstasy of joy and gratitude" at the Philippine declaration of war against the Allies; several messages of support to the [Philippine nationalist Jose P.] Laurel; endorsement of a proposal of general military conscription against the Allies; presiding over the burning in effigy of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Van der Plas's petty promises of "welfare and blessing."[61]

No Prosecution

In his responsibility over Southeast Asia excepting the Philippines, Louis Mountbatten had three principal tasks: maintaining law and order, rescuing Western internees, and repatriating the Japanese.[62] In carrying out such a big responsibility, however, he found himself shorthanded. In doing his task in Indonesia, for instance, he had no sufficient British forces to help him. His one ethnically British division had been assigned to India and Burma. In Indonesia he only had non-British troops (mostly Indians) with a limited time of assignment—seven months—because they were also needed in India itself.

This shorthandedness made Mountbatten limit his operation goals regarding the Dutch-Indonesian affairs. He made himself clear when he declared that "Our one idea is to get the Dutch and Indonesians to kiss and make friends ... [so we can] pull out."[63] The Dutch found such a declaration very disappointing. For a long time they had worried about two factors: American anti-imperialism and British military weakness. Now they felt that the two had merged and became a reality in the person of Mountbatten. The

British commander, the Dutch correctly believed, had neither the desire nor military strength to help them restore colonial power.[64]

The Dutch disappointment was aggravated by Mountbatten's reaction to Sukarno's letter regarding Indonesian independence. On September 30, 1945, Sukarno wrote a letter to Mountbatten in which he declared: "We do not ask the Allied Military Forces to recognize the Republic of Indonesia. We only ask you to acknowledge facts, namely that to the feelings of the people there exists a Republic of Indonesia with a government."[65] When the Dutch Lieutenant-General Hubertus J. van Mook learned that Mountbatten did not indicate any objection to the demand in Sukarno's letter, he became irritated and began to criticize Mountbatten for not defending Dutch interests. The British Commander's response, however, was even more disappointing for the Dutch. Mountbatten responded by saying that he "could not recommend to H.M. Government that British/Indian troops should be used to crush the Indonesian Republic."[66]

The disappointment of the Dutch with the British was further aggravated by a controversial speech by Lieutenant General Sir Philip Christison, commander of the Seaforth Highlanders forces. Shortly after the landing of the forces in Jakarta, Christison announced that there were only two goals Britain wanted to achieve in Indonesia. One was the evacuation of Allied prisoners, and the other was the disarmament of the Japanese forces. "The British have no intention of meddling in Indonesian internal affairs," he announced, "but only to ensure law and order." He then asked Indonesian nationalist leaders to treat him and his troops as "guests." He also assured the Indonesians that the British troops would not move outside designated areas in certain major cities.[67]

Christison's announcement greatly damaged the morale of the Dutch in Indonesia.[68] They felt that they had been betrayed by the Allies. Van Mook regarded Christison's announcement as virtual recognition by the British of the Republic of Indonesia. The Dutch complained that the British were treating Sukarno, the "detestable collaborator," as a political equal. They also complained about British postures which indicated that there would be no prosecution against Indonesian "war criminals" and "collaborators."[69]

The Hague Conference

The final phase of the war worked to the advantage of Indonesian nationalists. McArthur's plan to invade Java, as we have seen, was aborted, sparing the Indonesians from possible heavy battles and making it more difficult for the

Dutch to restore power. The fact that Java was saved from Allied attacks also gave Indonesians the opportunity to take over Japanese arms. The Indonesian nationalists—and a large number of the populace—who had been well-trained by the Japanese in military and paramilitary trainings, now faced real military threats and possessed real weapons in their hands. As for the British, even if they were willing to help the Dutch restore power, they did not have sufficient forces to do so. Meanwhile, the Dutch forces—weak as they were—only arrived in Indonesia in December, by which Indonesian revolutionaries were psychologically and physically ready to defend their newly-gained freedom and independence.

The development of events in Indonesia in late 1945, however, changed the British initially neutral posture toward Indonesia. On October 25, British forces arrived in Surabaya, the largest town in East Java. The main task of these forces was "to disarm the population, take the key buildings and communication centers, and free internees."[70] Although very well-armed, these forces were small in number and had to divide themselves into groups which were assigned to free the internees in different camps and to protect the Surabaya harbor. While carrying out these tasks, they were attacked by Indonesian revolutionaries. Motivated by a sense of independence and anti-colonial sentiment, Indonesian revolutionaries ambushed British forces whom they considered as an extension of Western colonial power. A state of chaos and conflict now existed between the Indonesians and the British forces. The Indonesians fought the British with a determined spirit, which was further aroused an effective radio announcer and nationalist, Bung Tomo. From the Radio Pemberontakan (Radio Rebellion) Bung Tomo called *arek-arek Surabaya* or the sons of Surabaya to fight against the "imperialist power."[71]

The Commander of a Gurkha brigade of Seaforth Highlanders urged President Sukarno and Vice President Hatta to come to Surabaya and call for a cease fire. On October 29, an agreement were reached between the Indonesian leaders and British commanders. Both sides agreed that the British would be granted free passage they needed to evacuate the internees, and withdraw to designated positions, while the Indonesians' right to bear arms would be maintained.[72]

Sukarno and other Indonesians then returned to Jakarta. However, shortly after their return to Jakarta, a conflict between British forces and Indonesian revolutionaries resumed. Amid this new conflict the British commander of the Forty-ninth (Indian) Brigade, Brigadier General Mallaby, was killed. It was possible that his death was accidentally caused by his own men, as many

Indonesians believed, but the British soon held Indonesians responsible for the death. The danger of revenge and massive killings soon loomed in the air. On October 31, in a radio broadcast—one of the most remarkable speeches in his life—Sukarno urged the Indonesian revolutionaries to stop their fight against the Allied forces:

> We know that the Indonesian army was well organized there; that the *pemuda* [youth] and workers had already formed well-knit units. But because of abuses of this strength of ours, and because we did not base our struggle on a strategy of cooperation with other parts of Indonesia nor on a strategy of long-term struggle, a situation has now arisen which has weakened our strength in Surabaya and in Indonesia.... As a result of these considerations I have ordered all fighting against the Allies to cease... Only NICA profits by the struggle we have been carrying on against the Allies, while we have been weakened by using up no little part of our military resources ... Don't let us be forced to face alone the whole military power of England and all the Allies. ... If there are problems, we must and shall follow the path of peace, since the Indonesians are peace-loving people. ..One again, I order all fighting with the Allies to cease. Carry out my orders. Merdeka![73]

The broadcast was effective and was followed by a period of calm on both sides. This calm, however, was soon destroyed by a British commander, Major General Mansergh. Shortly after his arrival in Surabaya with the Fifth Indian Infantry Division and tanks, and with Dutch foreknowledge, he issued an *ultimatum* on November 9, 1945. In the ultimatum he ordered that all arms in Surabaya be turned in the next morning. He also ordered that the "murderers" of Mallaby be surrendered to the British forces.[74] This was an impossible demand, which predictably was rejected by the Indonesian revolutionaries.

In response to the rejection, at 6:00 a.m., on November 10, 1945, British forces attacked Surabaya with heavy naval and aerial bombardment. On land, the British were involved in a street-to-street battles for three weeks against Indonesian revolutionaries. Many of the revolutionaries were armed with weapons they had seized from the Japanese, but many others were fighting only with very simple weapons, such as bamboo spears.[75] On the other side of the battle, in the course of the three weeks the British forces became very well-equipped. The 6,000 Seaforth Highlanders who had arrived earlier were now

aided by 24,000 'battle-hardened' troops of the Fifth Division. In terms of equipment, the British now had with them 21 Sherman tanks, 8 Thunderbolt and 16 Mosquito planes, and a division of artillery.[76]

Despite the heavy equipment they had the British soldiers did not have the inner motive which the Indonesian revolutionary had. While the British were fighting for a cause not all of them were really willing to fight for, the revolutionaries felt that this battle was a noble cause, of defending their freedom and independence against all imperialistic enemies. While British forces were at the very end of a war, the Indonesians were at the very beginning of it. At the same time, the availability of arms seized from the surrendering Japanese army helped enhance the Indonesians' courage to fight. By the end of the battle Indonesian casualties were very high. According to the British reports, 1,168 Indonesians died in the battle itself, and another 4,697 died afterwards of wounds sustained in the battle.[77]

Superior in number and equipment in the Surabaya battle, the British won the city; but at the same time the Indonesians won respect and recognition in their determination to defend their freedom and independence. With that the hope of the Dutch to restore colonial power became more and more dismal. In July-August 1947 and December 1948, in what they called "police actions"—against the will of the United Nations—the Dutch attacked key positions of the Republic in their last attempt to restore power.[78] Both attacks failed to help the power restoration, and the Dutch began to realize that an era was ending, and a new one was beginning. In the Hague Conference of December 1949, the Dutch recognized the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia.[79]

Freedom and Independence

The Indonesian struggle for independence had begun during the Dutch colonial period. Although in the 1930s the Indonesian nationalists accelerated their activities in the movement for independence, the Dutch colonial government always succeeded in suppressing them. The outbreak of the Second World War in the Southeast Asian theater, however, fundamentally changed the course of the fight for Indonesian independence.

The course of the war in Southeast Asia and the Japanese invasion of Indonesia, followed by the Dutch surrender soon afterwards, brought a period of change in the history of the Indonesian struggle for independence. The military and paramilitary training given by the Japanese in anticipation of

an Allied attack gave the Indonesians two important aspects in their struggle: militant self-assertion and military capacity.

The surrender of Japan to the Allies on August 14, 1945, and the power vacuum which followed, provided a very important opportunity for Indonesians in their struggle for independence. Three days after the surrender, on August 17, represented by Sukarno and Hatta, Indonesians declared independence. On this day, they proclaimed themselves a nation free of colonial subjugation. The ability of the Indonesians to defend themselves against the Allied military attack, to frustrate the Dutch attempt to restore colonial power, and to win Dutch recognition in 1949, in turn, demonstrated their strong determination in winning and defending their freedom and independence.

Notes:

1 See Arthur S. Banks (ed.), *Handbook of the World 1992* (Binghamton, New York: CSA Publication, 1992), 348-349; I.C.B. Dear (General Editor.) *The Oxford Companion to World War* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 786-87.

2 Theodore Friend, *The Blue-Eyed Enemy: Japan Against The West In Java and Luzon, 1942-45.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 17.

3 Dear, 786-87.

4 Friend, 14.

5 Friend, 17. As Friend sees it, in the long run, the Dutch eventually "provoked, even as it suppressed, Islamic, Marxist, and Nationalist opposition and radicalism among the young." Friend, 34.

6 brief but substantial history of Indonesian nationalist movements prior to 1942, see George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell U rsity Press, 1959), 37-100.

7 S.L. van der Wal (ed), *Herinneringen van Jhr. Mr. B.C. de Jonge*. (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1948), 191-192, as quoted in Friend, 40.

8 Friend, 40.

9 Friend, 4.

10 During the war period the Japanese called the Allied forces "the blue-eyed enemies" who owned "black slaves." To them "this was a way of defining other people as sub-human, therefore [they] could be annihilated without calling it murder and subjected as a matter of duty." Major General Yamagata to this troops at Giruwa, November 25, 1942, as quoted in Friend, 59. At the same time the Japanese considered their victory over those enemies a justification for their ruling of "lesser "peoples of Southeast Asia." Friend, 59. In fighting the war, the "Japanese imperial power was equipped with a hierarchical theory of international affairs, summarized in the slogan *hakko ichiu*. Freely translated, it meant "everyone under one roof." National textbooks in the 1930s conveyed the idea to Japanese school children in the popular form of "one big family" of nations. Japan was to be the father of the family and other peoples the children, a metaphor implying generalization of the Japanese imperial throne and expansion of its nation-state. Theodore Friend, "Hakkio-Ichiu and Dogi: the Rhetoric of Japanese Expansion," appendix B in I ma Masamichi and Tekeuchi Tatsuji, *The Philippines Polity: A Japanese View*, ed. Friend, Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, Monograph Series, no. 12 (New heaven, 1967), 286-89, as quoted in Friend, 60. As later

development would show, this "archaic Japanese fusion of religion, state, and society, combined with military aggression," however, "made *hakko ichiu* difficult to practice." See Friend, 62.

11 Friend, 3.

12 Long before the invasion Japan had sent to Indonesia a number of its citizens, who later would work as interpreters or secret agents. Kahin, 103.

13 Friend, 55. See also discussion on this matter in Jonathan Marshall, *To Have and Have Not: Southeast Asian Raw Material and the Origins of the Pacific War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 64-85, 121-156.

14 Friend, 56.

15 Friend,57.

16 Friend, 58. At the same time in Singapore the British forces also suffered a great defeat by the Japanese, which Winston Churchill admitted to the House of Commons as a "debacle." Friend, 58.

17 Kahin, 100.

18 *Sinar Matahari*, July 8, 1943 as quoted in Friend., 73.

19 Friend, 65-66.

20 Friend, 94.

21 Friend, 91- 92. In Kahin's words, despite its "high-powered propaganda," the Triple-A movement was a "complete fizzle." Kahin, 103.

22 Friend, 92.

23 Friend, 97.

24 Friend, 97.

25 Kahin, 109, 113

26 Friend, 97. Kahin, 163.

27 Kahin, 106-110, Friend, 95.

28 Kahin, 107.

29 Kahin, 110, 111, 115; Friend, 96.

30 Kahin, 94-95.

31 Kahin, 98, 176.

32 Tjantrik Mataram, *Ichtiarkanlah terlaksananya*, 3 as quoted in Friend, 77.

33 Friend, 77; Kahin, 100.

34 Friend, 190.

35 Friend, 84.

36 Even in the early days of the occupation Sukarno, in fact, had suggested some agreement to cooperate with the Japanese colonial government. In his autobiography he said that he had already agreed to cooperate with the Japanese military commander in Bukittinggi, Sumatra, Colonel Fujiyama. Sukarno's autobiography devotes four pages to the meeting. See Sukarno, *An Autobiography As Told To Cindy Adams* (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), 159-163.

37 Friend, 162-163.

38 Friend, 74.

39 Friend, 105.

40 Friend, 67.

41 Friend, 106.

42 Friend, 107.

43 Friend, 71.

44 Friend, 109.

45 Quotations from Y. Ichibangase, "A Report of the Preparative Investigation Committee for Indonesian Independence," November 13, 1946. See Friend, 110.

46 Friend, 114.
47 In early August 1945 the Japanese colonial government announced that it was "planning" to discuss more substantial matters about granting independence to Indonesia. The relatively sudden Japanese surrender, however, made carrying out the plan impossible. It was doubtful that the government really intended to have such a plan, except another tactic to appease the population. At the same time there was a strong determination among Indonesian nationalists that Indonesian independence should not be merely a "gift" from Japan, but as the fruit of their own years of struggle. Friend, 114-117.
48 Friend, 117-120.
49 Friend, 117, based on interviews with Hatta, July 5, 1968 and Subardjo, March 12, 1968.
50 Friend, 220.
51 Friend, 220.
52 Robert J. Mc Mahon, *Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1981), 38. Kahin, 134-136. In his book, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, Benedict A on put a great emphasis on the role of the pemuda in the Indonesian revolution. See Benedict R.O'G. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972).
53 Kahin, 134-136.
54 Anderson, 82. The text was signed: "In the name of the Indonesian people, Sukarno-Hatta." Anderson, 82; McMahon, 38.
55 Friend, 120.
56 Friend, 120.
57 Friend, 220-221.
58 Report of Wing Commander Tull, RAF, attached to RAPWI, on Operation "Salek Mastiff," September 10-December 15, 1945. Friend, 222.
59 McMahon, 73, 78-79.
60 Friend, 214.
61 Extracts from Sukarno's speeches, April 29, 1943, September 28, 29, 1944, October 1, 25, 27, 1944, May 14, 1945; *Asia Raya* September 14, 1943; Manila *Tribune*, November 4, 1944; extract, August 16, 1944; *Tjahaja*, September 2, November, 1944; See Friend,, 217.
62 Anderson, 135.
63 Anderson, 132-135; McMahon, 80, 83-84.
64 Friend, 312.
65 Friend, 223.
66 Friend, 236.
67 Anderson, 135
68 Anderson, 136.
69 Later the Dutch proceeded with their own trials of suspected "war criminals" such as Gatot Mangkupradja. In a move to restore Dutch colonial authority, however, in 1947 van Mook released them by granting "amnesty." Friend, 218.
70 Friend, 227.
71 Regarding Bung Tomo and the Surabaya battle, see Anderson, 155-158.
72 Friend, 227.
73 Anderson, 164-165.
74 Friend, 228.
75 Anderson, 164-65; quotation from David Wehl, *Birth of Indonesia* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1948), 66. See Friend, 228.
76 Friend, 269.

77 Regarding the casualties of the Surabaya battle see Roeslan Abdulgani, Semangat dan Jiwa Kepahlawanan, 1-2. C.L.M. Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, *Abdul Haris Nasution: A Political Biography* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1985), 21-22.

78 It is important to note that the total number of Japanese killed in Indonesia after their surrender was 1,057, of which 544 died in action. That the number of Japanese dead equaled or exceeded that of the British and Dutch combined (which was between 500 and 700 men) may help explain Japanese resentment over the role forced on them in this period. The figures certainly illustrate Dutch unwillingness to risk lives to save their own empire. There were about 25,000 Indonesians killed during the Indonesian revolution between 1945 and 1949. Friend, 237.

79 At this conference, however, the Dutch obliged Indonesia to pay a $1.3 billion war "debt" to the Netherlands. Despite the recognition of Indonesian sovereignty, the Dutch refused to recognize West New Guinea (West Irian) as part of the Republic of Indonesia. They retained their colonial claim over the territory. This claim would become source of long and bitter diplomatic negotiation between the two countries before eventually, in 1963, the Indonesians won sovereignty over the territory. Kahin, 433-434; McMahon, 300.

≈ Chapter 13 ≈

The United States and Covert Policies toward Indonesia, 1945-1960

My literal responsibility as director of the CIA with regard to covert action was to inform the Congress—not to seek their approval; to inform.

-Michael Hayden

ON AUGUST 17, 1945 following the Japanese surrender to the Allies three days earlier Indonesians declared independence. As we have seen, out of the Dutch colonial territory the Indonesian nationalists established a new nation and a new government called the Republic of Indonesia. The returning Dutch colonial-government-in-exile refused the declaration of independence and the new government. It wanted to return Indonesia back as Dutch colonial possession. With the military support of the Allies, the Dutch forged to re-establish their colonial power over Indonesia. A war of independence soon broke out, fought by the Indonesians against their former colonial masters. The protracted war of independence was followed by a series of diplomatic negotiation between the two opposing parties in order to find a lasting settlement.

The efforts to find a lasting settlement involved outside powers, one of which was the United States. As one of the two strongest military powers in the beginning of the Cold War following the end of the Second World War, the U.S. had both influence and interests in the post-war Indonesian.

This chapter attempts to demonstrate American involvement in Indonesian affairs, particularly since the proclamation of Indonesian independence in 1945 up to 1960, with a great emphasis on President Eisenhower's administration's covert policies toward Indonesia in the late 1950s. This chapter will show how, in midst of the Cold War dynamics, American policies towards Indonesia were mostly covert in nature and were greatly determined by the doctrine

of containment against the spread of Communism. The covert nature of these policies, this chapter will also show, necessitated the Eisenhower administration to rely heavily on intelligence reports supplied by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which later proved to be unreliable and eventually led the policies into an abysmal failure.

Soviet Penetration

The United States began to get involved in Indonesia's politics from the first years of the country's independence, particularly in its negotiations with the Dutch regarding its independence and territorial boundaries. During this period many Americans shared Indonesians' anti-colonial sentiment. Despite the shared sentiment among the *people*, however, the sentiment among US *government officials* was different. Many officials of the government of that day, namely the government of President Harry S Truman, tended to support the Dutch desire to restore their colonial power over Indonesia—albeit discreetly and often indirectly.[1] There were several reasons for such posture.

The *first* reason was fear of communism. Many postwar policy makers in the Truman administration feared that the absence of a Western power in the post-colonial Indonesia would make Indonesia lean toward the Soviet Bloc and therefore would make the country a fertile ground for the existence and spread of Communism. Indonesia's inclination toward the Soviet Bloc, they believed, would mean "the strategic stake for Moscow is high—a Communist stronghold situated between Singapore, the Philippines, and Australia."[2] They hoped that the presence of the Dutch in the area would avert such a possibility from becoming a reality. In many cases this fear of Communism overrode their opposition to colonialism.[3]

The *second* was the importance of Indonesia to the Dutch economy. Rich in natural sources such as oil, bauxite, gold, silver, tin, rubber, and copra, Indonesia was a major contributor to the Dutch economy. It provided some 20 percent of Dutch national income. The return of Dutch control over Indonesia would become a great support for rebuilding the war-torn Netherlands' economy. Conversely, the American policy makers believed, the absence of such control would help create economic instability in the Netherlands—regardless of how much economic assistance the U.S. could give to the country.[4]

The *third* was American economic interests. Although not as great as those of the Dutch, the U.S. also had economic interests in Indonesia. There were already several American companies operating in Indonesia during this

period, particularly in the oil and rubber industries in Sumatra. Dutch control in the archipelago would help secure American investment. The policy makers feared that the absence of Dutch colonial government would open the way for the Indonesian government to nationalize all foreign investments, including those of the American companies.[5] One of the U.S. State Department's most prominent experts on the Far East during this the period, Stanley K. Hornbeck, wrote in 1948 that Indonesia was "the world's richest island empire ... a region of political, economic, and strategic importance to the whole world."[6] The presence of the Dutch in the area was expected to help secure such importance for American interests.

The *fourth* reason was American need for Dutch support in the post-war Europe. In the early years of the Cold War in Europe, the United States had great need for Dutch cooperation to build a joint military shield against the spread of the Soviet Union's influence in Western Europe. In return, the U.S. was obliged to support Dutch attempts to resume colonial rule over Indonesia or at least to support Dutch interests in its former colony.[7]

CIA-backed regional rebellion in Indonesia
http://www.informasibelajar.com/2016/08/pemberontakan-prri-permesta.html

The *fifth* was the Dutch need for American support. As a small nation devastated by the German invasion during the war, the Netherlands needed American assistance to reconquer its former colony and rebuild its economy. Without any help from the outside, particularly the U.S., it would be difficult for the Netherlands to regain pre-war condition. In order to get such help the Dutch would do anything they considered necessary, such as offering a misleading

description of Indonesian top leaders. For instance, they told American policy makers that Sukarno, Hatta, and other high-ranking Indonesian leaders had been detestable collaborators during the Japanese occupation, and now they were "extremists" who were leaning toward Communism. Any success of Indonesian leaders in resisting the return of Western power, the American officials were told, would open the way for Soviet penetration and Communist expansion in Indonesia and, possibly, in other parts of Southeast Asia as well.[8]

Extra Efforts

For a period of time those reasons became the basis for American policies that supported Dutch interests in Indonesia. But soon such policies began to change. In the late 1940s the U.S. began to question its own support for the Dutch and its opposition to Indonesian independence. There were two reasons for this. One was the success of the Indonesian government in suppressing what was perceived as a "Communist rebellion" in Java. In September 1948 a Soviet-oriented Communist group was accused of launching a rebellion against the Indonesian central government in the city of Madiun, East Java.[9] President Sukarno and his government took immediate and firm actions against the uprising. By October of the same year the rebellion was suppressed. American officials were impressed.[10] The Indonesian government's success in suppressing the rebellion, in turn, made the Dutch no longer able to convince the U.S. and the international community that the Indonesian top leaders were leaning toward Communism.[11]

Another reason for the change was the Dutch military campaigns against Indonesia. In July through August 1947 and December 1948 the Dutch launched heavy military attacks (which they claimed as "police actions" while the Indonesians called them "aggressions") against the Indonesian government. By launching these attacks the Dutch ignored the United Nations' request to stop military operations in Indonesia and to pull out from the newly independent nation's capital as well as to release top Indonesian leaders, including Sukarno and Hatta, whom the Dutch had arrested. The American policy makers feared that a failure of the UN to show its authority to a minor power like the Netherlands might lead to the failure of this world organization as it had occurred to its predecessor, the League of Nations, as we have seen in the previous chapter.[12]

These two factors helped many U.S. policy makers reconsider their support for the Dutch, and become more sympathetic toward the Indonesians. They soon began to exert pressure on Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who

himself had been supportive of Dutch colonial interests. Unable to resist the pressure, Acheson agreed to the United States becoming a mediator in the UN-sponsored Dutch-Indonesian negotiations in the Hague Conference to discuss Indonesian independence. With the mediation of U.S. representative H. Merle Cochran[13] in December 1949, Indonesia and the Netherlands reached important agreements. The Netherlands recognized the independence of the Republic of Indonesia, but refused to acknowledge the inclusion of West Irian territory to the Republic, as claimed by the Indonesian government. The Dutch also demanded Indonesia pay a $1.13 billion "debt" to the Netherlands.[14] The Dutch refusal to recognize the inclusion of West Irian into Indonesia, as later developments would show, became "a thorn in the flesh" in the Dutch-Indonesian-American relations.

The relation between the U.S. and Indonesia following the Hague Conference was relatively good, but it did not last very long. It was soon damaged by America's first Ambassador to Indonesia, H. Merle Cochran, the same person who had represented the U.S. in the conference.[15] With the idea of advancing his career in the State Department, Cochran tried to persuade the Indonesian government to abandon its non-aligned foreign policy and to join the Western bloc by offering American economic assistance. Without prior adequate endorsement from the State Department he told the Indonesian officials in 1952 that according to the U.S. government such assistance required Indonesian alignment of its foreign policy with the West. Without knowing that the Ambassador's action lacked the support of the U.S. government, the Indonesian government agreed to sign the agreement. Shortly afterwards, however, it learned that there were other non-aligned nations (such as Burma and India) which received the same assistance but without any requirement of alignment to the West. Many Indonesians were irritated. An anti-American reaction soon exploded in many parts of the country. Consequently, the U.S. government needed extra efforts in order to restore Indonesian-American relations that had been greatly damaged by Cochran's action.[16]

Loss of China

Despite efforts to restore the damaged relation, American support for Indonesian independence and sovereignty in general began to decrease. In the early 1950s President Sukarno's policy of non-alignment or neutralism in international relations and his closer ties with the Soviet Bloc countries and his lack of policy regarding the growth of Communism in Indonesia worried many U.S. policy makers. Not surprisingly in the early days of President

Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration many U.S. foreign policy makers began to reconsider their support for Sukarno and the Indonesian government. The Eisenhower administration soon introduced policies of containment intended to halt the spread of communism in Indonesia. Due to the secret nature of the policies the President and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles relied heavily on the CIA which was then under the directorship of the Secretary's brother, Allen W. Dulles. The Agency soon became a vital instrument of presidential policies on Indonesia.[17] It received orders from the President, and was responsible only to him.[18] Audrey and George Kahin believe that "this was particularly true ... during the crucial period from mid-1957 to mid-1958, [when] the reporting of the American Embassy in Jakarta, as well as that of Foreign Service officers on the State Department's Indonesia desk was of distinctly marginal influence."[19]

It should be noted that the Eisenhower administration's Indonesia policies of this period were in line with American policies toward other Southeast Asia nations, such as Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. During this administration these countries became a battleground for the execution of widespread covert foreign policies. Secret but extensive militarized interventions often overshadowed overt official policies.[20] There was a "common denominator" which underlined this administration's approach to all these countries, and that was the assessment of the reasons for the "loss of China" to Communist control in 1949.[21]

Many in the Eisenhower administration believed that the loss of China could have been avoided had the Truman administration's view on Chinese affairs been more realistic. The Truman administration, they believed, had overemphasized the "territorial integrity" of China while that country was facing the threat of Communist forces. In 1949 China's territorial integrity was managed, they argued, but to the benefit of the Communists who eventually took over China. They also argued that the United States should have supported Chiang Kai-sek by concentrating its power in the most defensible territories. The less defensible ones should have been left to the Communists temporarily, in order to be recaptured later. In other words, they believed that instead of emphasizing Chinese territorial integrity, the U.S. should have allowed a temporary territorial breakup.[22]

It was partly this "lesson from the loss of China" which directed the Eisenhower administration's policies toward Indonesia in the 1950s, making it an arena of by far the most extensive—and up to the present the least known to the public—of its covert militarized interventions.[23] In the Eisenhower administration's view, it would be better to see Indonesia break up into several

political entities than to let it maintain its territorial integrity but fall into the hands of the Communists.

Declared Independence

In mid-1957 the administration was alarmed by the notion that the government of the Republic of Indonesia had certainly drifted to the left. Many in the administration (including President Eisenhower, the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and the director of the CIA Allen Dulles), worried that the Indonesian head of state Sukarno and the Army were throwing themselves into the embrace of the Communists. Sukarno's continuing insistence on the Indonesian foreign policy of non-alignment, and the growth of membership as well as influence of the Indonesian Communist Party (the PKI—Partai Komunis Indonesia) only added to the administration's anxiety.[24]

A year earlier, in mid-1956, a sense of dissatisfaction began to grow among the Indonesian Army officers, following several military transfers and appointments among the officers by the Army's Chief of Staff General Abdul Haris Nasution. A number of people in the officers' corps were upset by General Nasution's policies and demanded changes in the Army's power structure. In November, at the reunion of the SSKAD (the Army Staff and Command School) in Bandung, this dissatisfaction became evident. A number of participants in the reunion openly stated their criticism toward Nasution's policies. A month later, under the leadership of North Sumatra Commander Maludin Simbolon, several North Sumatran officers met and urged other regional military commanders to join them in freeing themselves from the central military command's control. On December 16, they went further by openly declaring their intention to free themselves from Indonesia's central government's authority. In order to show their solidarity in seeking independence, they "drank a toast and smashed their glasses to symbolize their break with the old ways."[25]

Throughout 1957 a series of negotiations were held between the dissident officers, the government, and the Indonesian Army but there was no significant agreement among the conflicting parties. On September 8, 1957, the dissidents issued a declaration called the "Palembang Charter," signed by three leaders of the rebellion, namely Lieutenant Colonel Barlian, Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Husein and Colonel H.N. Ventje Sumual. The charter proposed six major demands, and they were: "(1) the Sukarno-Hatta Dwitunggal [duumvirate] must be restored;[26] (2) the existing leadership of the Army must be replaced; (3) the regions must be given extensive autonomy; (4) a senate must be formed;

(5) there must be a general rejuvenation of the government and of the nation; and (6) 'internationally-oriented Communism' must be banned".[27]

On February 15, 1958 after their ultimatum to the government was rejected, members of the rebels' Revolutionary Council in Sumatra officially declared independence from the government of the Republic of Indonesia. They formed their own government with a multiparty, coalition cabinet.[28]

By the CIA

Many senior officials in the Eisenhower administration regarded the rebellion and the formation of a cabinet independent from the Indonesian central government an excellent opportunity to interfere with Indonesian politics. They hoped that by such an interference they would be able to change the country's inclination toward Communism to becoming an anti-Communist country which aligned itself with the Free World, particularly with the United States. In order to achieve these goals, they would first seek immediate policies "to eliminate the Communist Party, weaken the army's strength on Java, and drastically clip the wings of, if not fully remove, President Sukarno."[29]

Shortly after the rebellion began, therefore, the administration launched an operation to provide direct military assistance to the rebels, which at the same time had to be kept secret from the Indonesian central government as well as from the American public. In early March 1958, in an attempt to conceal the operation, Secretary John Foster Dulles told Congress regarding US policy toward Indonesia, "We are pursuing what I trust is a correct course from the point of international law." He continued, "*We are not intervening* in the internal affairs of this country."[30] On another occasion, however, he gave an indication of American true posture by saying that "Washington would be more pleased with a more constitutional government."[31]

A week later, in Sumatra leaders of the rebellion demanded more military assistance from the Eisenhower administration. They also sought recognition from the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, SEATO. Again, despite the plan to grant the rebels' demands, Dulles stated that the United States maintained its neutrality toward the rebels: "The U.S. views this trouble in Sumatra as an internal matter.... We try to be absolutely correct in our international proceedings and attitudes toward it."[32]

Despite the secrecy, however, there was a strong indication that President Sukarno knew about American involvement. On April 30, 1958 the President expressed his complaints, accusing the United States of supplying the rebellion's air force with bombers and pilots. Sukarno warned the Eisenhower

administration "not to play with fire in Indonesia."[33] He added: "If the outside world is thinking in terms of making Indonesia into a second Korea or a second Viet Nam, there will be World War III."[34]

In response to such warning, Eisenhower held a press conference the same day in Washington. Asked about Sukarno's charges against the administration the President replied, "Our policy is one of careful neutrality and proper deportment all the way through so as not to be taking sides where it is none of our business." He continued, "Now on the other hand, every rebellion that I have ever heard of has its *soldiers of fortune*... People were going out looking for a good fight and getting into it, sometimes in the hope of pay, and sometimes just for the heck of the thing. That is probably going to happen every time you have a rebellion."[35] In other words, Eisenhower wanted to state that his administration was not involved in the Indonesian rising, and that "boys would be boys" and no one could expect him to change human nature. The problem with such statement is, of course, that it was simply a lie.[36]

Instead of "soldiers of fortune" acting on their own, the Americans who carried out military attacks for the rebels against the Indonesian central government were agents with a special mission, which was to help overthrow the government. Instead of people who were "going out for a good fight," they were well-trained professionals acting at the direction of the Eisenhower administration.[37] They were part of the administration's major covert operation, directed to support the rebellious military officers and to topple Indonesia's central government.

In executing such a major operation, the administration relied heavily on the CIA and large supplies of modern military equipment, provided by the U.S. Seventh Fleet. It also relied on the assistance of foreign governments such as the governments of the Republic of China (Taiwan), the Republic of the Philippines, as well as support from the British and Australian governments.[38] In the operational level, the task was coordinated and carried out by the CIA.

A Failure

The CIA's Indonesia task in this operation, however, was not the first to undertake. Even several years before the rebellion began, the Agency had been involved in activities designed to undermine Indonesian government. The year of 1955 provided a significant example. In mid-April of that year President Sukarno was organizing an international conference of the newly independent Asian and African nations in the city of Bandung, Indonesia. In this so-called Bandung Conference the participating nations were planning to adopt

a doctrine of neutralism or non-alignment as the basis of the international relations of the underdeveloped nations of Asia and Africa, refusing to join either Eastern or Western Bloc. They considered themselves a "non-bloc" entity. In turn, the conference was also an answer to the formation of SEATO, a political-military alliance of Southeast Asian nations which was initiated by the U.S. in order to contain the spread of Communism in the region. To the Eisenhower administration's policy makers and the CIA, such a conference would be a "heresy" that should be eliminated. With the blessing of the administration, the CIA was considering a plan to carry out an assassination in order to sabotage the conference.[39]

This plan was kept secret until 1975, when a Senate Committee—which was initiated by Senator Frank Church and was assigned to investigate the CIA's covert activities—heard testimony regarding the agency's officers stationed in East Asian countries. According to that testimony these officers had suggested a plan to assassinate an "East Asian leader" in order to disrupt the conference in Bandung, which they called a "Communist Conference".[40] The Church Committee reported that it had received some evidence that regarding the plan to eliminate an East Asian leader the Agency was involved in a plan to assassinate President Sukarno. It also reported that the planning had proceeded to the point of identifying an agent whom it was believed might be recruited to carry out the assassination plan. The report stated,

> In addition to the plots discussed in the body of this report, the Committee received some evidence of CIA involvement in plans to assassinate President Sukarno of Indonesia.... Former Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell testified that the assassination of Sukarno had been "contemplated" by the CIA, but that planning had proceeded no further than identifying an "asset" whom it was believed might be recruited to kill Sukarno. Arms were supplied to dissident groups in Indonesia but, according to Bissel, those arms were not intended for assassination. (Bissel, 6/11/75. P. 89).[41]

According to the Committee, at the end "cooler heads prevailed at CIA headquarters in Washington and the suggestion was firmly rejected."[42] The Bandung Conference proceeded as it had been planned, and the doctrine of neutralism was adopted by the participants.

In a project to frustrate Sukarno's Indonesian Nationalist Party (the PNI) and the PKI the Agency donated a million-dollar fund to the Masjumi Party, a centrist coalition of Muslim organizations, during a national election

campaign of 1955. The CIA personnel in Indonesia had very strong reasons for giving such great financial support for Masjumi. "Our estimate of the situation in Indonesia on the eve of the 1955 elections," former CIA officer Joseph B. Smith argued, "was that the Masjumi was the counterforce the country needed to prevent the dangerous drift of Sukarno and his closest political associates toward a dictatorial government with strong PKI influence."[43] Regarding the fund donated to the Masjumi, Smith—who during this period was the deputy branch chief of CIA's Far Eastern division—stated that the project was unusual, because it "provided for complete write-off of the funds, that is, no demand for a detailed accounting of how the funds were spent was required. I could find no clue as to what the Masjumi did with the million dollars.'"[44] As it turned out, the project was a failure. "It didn't produce the winning votes," wrote Smith.[45]

Leave the Country

In May 17, 1956 President Sukarno made an impassioned speech before a joint session of the U.S. Congress. In his speech, which was published in full in the *New York Times* the following day, the President asked for more understanding of the problems and needs of developing nations like Indonesia. He emphasized his gratitude for American friendship and assistance. He said that "Indonesia is indeed grateful for the technical assistance she has received to date from America, and in acknowledging my gratitude I want to express myself with the frankness of a friend." He then added rhetorically, "Am I allowed to be frank, Mr. Speaker?"

At the same time, he reminded the audience that any assistance given by the United States should be given on the basis of mutual benefit. Sukarno stated that

> from whatever quarter of this divided globe that assistance comes we are determined that no material advantage will buy from us any part of our hard-won freedom, for that freedom is more dear to us that the products which any country can give or sell... We welcome assistance on term of mutual benefit. We reject the idea of exchanging intellectual and spiritual independence or physical liberty for momentary advantage.[46]

Not everybody in the U.S. was pleased with Sukarno's speech. Many were disappointed that Sukarno did not only criticize U.S. assistance to

Indonesia but also failed to mention Indonesia's willingness to curb the spread of Communism in the country. Frank Weisner, CIA's Deputy Director of Plans—who was in charge of covert operations—was one of those who were not happy with the speech—and with Sukarno in general. In November 1956 he clearly expressed his view about Sukarno when he said to Al Ulmer, the new Far East Division chief, "I think it's time we held Sukarno's feet to the fire."[47] Although no one knew the precise date when Weisner said these words, many in the Agency knew that the new chief of the Far Eastern Division took the words seriously. Joseph B. Smith wrote, "Al [Ulmer] made it plain to the officers of FE/5, the branch responsible for Indonesia, Malaya, and liaison with the Australian intelligence service, that if some plan for doing this were not forthcoming Santa might fill their stockings with assignments to far worse job." He added, "Thus began a year and a half of concentrated misadventure that ended with thousands of Indonesians dead ..."[48]

Soon Weisner's view was followed by CIA's decision to make it a reality by launching a more direct action in Indonesia. The rebellion in Sumatra, which among others was based on the concern of the growing communist influence of the Communists in the Indonesian central government, provided a justification.[49] In 1957, the Agency began a direct military operation in the country. This operation was of a certain scale, however, that necessitated significant assistance from the Pentagon. Such assistance could only be secured to a "political action mission" status only if approved by the National Security Council's "Special Group." William Blum, a former State Department staff, explains that this special group was "the small group of top NSC officials who acted in the president's name, to protect him and the country by evaluating proposed covert actions and making certain that the CIA did not go off the deep end; known at other times as the 5412 Committee, the 303 Committee, the 40 Committee, or the Operation Advisory Group."[50]

The way how the CIA sought the approval is a classic case of how influential the Agency was in determining U.S. foreign policy. Joseph Smith, who was in charge of the Agency's Indonesia desk in Washington from mid-1956 to early 1958, wrote his experience on this in his memoirs. According to him, instead of proposing the plan and let Eisenhower's policy makers make the decision the CIA officials, including Smith himself,

> began to feed the State and Defense departments intelligence that no one could deny was a useful contribution to understanding Indonesia. When they had read enough alarming reports, we planned to spring the suggestion we should support the colonels' plan to reduce

> Sukarno's power. This was a method of operation which became the basis of many of the political action adventures of the 1960s and 1970s. In other words, the statement is false that CIA undertook to intervene in the affairs like Chile *only after* being ordered to do so by ... the Special Group. ... In many instances, we made the action programs up ourselves after we had collected enough intelligence to make them appear required by the circumstances. Our activity in Indonesia in 1957-58 was one such instance. We also made a few special contributions to the technique of making a situation appear to require that CIA step in to correct it.[51]

In dealing with the Indonesian dissident colonels, Smith acknowledges, the CIA "had many problems." However, he continued, "none was greater than the one we created for ourselves." Smith and other CIA personnel, for instance, "had a terrible time articulating our objectives in contacting the colonels because we hid the fact [that] we were supporting their aspirations to form a separate state independent of Sukarno's government from higher authorities in Washington until we were certain we could win approval for this course of action."[52]

Smith's account confirms Audrey and George Kahin's contention on the matter. The Kahins contend that in their policies toward Indonesia, Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles heavily relied on "the credence they gave to the CIA's frequently tendentious and often badly flawed reporting—information and interpretations of it that accorded well with their known prejudices—rather than their relying on the generally more sober and reliable dispatches from their ambassadors to Jakarta and their staffs, including their military attaches."[53] In addition to the heavy reliance on the CIA reports, the President and the Secretary also relied on the reports and analysis of Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia (September 3, 1953-March 3, 1957) and Chairman of Inter-Departmental Task Force on Indonesia (1957-58), who had a personal animosity toward President Sukarno.[54]

In July 1957 the PKI did very well in local elections. This development worried the Eisenhower administration. In the 333rd meeting of the National Security Council (the NSC) on August 1, 1957 Under Secretary of State Christian A. Herter stated that he was "disturbed by the development in Indonesia," because "a democratic government in that country was out the window."[55] According to the memorandum of the meeting, Herter "felt it would be useful to have a JCS estimate of the importance of maintaining Java in the Free World." In the meeting the Under Secretary asked the probable

consequences of the separation of Sumatra and Java. Such estimate, according to Herter, "would be very helpful in enabling us to decide how much effort to devote to Indonesia in the future."[56]

The Under Secretary's concern about the situation in Indonesia was shared by other officials in the State Department, as it was obvious from the August 2, 1957 message of the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson to the Ambassador to Indonesia, John M. Allison. In the message Robertson expressed his concern over "a steadily deteriorating situation in Indonesia ... and the prospect that through inadequate action on our part Communists may soon be in a position to play a determinant role in the organized political life of that country." The Assistant Secretary felt that "the net effect of the course of action Sukarno is (deliberately or unwittingly) taking is to greatly bolster PKI."[57]

For the CIA, such concerns were another reason to convince the Eisenhower administration how serious the influence of Communism was in Indonesia. The American Ambassador to Indonesia, John M. Allison, however, proved to be a big "stumbling block." In the midst of concerns over Communist growing political influence in the country, Ambassador Allison suggested that the U.S. should deal with the Indonesian government in a more rational and cordial way. On December 30, 1957, for instance, in a long telegram to the State Department, Allison expressed his conviction that "despite sincere assertions of an 'active, independent foreign policy,' Indonesians turn naturally to America, and what they long for is not just technical or military assistance, but especially the warmth of human understanding." He continued, "Up to now America has not been tarred with same brush in Indonesian thinking, and Indonesians are hurt, disappointed and confused to see us apparently forsaking our own heritage and joining the imperial club which firmly but not very courageously [bolts] the door against the pariahs."[58]

Allison, who resumed his post on March 3, 1957 replacing Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., believed that "certain possible courses of action which might have been helpful had not been considered." He disagreed with those who said that President Sukarno was "beyond redemption." According to Allison, it was still possible to reduce the President's reliance on the Communists. As an Ambassador he believed that the U.S. "should have supported the efforts of the present Indonesian Government since ... the main influences in the Cabinet are non-Communist...." The Ambassador further suggested that the United States should extend its economic assistance and sell military equipment to the Indonesian government.[59]

Prior to the sending of the telegram Allison had also opposed the CIA's participation in dealing with the Indonesian situation. According to Joseph Smith, Allison

> did not think CIA operations contributed as much to the overall effort of the U.S. government abroad as we did. He wasn't too sure their contribution was worth the risk entailed in having CIA officers under embassy cover in contact with dissident rebel colonels. This was really the reason the chief of station had cautiously sought headquarters approval for the first contact with the colonels in the cable he sent in. He could then, if required, tell the ambassador that he had been ordered to do it by Washington.[60]

In dealing with the "stubborn" Ambassador Allison the CIA used the old technique the Agency had been familiar with. "The most efficient way to handle ambassadors who demand their rights as heads of U.S. missions abroad to be informed of CIA operational activities," Smith writes, "was to tell them plausible lies."[61] Clearly Ambassador Allison became a "problem" in the CIA's covert operation. He frequently raised "annoying questions" regarding the CIA's activities. Smith contends that he also often "made a point of writing Washington his explicit disagreement with our estimate of the situation as it progressed."[62]

The CIA officers were greatly disappointed with the Ambassador and began to set up a plan to get rid of the Allison problem. Apparently they did not find great difficulty in carrying out their plan. As Smith reports, "we handled this problem by getting Allen Dulles to have his brother relieve Allison of his post within a year of his arrival in Indonesia."[63] John Foster Dulles granted the demand promptly. On January 3, 1958 Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management Loy Henderson sent a cable to Ambassador Allison in Jakarta, asking him to leave Indonesia and move somewhere else. Henderson wrote,

> In response to your message to [Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S.] Robertson through [Director of Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs John Gordon] Mein, we would like to recommend to President your appointment as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia. It would be appreciated if you would advise immediately whether or not such appointment would be agreeable to you.[64]

Allison knew that the reason for his removal was because of some recommendations he suggested regarding U.S. policies in dealing with Indonesia at present. On January 6 he replied,

> Appreciate your message and have carefully considered offer you make. I assume from first sentence reference telegram that policy to be carried out in Indonesia lacks those elements which I told Mein I considered essential. If this is so, as I told Mein, it would be extremely difficult if not impossible for me to carry out such a policy and the government would not undoubtedly be better served if there were another Ambassador here. Mrs. Allison and I have seriously thought over whether I should accept Czechoslovakia post if offered. While neither of us is happy about it, we agree that as a career officer I should be willing to go where the Department desires.[65]

On January 28, 1958—less than a year being American Ambassador to Indonesia—John M. Allison had to leave the country. He was replaced by Howard P. Jones whose appointment "pleased" the CIA officers in Indonesia. Smith reports, "Jones was fully cut in on the operation and his selection pleased all our officers."[66]

Joined the Rebels

Another case showed an example how the CIA carried out its covert operation regarding the situation in Indonesia. On November 30, 1957 an assassination attempt was launched against Sukarno. As the President was leaving a school in the Cikini area of Jakarta, several hand grenades were thrown at him. He managed to escape, but 10 people were killed and 48 schoolchildren were wounded. Without knowing who were behind the assassination attempt, which latter known as "the Cikini Affair," the CIA agents quickly put the blame on the Communists. Allen Dulles himself was not certain about who were the responsible parties behind the affair. In the NSC meeting on December 5, Dulles expressed his doubt on the reports which stated that the Communist were behind the assassination attempt.[67] The Jakarta CIA officers, however, took their own course and soon began to blame the Communists. Smith explains why such a course was taken:

> I suggested we act fast, before our friends [the rebellious colonels] were blamed. Whether they were innocent or guilty we could try

> to find out later. So we quickly put out the story that the clumsy assassination attempt had been staged by the PKI at the suggestion of their Soviet contacts in order to make it appear that Sukarno's opponents were wild and desperate men.[68]

Later it was discovered that the culprits behind the assassination attempt were members of a Muslim group which had no association with the PKI or with the Agency.[69]

At the 350th meeting or the National Security Council on January 6, 1958 CIA Director Allen Dulles reported his view on the latest development in Indonesia. According to the memorandum of the meeting he stated that "the Indonesian Government had apparently decided to turn to the Soviet bloc for the purpose of acquiring arms, although the Government would also shop for arms in Western Europe." The countries from which the Indonesian Government tried to get arms, Dulles reported, were Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. He also reported that "the deteriorating economic situation in Java has led to further defections from the Central Government on the island of Borneo, as had occurred earlier in Sumatra and the Celebes."[70]

On February 6, at the NSC's 354th meeting, Allen Dulles said that "whatever happened, the outer islands would split off from Java," predicting that the breakup of the Republic of Indonesia was inevitable.[71] Four days later, February 10, the NSC 1788 approved the Special Report on Indonesia which among other notions suggested three approaches toward achieving U.S. objectives in Indonesia. The approaches suggested were:

a. Employ all feasible covert means to strengthen the determination, will and cohesion of the anti-Communist forces in the outer islands, particularly in Sumatra and Sulawesi, in order through their strength to affect favorably the situation in Java, and to provide a rallying point if the Communists should take over Java.
b. If the situation on Java continues to deteriorate, then move to more forthright means in pursuit of the course of action outlined in a.
c. Utilize such leverage as is available and may be built up by the anti-Communists forces in the outer islands to continue our efforts to try to unify and stimulate into action, singly or in unison, non- and anti-Communist elements on Java against the Communists.[72]

On the same day this report was approved, the rebellious colonels in Indonesia issued an ultimatum against the Indonesian central government as they had told the CIA they would. They demanded that Sukarno to give up his "unconstitutional actions" and return to his constitutional position. They also demanded some changes in the Government administration.[73] The rebels gave the central government five days to respond to the ultimatum's demands.

On February 13, after the NSC meeting of that day CIA Director Allen Dulles and Under Secretary Herter met with President Eisenhower and had a conversation about the Indonesian situation. Memorandum of this conversation reports that, "CAH [Under Secretary of State Christian A. Herter] told the Secretary that the President did not attend the NSC meeting this morning, but after the meeting CAH and Allen Dulles spoke with the President to bring him up-to-date on the covert side of the Indonesian matter." However, no record of the conversation between Eisenhower, Allen Dulles, and Herter has been found.[74]

The Indonesian central government firmly rejected the rebels' ultimatum. Instead of granting their demand, General Nasution dishonorably discharged the rebels' leader Colonel Ahmad Hussein from the Armed Forces along with his supporters, Col. Zulkifly Lubis, Col. Dahlan Djambek, and Col. Maludin Simbolon.[75] In Sumatra, on February 15, the dissident leaders responded by declaring an independent Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) and named Sjafruddin Prawiranegara Prime Minister of the new government.[76] *Time* magazine reported that 40,000 troops and civilians were present when Hussein proclaimed a "revolutionary government with full sovereignty over all Indonesia." At the same occasion, the magazine reported, the newly appointed Prime Minister Sjafruddin declared: "It is with deep sorrow and sadness that we are compelled to raise a banner against our own head of state. We have talked and talked. Now we must act."[77]

Allen Dulles was able to follow all the development in Indonesia closely, thanks to the CIA officers which kept him abreast of the situation. In the 357th meeting of the NSC on March 6, in which he predicted the split of the outer island from Java, Allen Dulles gave a comprehensive view on Indonesian situation. Regarding the source of information he referred to "the intelligence community."[78] Clearly what he referred to here is the CIA officers who were undertaking covert mission in Indonesia. Meanwhile, in its secret mission in Indonesia the CIA was greatly helped by U.S. military presence in the Southeast Asian region. The British also helped the Agency by providing operation headquarters in Singapore, which is very close to Sumatra. In the

Philippines the Agency had the advantage of using training bases, while in several places adjacent to the Indonesian borders it could use airstrips needed for transportation and bombing missions. The CIA recruited many Indonesians, Filipinos, Taiwanese and Americans to carry out the operation and provided them with arms and equipment.[79]

This operation in support of the Indonesian rebels was the Agency's most ambitious covert operation to date. It involved tens of thousands of manpower, trained, armed, and equipped by the U.S. Army. At sea the rebels were supported by U.S. Navy submarines which regularly patrolled the coast of Sumatra, the rebels' main stronghold. In the sky the U.S. Air Force provided an air transportation which helped the rebels by air-dropping them weapons and equipment. It should be noted, however, that all of the planes used in the operation, along with all the arms and equipment sent to the dissidents had to be "sanitized" in order to be able to deny any American involvement should they were captured by the Indonesian central government's forces.[80]

As early as the first months of the rebellion, CIA pilots began to help the rebels by providing planes and pilots to carry out bombing and strafing missions to the government's positions.[81] The pilots carried out the mission effectively. In May 1958, one of the pilots bombed and destroyed a British tanker *San Flaviano* which was anchored in the Indonesian port of Balikpapan, Kalimantan. An Indonesian corvette anchored nearby was also hit and destroyed. *Aquilla*, an Italian freighter, was bombed and sunk in Amboina harbor. In the same harbor a Greek ship, *Armonia*, was attacked and a Panamanian ship *Flying Lark* was hit with nine casualties dead. Although all of the planes used in the operations were unmarked, people in the operation area knew who were really in charge of the bombings. A survivor of the British tanker *San Flaviano* said, "You can't tell me an American wasn't at the controls."[82]

In order to strengthen the rebel force the Agency persuaded the Indonesian military attaché in Washington to join the dissidents. Smith writes that Ned, the name Smith gave to the CIA's chief of the Indonesia desk, was optimistic. The chief, according to Smith, "was pleased because it looked as though our efforts to defect Colonel Alex Kawilarang, the Indonesian military attaché in Washington, were being successful."[83] Kawilarang was regarded as "the man who could command the rebel troops better than any of the others."[84] In this defection business the Secretary of States had been given a special assignment. "Secretary Dulles," Smith writes, "had prepared a good cover statement for issue the next day." The following day the Secretary declared that the Kawilarang's defection was part of an "internal Indonesian problem,"

while added that "apparently Sukarno's guided democracy does not satisfy large segments of the population."[85] The colonel soon returned home and joined the rebels in Sulawesi.

Rough Estimate

The rebellion against Indonesia's central government apparently did not go very well. By April 1958 it was evident that, despite massive support from the CIA, the dissidents' attacks on the Indonesia's central government were ineffective.[86] Meanwhile, the government's forces were effectively crushing many of the rebels' positions. *Time* reported an example of how the government troops dealt with the rebel forces in the city of Padang, Sumatra:

> Government troops at dawn scrambled from transport into lifeboats and landing craft, surged onto the beaches north of Padang, the rebel nerve center. A spearhead of Indonesian marines had already pushed inland against light resistance. At the Padang airfield, eight miles north of town, government planes strafed gun positions while 200 paratroopers drifted down at the field's edge. Within twelve hours, the rebel defenders were in flight along the road to Bukittinggi, 58 miles away, and Padang was firmly in the control of Jaka[illegible]'s Colonel Ahmad Jani, who had learned his lessons well at the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kans.[87]

In an attempt to reverse the government's winning position in the conflict, the CIA helped the rebels by escalating the bombing and strafing missions in the Moluccas. Regarding these missions, President Sukarno, in his autobiography, claimed that in a single attack by the rebel forces hundreds of Indonesians were killed. Without mentioning a name of a specific country, the President also expressed his suspicion of the involvement of a "third party" in the rebels' military attacks. He stated,

> Often a third party intervenes to solve a conflict, but when they actually bombed us it was more than intervention. On a Sunday morning in April, 1958, rebel planes staged a bloody raid on the Christian island of Ambon and they scored a direct hit on a church. The building was demolished. Everyone in it was killed. They sank a Republican vessel in the harbor and all hands went down.

> In that single run there were 700 casualties. The list of dead was incalculable.[88]

Sukarno's suspicion of the third party's involvement became evident in the following month. On Sunday morning, May 18, while on a bombing run over Ambon, a CIA plane was shot down. The plane was shot only three days after a series of bombing over the same island which had killed a large number of people on their way to church on Ascension Thursday. Following the shooting down of the plane, the crewmen were captured. One of the crewmen was pilot Allen Lawrence Pope, a CIA agent.

A twenty-nine-year-old man from Perrine, Florida, Allen Pope was an ex-Air Force first lieutenant who won the D.F.C. in the Korean War. He had flown 55 night missions over Communist line in Korea for the U.S. Air Force. He also had spent two successful months flying through Communist-held territories in Vietnam on a CIA mission to drop supplies to the French at Dien Bien Phu.[89] In Ambon, he was not very lucky. Antiaircraft batteries hit his plane while he was carrying out his bombing mission. He jumped out of the plane on a white parachute, was driven by the wind, and was caught in a tall coconut tree, before he eventually fell to the ground with a broken hip. He was soon captured by Indonesian soldiers who saved him from the angry population who might have killed him.[90] In his confession he told the Amboina commander Col. Herman Pieters that the rebels had hired him to carry out bombings at $10,000 a month and that he "had flown most of the destructive missions over East Indonesia in which foreign and native shipping was sunk and damaged." In his confession Pope also told his captors that the reason for joining the rebels was because he believed Indonesia was "turning Communist."[91]

In reaction to the capture of Allen Pope, Ambassador Jones followed Eisenhower's lead. He dismissed Pope as "the kind of man generally characterized as a 'soldier of fortune'... who sought danger and adventure wherever he could find it."[92] President Sukarno was irritated by Jones's statement. To the Ambassador he said,

> The fact that your government is trying to pass him [Pope] off as a "Soldier of Fortune" is a ridiculous story... It's childish. It is well known that America, Taiwan, and Britain are actively supporting the rebellion. I submit he is employed by the CIA. Draw a circle around my country and include airfields within refueling distance which can land and supply those planes that are dropping weapons to the rebels.

> You will find there are not many. These are either British airstrips in Singapore or the American field in the Philippines... Suppose Pope's jumping-off place is owned by either Britain or America, would I then not have reason to be angry and curse the imperialist powers who are trying to subvert my country?[93]

But as late as May 9, 1958 the *New York Times* still tried to help the administration in denying any American involvement in the rebellion. It stated:

> It is unfortunate that high officials of the Indonesian Government have given further circulation to the false report that the United States Government has been made plain, again and again. Our Secretary of State was emphatic in his declaration that this country would not deviate from a current neutrality... the United States is not ready ... to step in to help overthrow a constituted government. Those are the hard facts. Jakarta does not help its case, here by ignoring them.[94]

Regardless of the "hard facts" the *Times* tried to offer, the reality was different. On May 27, realizing that a captured American military personnel could become a world commodity while he remained alive, the Indonesian government called a news conference in which Allen Pope as his official documents were presented to the world to see. Pope was not a stupid man. When he was captured, the pilot carried "a set of incriminating documents, including those which established him as a pilot for the US Air Force and the CIA airline CAT [Civic Air Transport]." Before carrying out the bombing mission pilot Pope and his plane had been had been "sanitized" in order to obscure his identity. Pope, however, had secretly smuggled and brought his official documents with him, because he knew that without any such documents he might be captured by the enemy as a "stateless person," and therefore could be executed without necessary legal procedure.[95] The revelation of Pope and his document in the press conference, in turn, contradicted previous statements which had been presented by American press and high U.S. officials, including President Eisenhower's declaration of American "neutrality" with respect to the Indonesian uprising.[96]

The capture of Allen Pope was a very important public revelation for all sides in the rebellion, showing that the U.S. had greatly and directly supported the dissidents against the constituted central government of Indonesia. As the Pope case also indicated, the support was doomed to fail. By mid-May 1958

American Embassy in Jakarta suggested that the administration reconsider its support to the dissidents. On May 17, 1958 Jones wrote to Secretary Dulles,

> Let me reemphasize that there are no views that I know of in this community—American, British, Australian or anti-Communist Indonesia—in disagreement with idea that it is time for America to make strong positive gesture of support for GOI [Government of Indonesia]. My own view is that this can best come in public expression by Secretary, but it should be accompanied by real effort to discourage additional support for rebels and particularly bombing which has roused antagonism of even those elements sympathetic rebel objectives.[97]

Among the CIA officials, the rebels' failure along with the capture and exposure of Pope necessitated them to realize that "the light was no longer worth the candle." These officials and other Eisenhower administration policymakers began to reconsider their support to the Indonesian dissidents.[98] On May 27, 1958 Secretary of State Dulles met with officials from the Netherlands Embassy and Assistance Secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs Walter S. Robertson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Fred W. Jandrey, and Deputy Director of Office of Western European Affairs Turner C. Cameron. In this meeting Dulles explained the background of American efforts in encouraging and influencing Indonesian military and civil leaders to take steps to reverse the Communist orientation of Indonesia. Dulles, according to the memorandum of the meeting, also explained that the U.S. had first tried to encourage the rebel movements in Sumatra and in the Celebes. He then said that American efforts "would make an epic story." Unfortunately, he continued, these rebel movements had apparently spent themselves. The "epic story" never became reality. "Arms supplied to the rebels," the memorandum continued, "had been lost and the Indonesian Government, in fact, now holds an American. [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified.*]"[99] By the end of June 1958, Indonesian army troops loyal to Sukarno had effectively crushed the dissident military revolt, particularly in Sumatra.[100]

After the crushing of the rebellion in Sumatra, the dissidents tried to continue their struggle in Celebes and the Moluccas. The government forces, however, began to crush them there as well. In May 1958 the North Celebes rebel leader Colonel Sumual gave an indication of surrender to the government when he broadcasted that he was willing to "negotiate a settlement of the

revolt."[101] But President Sukarno's response was firm. He refused to negotiate with the rebels and ordered the attack on them continued. *Time*, showing how the Indonesian Army loyal to Sukarno and Nasution effectively attacked the rebels' positions, reported that "Morotai, scene of a U.S. amphibious assault in World War II's South Pacific island-hopping campaign was captured; Gorontalo in the Celebes was seized; government planes made five bombing raids on the rebel capital of Menado without suffering any loss."[102] Such development, in addition to the exposure of Pope's connection with the CIA, strongly forced the Agency officers in Indonesia to admit that their covert paramilitary action in Indonesia had been a debacle and that they had to abandon the enterprise. R[illegible]Cline, a former CIA's Deputy Director, excellently summarized the CIA's debacle in Indonesia:

> The weak point in covert paramilitary action is that a single misfortune that reveals CIA's connection makes it necessary for the United States either to abandon the cause completely or convert to a policy of overt military intervention. Because such paramilitary operations are generally kept secret for political reasons, when CIA's cover is blown the usual U.S. response is to withdraw, leaving behind the friendly elements who had entrusted their lives to the U.S. enterprise.[103]

Initially, the Agency had been sending massive support to the Indonesian dissident colonels. But shortly after the involvement was revealed following the capture of Allen Pope along with the rebels' inability to perform successful uprising against the government, the Agency began to withdraw, leaving the rebels on their own. In mid-1958, when the remaining dissidents in the Celebes under Colonel Joop Warouw asked the CIA for continued help, Allen Dulles' response through the CIA agents in the island was clear and simple: "Tell Colonel Warouw that we must disengage."[104]

Despite the CIA's disengagement, the rebels were able to continue their activities for a while, but, as Kawilarang said in an interview years later, "by 1960 the forces of the rebels were very badly disunited. They had incorporated many robber gangs and these groups asserted much independence. The country was ruined by the fighting each other. Almost every battalion was on its own, many of them fighting each other."[105]

By the end of the rebellion, many Indonesian had suffered and died as casualties. Regarding the total number of the casualties, particularly among the civilians, it is not easy to find reliable figures. Figures given by General

Nasution in his book *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas* (1985), however, provide a rough estimate on the number of Indonesians who lost their lives in the late 1950s uprising. Nasution gave a total of 10,150 on the side of the Indonesian central government. Among these, 2,499 of them were soldiers, 965 were members of the PKI-controlled Pemuda Rakyat (People's Youth) organization, 274 police, and 5,592 civilians. Nasution did not give numbers of casualties from the Navy—in which loss of life was high—and the Air Force. Regarding the figures of the dead among the dissidents Nasution gave a total number of 22,174 rebels killed. He did not provide the civilian casualties among on the rebels' side.[106]

Human and Natural Resources

The success of the Indonesian central government in suppressing the large part of the rebellion, and the failure of the rebels to defend themselves—let alone to take the offensive—also sent a strong message to the United States that the policies supporting the dissidents needed reconsideration. As Audrey and George Kahin write, "by mid-1958 the Eisenhower administration had been forced to acknowledge that its Indonesian intervention had failed; it then decided to cut its losses, concluding that the wisest course was now to make concessions to and try to get along as best it should with the government it had just been trying to overthrow."[107] In other words, a drastic shift of policy was needed. In the State Department meeting of May 27 Secretary Dulles indicated such a shift of policy. "When the movement in the Celebes appeared to be following a pattern similar to that of the Sumatran rebellion," he told those present in the meeting, "it was decided that the moment had come when we should try to influence Indonesian military and civil leaders."[108] The Eisenhower administration soon began to reduce its support for the Indonesian dissidents and, shifting the course of the Indonesia policies, resumed efforts to support the Indonesian central government.

This shift occurred when the administration's officials began to rely more on the information supplied by American Embassy in Jakarta than on the intelligence reports supplied by the CIA and ex-Ambassador Cumming's interagency task force. This time the administration gradually realized that the Indonesian Army was in fact *fundamentally anti-Communist* and was "a potent and reliable ally in opposing the increase of Communist strength in Indonesia."[109] A telegram of June 6, 1958 from the American Embassy in Jakarta suggested that the United States "expedite subsequent action list of items in $ 7 million arm package."[110] This suggestion was in line with that of

Mukarto Nodowidigdo, the Indonesian Ambassador to the U.S., which stated that "U.S. assistance in constructing barracks for Armed Forces would be important step in strengthening [the] pro-U.S. orientation [of the] Indonesian Army."[111]

In response to the suggestion U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor demanded that military assistance to the Indonesian Army should be sent immediately. He stated that "it is important to give General Nasution material support right away." He also suggested that "it might be desirable to get Presidential approval for the $7 million package in assistance and we would then be in a position to move rapidly if the situation required it."[112]

Thus began U.S. policies of supporting the Indonesian Army. Such policies continued through 1960 and after.[113] NSC 6023 gives an example of major policy guidance to be applied in Indonesia in the 1960s. The first instruction given by the NSC statement was that the U.S. should

> employ all feasible means, including, in accordance with constitutional processes, the use of U.S. armed forces if necessary and appropriate to prevent Indonesia or vital parts thereof from failing under Communist control by overt armed attacked, subversion, economic domination, or other means; concerting action with other nations as appropriate.[114]

Regarding the Indonesian central government and the dissidents, the policy guides recommend the U.S. to "encourage relation between the rebels and the central political and military leaders, as well as between political parties, in order to stimulate the development of a more effective non-Communist political force."[115]

In addition to it the NSC statement also recommended the U.S. to "maintain and strengthen existing U.S. ties with the Indonesian police and military establishment; and increase their capability to maintain internal security and combat Communist activity in Indonesia by providing appropriate arms, equipment, and training, on a limited but continuing basis." The policy guides were clear regarding the effort to stop external Communist influence. "To the maximum extent practicable," the guides stated, "U.S. training of personnel of the Indonesian armed forces should be expanded and efforts made to curtail Sino-Soviet Bloc training programs."[116]

There were two main objectives which the U.S. policymakers wanted to achieve in the policies toward Indonesia in this period. *First*, the short-range objective, was the "prevention of Communist control of Indonesia,

or vital parts thereof by overt attack, subversion, economic domination, or other means." *Second*, the long-range objective, was "the establishment of a politically stable, economically viable nation, friendly to the Free World, with the will and ability to resist Communism from within and from without, and the denial of its human and natural resources and strategic positions to the Sino-Soviet Bloc."[117]

Debacle

Clearly, U.S. policy toward Indonesia in the second half of the 1950s was a major one. It involved not only President Eisenhower and top officials of the State Department, but also American military force and the military forces of several other countries. In its operational level, the CIA played a central role. The Agency directly interfered with the U.S. mission and with the political development in Indonesia. Moreover, it provided direct military support to the Indonesian rebels. At the end, however, the policy failed. Despite American massive support to the rebels and loss of lives of several thousand Indonesians, the Eisenhower administration did not succeed in helping the rebels in their violent attempt to change the political direction of Indonesia's central government. As the Kahins wrote, compared to the 1961 Bay of Pigs affairs, "the intervention in Indonesia was by far the most destructive in human terms, had a heavier and more lasting political impact, and, with respect to U.S. objectives, was the most counterproductive."[118] The "epic story" Secretary Dulles wanted to create with the help of his "soldiers of fortunes" never became reality.

The failure in the making of the epic story, despite its high human cost, indicated the inability of the administration to understand the real situation of Indonesia. This inability was largely due to the administration's heavy reliance on information supplied by the CIA rather than on reports and analysis provided by the U.S. Embassy personnel in Jakarta. The fact that the director of the CIA during this period was the brother of the Secretary of State helped enhance the CIA in strongly influencing the policymaking process in the administration. The removal of Ambassador John Allison from Jakarta and his replacement by Howard Jones was an example on this.[119]

The heavy reliance on intelligence information provided by the CIA, in turn, caused the administration to miscalculate and underestimate the strength of the Indonesian central government under the leadership of President Sukarno and that of the Indonesian Army under General Nasution. Such reliance also helped the administration overestimate the political influence

and growth of the PKI as well as that of the Sino-Soviet bloc in Indonesia. Moreover, inadequate information and analysis given by the Agency officers in Indonesia was an element in the failure of Eisenhower's policymakers to assess the actual strength of civilian support to the rebellious colonels enjoyed in their revolt against the central government. All these failures led to the debacle of the Eisenhower administration's interventionist policy toward Indonesia.[120]

Held Accountable

In retrospect, the U.S. policy toward Indonesia in the second half of the 1950s could be seen as a miniature of U.S. policies toward that country in the period of 1945-1960 in general. There were at least two parallel features. One, the policies were greatly determined by fear of Communist expansion and the idea of containment policy, and the other, the policies were mostly covert.

As it was in the late 1950s, American policies toward Indonesia in the period of 1945-1960 were greatly determined by the concern over the spread of Communism. When the U.S. changed its anti-colonial attitude into supporting the Netherlands in the attempt to resume its colonial control over Indonesia, the American primary motive was to keep the Dutch power in the area, in order to contain the spread of Communism in the country and to check any possible intervention of the Communist Sino-Soviet bloc.

The American fear of internal spread of communism was enhanced by the notion from the Dutch that the Indonesian top leaders were leaning toward Communism. The determination and success of the Indonesian government to suppress the Communist "rebellion" in Madiun in 1948 demonstrate that such a notion was wrong. The United States then resumed its support for the Indonesian government. This support, however, soon decreased, when in the mid-1950s American policymakers began to worry about the growth of the Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI, and the lack of government's willingness to halt it. The U.S. worried that the Indonesian government had "drifted to the left." What followed was the Eisenhower administration's operation to covertly support the Indonesian rebels against the central government.

In applying its policies toward Indonesia in the period of 1945-1960 the U.S. moved from an overt to a covert *modus operandi*. In the early years of the Indonesian independence the U.S. dealt with the Indonesian affairs mostly in the open, such as by the willingness to mediate the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations at The Hague Conference. In the later developments, however,

the U.S. began to take covert measures in dealing with Indonesia. The U.S. intention to secretly frustrate the Bandung Conference of 1955 was an example.

This was soon followed by other policies which were hidden from the Indonesian government, and in many cases even from American Embassy in Jakarta. Furthermore, the policies were also kept secret from the American public scrutiny. The fact that there was not a single American life lost during the execution of the covert policies in Indonesia has greatly helped American government keep its policies hidden from the American public—although for thousands of Indonesians who lost their family members or friends during the policy implementation there was no secret at all.[121]

Particularly during the Eisenhower administration, the covert nature of the American policies toward Indonesia required a great reliance on the Central Intelligence Agency. President Eisenhower and many in his administration liked to work with the CIA because of the Agency's ability to provide secrecy in the planning and execution of covert policies. Secrecy helped them primarily in concealing their actions from the American public and U.S. Congress.[122] Secrecy was needed particularly to save face for those who were involved, should the covert policy fail—as in the case of the covert action in supporting the rebellious colonels.[123]

This secrecy system, in turn, helped explain why despite the major scale of American involvement in Indonesia during the Eisenhower administration, none of the State Department officials or CIA officers, let alone the President, were ever held accountable for the involvement and the tragic failure of the administration's covert actions.[124]

Epilogue: Mass Murder

Unfortunately, the story of U.S. covert action programs in Indonesia under the influence of the CIA did not end in 1960 with the switch of U.S. policy from supporting the rebellious colonels to supporting the Indonesian Army and central government. In the early 1960s American support for the Indonesian Army was escalated and directed toward the effort to eliminate the Indonesian Communist Party, to greatly limit President Sukarno's power, and to change the direction of the Indonesian government into a-pro U.S. one.

During this period, with Sukarno stood as balancing power the middle, tension was building up between the PKI and the Indonesian Army. The tension reached its climax in the *"putsch"* of October 1, 1965 in which six top Indonesian generals were kidnapped and murdered. The Indonesian Army immediately declared the Communists as the culprits responsible for

the *putsch*. In mid-October, along with large population of Central Java, East Java, and Bali, the Army began mass murder of the alleged PKI members in which about 500,000 people were killed. The CIA had provided the Army with lists of thousands of "Communists" which later were mostly summarily executed.[125] Some 1.4 million of other alleged Communists were put in jail for years after the uprising. A military, pro-U.S. government was soon established following the aftermath of the 1965 tragedy.

Notes:

1 See U.S. Government, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter FRUS), vol. VIII, 1946, Far East. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 787-859. Audrey Kahin and George McT. Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia*. (New k: The New Press, 1995), p. 29.

2 U.S. Government, *FRUS*, Vol. VI, 1947, The Far East (Washington" Government Printing Office, 1972), Doc. 856E.00/4-1747, p. 917.

3 Kahin and Kahin, p. 29.

4 Kahin and Kahin, p. 29; *FRUS*, Vol. VI, Doc. 565.56D31/3-1247, pp. 904-905. Smith, p. 212.

5 in and Kahin, pp. 29-30.

6 Stanley K. Hornbeck, "The United States and the Netherlands East Indies," *Annals of the ican Academy of Political and Social Science,* 255 (January 1948): pp. 124-25, as quoted in Robert J. McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945-49.* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 19.

7 Kahin and Kahin, p. 30.

8 Kahin and Kahin, p. 31.

9 U.S. Government, *FRUS*, Vol. VI, 1948, "The Far East And Australasia" (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 353-58.

10 McMahon, pp. 242-43.

11 Kahin and Kahin, p. 31.

12 *FRUS* Vol. VI, 1948, Doc. 586d.00/12-1348, p. 551. Kahin and Kahin, 31.

13 Cochran, a career Foreign Service officer, was widely known as a Dutch sympathizer. McMahon, pp. 233-234.

14 Kahin and Kahin, pp. 33, 36.

15 Cochran served as American Ambassador to Indonesia from December 1949 to February 1953.

16 Kahin and Kahin, p. 34.

17 Example of an extensive observation of the CIA on the current Indonesia's situation was ssed in the January 31, 1958 memorandum written by Director Allen Dulles. See U.S. Government, *Foreign Relation of the United States*, Vol. XVII, 1958-1960, Indonesia (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994), Doc. 10-11, pp. 16-24.

18 For many years now historians have been debated the issue on whether it was Eisenhower or his Secretary, John Foster Dulles, who was most responsible for the shaping of the Eisenhower ad tration's foreign policy. Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower's biographer, wrote that "the truth was that Eisenhower, not Dulles, made the policy, as anyone w ew anything about their inner workings of the Eisenhower Administration realized." Stephen Ambrose, *Eisenhower,* vol. 2, *The President.* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 442. Other writers such as William Blum and Joseph B. Smith, who were both former Eisenhower

administration's staff members in foreign policy, demonstrate that it was the CIA who ...ped the administration's foreign policies (particularly in policies toward Indonesia). See William Blum, *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Intervention ...ce World War II.* (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995. First edition: 1986); Joseph B. Smith, *Portrait of a ... Warrior.* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1976).

19 Kahin and Kahin, 6.

20 Kahin and Kahin, p. 8.

21 Kahin and Kahin, p. 9.

22 Kahin and Kahin, p. 9.

23 Kahin and Kahin,p. 10.

24 Kahin and Kahin, p. 16.

25 R.Z. Leirissa, *PRRI Permesta* (Jakarta: Grafiti, 1991), p. 30; A.H. Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tug... 4: Masa Pancaroba Kedua* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1984), p. 63; and John Smail, "Military Politics of North Sumatra: December 1956-October 1957," *Indonesia* 6 (Oct. 1968): p. 140, as quoted in Kahin and Kahin, p. 57.

26 In December 1956 Hatta, who had been Indonesia's Vice President since the country's independence, resigned due to political disagreements with President Sukarno. The rebels demanded Hatta's return to the position.

27 See Penerangan Angkatan Dara... *ini Tabir dapat Dibuka* ([Jakarta?]: Kementerian Penerangan RI, 1958, p. 30; Daniel Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959* (Ithaca, New York: Monograph Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, 1966), pp. 36-37. See also Kahin and Kahin, p. 72.

28 *Time*, February 24, 1958, pp. 27-28.

29 ...n and Kahin, p. 17.

30 David Wise and Thomas Ross. *The Invisible Government*. (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 140. Emphasis added.

31 *Time*, March 10, 1958, p. 22.

32 Ambrose, pp. 249-50.

33 Kahin and Kahin, p. 186.

34 *Time*, May 12, 1958, p. 33.

35 Ambrose, p. 250, *Time*, May 12, 1958, p. 33. Victor Marchetti and John Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence,* (New York: Knopf, 1964), p. 26. Emphasis added.

36 Wise and Ross, *Invisible Government,* p.137. Ambrose, p. 250.

37 Ambrose, p. 250.

38 Kahin and Kahin, 17. See also *FRUS*, Vol. XVII, Doc. 101, p. 182, Doc. 145, p. 264, Doc. 37, p. 66, Doc. 51, pp. 91-92. *Time*, June 2, 1958, p. 27.

39 ...um, p. 99.

40 *Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Military Intelligence,* Book 4, Final Report of The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operation with Respect to Intelligence ...tivities (U.S. Senate), April 1976 as quoted in Blum, p. 99.

41 *Interim Report: Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders,* The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (U.S. Senate) November 20, 1975, p. 4 note, as quoted in Blum, p. 100. See Kahin and Kahin, p. 114. The Kahins suggest that numbers between the brackets indicate the still-classified record of Bissell's testimony.

42 Blum, p. 99.

43 Smith, p. 214.

44 Smith, pp. 210-211.

45 Smith, p. 211. When the CIA officers in Jakarta learned that Sukarno began receiving military assistance from the Soviet Union, they began to set up an opera[283]plan similar to the plan which the Agency had used in dealing Mohammad Mussadegh of Iran in 1953 and Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala in 1954. The operation plan, which was "almost identical" with the plan to overthrow Arbenz, PBSUCCESS, was checked over and approved by President Eisenhower. Ambrose, *Ike Spies,* pp. 222-223, 250.

46 The *New York Times*, May 1[226]6, pp. 1, 4.

47 Smith, p. 205. Blum, p. 99, John Ranelagh. *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), p. 334; Kahin and Kahin, p. 85.

48 Smith, p. 205.

49 Blum, p. 100.

50 Blum, p. 101.

51 Smith, p. 229. Emphasis original.

52 Smith, p. 225.

53 Kahin and Kahin, p. 17.

54 Kahin and Kahin, p. 82. See U.S. Government, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Vol. XXII, Southeast Asia, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1989), Doc. 207, p. 350.

55 [138]S, Vol. XXII, Doc. 240, p. 400.

56 *FRUS,* Vol. XXII, p. 400.

57 *FRUS,* Vol. XXII,Doc. 241, pp. 402-403.

58 Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/12-3057. See "Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of States," Jakarta, December 30, 1957, FRUS, Vol. XVII, D[201]41, p. 577.

59 "Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Secretary of State Dulles," January 2, 1958. *FRUS,* Vol. XVII, Doc.1, p. 3.

60 Smith, p. 229.

61 Smith, p. 230.

62 Smith, pp. 230, 240.

63 Smith, p. 230.

64 *FRUS,* Vol. XVII, Doc. 4, p. 10.

65 Department of State, Central Files, 123 Allison, John Monroe. See "Editorial Note," *FRUS,* Vol. XVII, 1958-1960, Doc. 4, p. 10.

66 Smith, p. 246.

67 *FRUS*, Vol. XXII, Doc. 306, p. 526.

68 Smith, p. 243.

69 Smith, p. 243.

70 Whitman File, NSC Records, Eisenhower Library. *FRUS,* Vol. XVII, Doc. 5, p. 11.

71 *FRUS*, Vol. XVII, Doc. 13, p. 27.

72 "U.S. Policy towards Indonesia," *FRUS,* Vol. XVII, Doc. 15, pp. 31-34.

73 Kahin and Kahin, p. 139.

74 [262]S, Vol. XVII, Doc, 18, p. 38.

75 Stephen Ambrose, *Ike Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1981), p. 249.

76 *FRUS,* Vol. XVII, Doc, 18, p. 38.

77 *Time*, February 24, 1958, pp. 27-28.

78 *FRUS,* Vol. XVII, Doc. 30, p. 54.

79 Blum, p. 102.

80 Blum, p. 102. "Telegram From the Chief of Naval Operation (Burke) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump) December 7, 1957," FRUS, Vol. XXII, Doc. 312, p. 533.

81 Blum, p. 103.
82 *Time*, May 12, 1958, p. 33.
83 Smith, p. 246.
84 Smith, p. 246.
85 Smith,. 246. See also *FRUS,* Vol. XVII, Doc. 59, p. 105. Blum, p. 103.
86 Blum, p. 103.
87 April 28, 1958, p. 32.
88 Sukarno, *An Autobiography As Told to Cindy Adams*. (New York: The Bobbs-Merill Company, Inc., 1965), pp. 268-269.
89 Blum, p. 103.
90 Howard P. Jones. *Indonesia: The Possible Dream.* (Singapore: Mas Aju PTE, LTD, 1973), p. 129. The writer of this book is the same person who served as U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia from March, 1958 to April 1965. FRUS, Vol. XVII, "Memorandum of Conversation," Doc. 103, p. 187. See also the footnotes of the memorandum.
91 *Time*, May 12, 1958 p. 33, and June 9, 1958, pp. 31-32.
92 Jones, p. 129.
93 Sukarno, p. 269.
94 The *New York Times*, May 9, 1958.
95 Blum, p. 103.
96 Blum, p. 103. Regarding the military operation and the Pope affair, see Wise and Ross, 145-46; Christopher Robins, *Air America* (US, 1979), pp. 88-94. Col. L. Fletcher Prouty, US Air Force, Ret., *The Secret Team: The CIA and Its Allies in Control of the World* (New York: 1974), 55, 308, 363-66; *New York Times*, May 9, 1958, p. 9; Sukarno, pp. 269-71.
97 Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, *FRUS,* Vol. XVII, Doc. 101, p. 184.
98 Blum, p. 103.
99 *FRUS*, Vol. XVII, Doc. 116, p. 211.
100 Blum, p. 103.
101 *Time*, June 2, 1958, p. 27.
102 *Time*, June 958, pp. 27-28.
103 Ray Cline. *Secrets, Spies, and Soldiers.* (New York: Acropolis Boo 976), p. 182 as quoted in Ambrose, *Ike's Spies,* p. 251. A Harvard graduate, Cline was an OSS officer, author of CIA's national Intelligence Estimates, and eventually Deputy Director of the CIA. Ambrose, *Ike's Spies*, p. 236.
104 Smith, p. 247.
105 The Kahins' interview with Kawilarang, Jakarta May 26, 1971 as quoted in Kahin and Kahin, p. 213.
106 Nasution, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas* Vol. 4, p. 383, as referred to in Kahin and Kahin, p. 305.
107 Kahin and Kahin, p. 18.
108 *FRUS,* Vol. XVII, Doc. 116, p. 211.
109 Kahin and Kahin, p. 18; *FRUS,* Vol. XVII, pp. 213-315.
110 *FRUS,* Vol. XVII, Doc. 18, p. 216.
111 *FRUS,* Vol. XVII, Doc. 119, p. 217.
112 *FRUS,* Vol. XV c. 127, p. 230.
113 See NSC 5901, *FRUS,* Vol. XVII, c. 177, pp. 334-344.
114 See *FRUS,* Vol. XVII, pp. 571-583, NSC 6023: "Draft Statement of U.S. Policy on Indonesia," December 19, 1960, D . 293, p. 581.
115 See *FRUS,* Vol. XVII, NSC 6023: "Draft Statement of U.S. Policy on Indonesia," December 19, 1960, Doc. 293, p. 582.

116 See *FRUS,* Vol. XVII, pp. 571-583: NSC 6023: "Draft Statement of U.S. Policy on Indonesia," December 19, 1960, Doc. 293, p. 582.

117 *FRUS,* Vol. XVII, Doc. 293, p. 581.

118 Kahin and Kahin, p. 3.

119 Kahin and Kahin, p. 17.

120 Regarding this failure the Kahins wrote that from" the unfolding of events in Indonesia and the United States that brought about this interventionist American policy, with its impact on the lives of Indonesians and on their country's immediate and long-term political development, it should be evident what an abysmal failure this essentially covert operation was and why the American government has been so reluctant to release the most important documents that bear on it." Kahin and Kahin, p. 18.

121 Kahin and Kahin, p. 19.

122 Kahin and Kahin, p. 7.

123 Kahin and Kahin,18.

124 It is interesting but at the same time disturbing to note that in Eisenhower's memoirs, *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961* there was no single mention of the Indonesian col s' rebellion against the central government, let alone his involvement in it. Dwight E. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961* (Garden City, New York: Dou y & Company, Inc., 1965).

125 See Ralph McGehee, "The CIA and the White Paper on El Salvador," *The Nation,* April 11, pp. 423-425; Ralph McGehee, "The Indonesia File," *The Nation,* Septembr 24, 1990. Kathy Kadane, "US Officials' Lists Aided Indonesian Bloodbath in '60s," *The Washington Post,* May 21, 1990. Chris Peacock, "Indonesia: Years of Living Dangerously," *Utne Reader*, January-February 1991, pp. 38-39.

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January 1, 8, 15, 22, 29, 1750; February 5, 12, 19, 26, 1750; March 5, 12, 19, 26, 1750; April 2, 9, 16, 23, 30, 1750; May 7, 1750.

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The author (fourth from left) with friends at the conference on the 1965 Tragedy, Frankfurt, Germany, November 2016.
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